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A set of parties want to compute a functionF over their inputs without revealing them, learning only the
output of F . This is the traditional scenario introduced to show what secure Multi-Party Computation
(MPC) can achieve: computing on encrypted data. Due to the initial theoretical papers appearing in
the beginning of 80s describing basic protocols to achieve MPC, it has now become a hot topic in the
cryptographic community where we can see dozens of startups finding good use-cases such as machine
learning on encrypted data as well as high quality research constantly pushing the field’s boundaries.
The goal of this thesis is to improve on dishonest majority MPC where all but one of the parties
can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol and still ensure input privacy of the honest parties.
Many modern MPC protocols are realized in two stages: an input-independent but usually expen-
sive preprocessing phase coupled with an input-dependent stage called online phase. The first contri-
bution of this thesis is to revisit two popular protocols (SPDZ and BDOZ) based on Homomorphic
Encryption (HE), and show that, with some improvements, the HE based protocols can perform better
than the state-of-the-art preprocessing based on oblivious transfer.
The second contribution of the thesis is to improve upon the TinyTable protocol which evaluates
lookup tables on secret data. We then evaluate more complex algorithms such as AES using the lookup
table approach within SPDZ framework, and make them competitive with their Boolean counterpart
based on garbled circuits for dishonest majority.
Next we build more efficient Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) protocols which have an efficient
description when evaluated over an arithmetic circuit instead of binary circuits where AES shines. The
resulted PRFs are then used to perform more efficient authenticated encryption using SPDZ protocol.
These two applications are crucial when a set of MPC servers want to compute F based on inputs
coming from external clients or storing outputs of F to an encrypted database where no party holds the
decryption key but still allow them to operate on the encrypted data.
Finally, we give efficient conversion procedures between different paradigms of MPC for dishonest
majority. This allows us to split F into chunks and evaluate each chunk using our favorite MPC pro-
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Nowadays when most of the people hear the word crypto they would probably think about cryptocur-
rencies. A simple Google search of the word crypto at the end of 2019 will yield dozens of web pages
of cryptocurrencies in the top results. When I started my PhD in 2016 the popularity of the words
cryptography and crypto was quite similar according to Google Trends [Goo19] whereas between De-
cember 2017 and January 2018 crypto would be about 50 times more popular than cryptography. This
peak had nothing to do with the content of the thesis or the author. We only try to point that people’s
understanding of words can change throughout time and meaning of cryptography can denote different
things depending on the context, whether the person comes from a practical side or with a more theo-
retical background. From an historical point of view cryptocurrencies started out as a small sub-topic
of cryptography.
The type of cryptography this thesis deals with is about protecting data throughout computation
without revealing it. This sub-field of cryptography is called secure Multi Party Computation (MPC)
which was introduced by Andrew Yao in 1980. Since that time period the community polished it so
much that nowadays there are various number of companies applying MPC to protect sensitive secrets.
Perhaps one of the simplest ways of explaining MPC to the general public is through the following
example: in a classroom, the teacher wants to find out how many people have failed a math exam with-
out looking at the students’ individual grades. The teacher then comes up with the following protocol,
write a random number r using a pencil on a sheet of paper and pass it to the first student. If the student
has failed the math exam erase r and write r + 1 and pass the sheet onto the next student, otherwise if
the student has passed the test then leaves the note as it is and send r to the next student. After the sheet
of paper gets sent to every student, the last student gives a number r + x to the teacher. In the end the
teacher just subtracts the first message (r) from the last message (r + x) to get the number of students
(x) who failed the math exam. In this way the students grades remain private while the teacher only
learns the amount of students which failed the exam.
The idea of multiparty computation is very simple: a set of parties willing to compute a function
over their inputs while keeping them private, revealing only the output of the computation. MPC takes
care of what happens after parties plug in their inputs to the computation, for example things can get
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complicated depending on the answers given to the following guide-through:
1. Number of parties involved in the computation. Are there two, three...one hundred, one thousand
parties?
2. Type of network connection. Are parties connected on a low-latency, local area network (LAN)
or through a high-latency, wide area network (WAN)?
3. Adversary behaviour: semi-honest or malicious adversary. Is there any malicious party which
can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol? If yes, how many: a minority of them (less than half of
the parties) or do we deal with a dishonest majority where all but one parties can act maliciously?
4. Adversary power. Do malicious parties have access to computationally unbounded machines or
should we assume they only have access to probabilistic polynomial computers?
5. Corruptions over time. Do we assume parties can get corrupted throughout the computation
(adaptive adversary) or is the number of corrupted parties known at the start (static adversary)?
One can see that there is a big subset of protocols depending only on the few listed questions above.
If we consider the variable t as the threshold of corrupted parties and n as the number of parties then
there are a few impossibility results known in the literature. One such result is that if the threshold is
t < n/3 then there are information theoretical secure protocols which are resistant for computational
unbounded adversaries. Increasing the threshold to t < n/2 with active security is impossible without
adding some extra cryptographic assumptions [Mau06, HM97] Although successful termination in the
case of full threshold MPC when t < n cannot be guaranteed, if we slightly relax the assumption
and allow parties to abort during the computation then it is possible to achieve MPC (with abort) for
t < n. The latter is usually obtained through expensive public key machinery such as homomorphic
encryption or oblivious transfer.
This thesis carries out work in of the most challenging models: multiparty computation with abort
for dishonest majority. By default we will assume parties communicate over a synchronous network:
i.e. they have access to some global clock and there exists a strict upper bound on how long a message
delivery should take. These restrictions are irrelevant when benchmarking protocols as parties act as
soon as they received data. However they are useful in practice to detect whether a malicious party
is intentionally delaying the protocol or to formally prove guaranteed termination of certain schemes
[KMTZ13].
1.1 Usecases for MPC
One can wonder if being able to compute on private data jointly owned by a set of parties is at all
useful. We argue that the answer is affirmative. The idea of garbled circuits stemmed from the seminal
work of Andrew Yao [Yao82] which tried to solve the millionaire’s problem: two parties figuring out
who is the richest without revealing their amount of money. Going from work of Lindell et al. [LPS08]
implementing the first two-party active security comparison protocol (as in Yao’s millionaire problem)
which took around 2-3 minutes to the present where computing comparisons using SPDZ takes a few
2
1.1. USECASES FOR MPC
milliseconds. Nowadays the practice advanced so much that there are cases which one can do privacy
preserving analytics on millions of entries in a matter of seconds depending on the privacy algorithm
and security model [MR18, SGRP19, MZ17]. We now recap some of most popular examples of MPC
deployments which some of them are illustrated as well by the book of Evans, Kolesnikov and Rosulek
[EKR18].
1.1.1 Sugar beet auctions
The first deployment of MPC was in Denmark 2009 when a team of researchers from Aarhus University
collaborated with the Danish Government to help farmers keep renew their contracts based on which
production pays off best [BCD+09]. After a survey which revealed a large concern of the farmers
about their bidding details Danisco, the farmer’s association DKS and the Aarhus researchers from the
SIMAP project decided to run a three party protocol where clients (farmers) would submit their bids in
secret shared form and let the three entities compute a double auction on their secret bids. In the double
auction the farmers would specify how much they would sell for each possible price whereas buyers
input the amount of sugar beets they would buy for a specific price. The goal of a double auction is to
find the market clearing price which is the point where total supply equals total demand which is what
the three organisations computed.
1.1.2 Estonian social studies on tax and education
Given the alarming drop-out of IT students where a total of 43% of the students quit their stud-
ies, the Estonian Association of Information and Communication Technology (ITL) wanted to study
this issue in more detail trying to see whether the IT companies were hiring to aggressively caus-
ing this massive university drop out. After passing through all the legal hurdles with their Ministry
of Education and Research and the Estonian Tax and Customs Board they succeeded in performing a
3PC computation where the third server belonged to Cybernetica, the company that develops Share-
mind [BLW08,Bog15]. The algorithm involved sharing of 800,000 study records along with 20 million
tax records, with the study concluding several interesting things: the more education one gets, the
higher the salary; and it turns out that IT companies aren’t hiring too much, it might be that Computer
Science courses are getting increasingly difficult to pass.
1.1.3 Key Management
In real life key management is hard. If you add the fact that an attacker can get access to your server and
steals your data including the precious keys, then key management becomes even more complicated.
One can actually apply multiparty computation in order to harden the security: take the owned key,
secret share it additively across multiple servers and then delete it. Now an attacker has to get access to
all computers in order to retrieve your key. Moreover the user will get rid of the painful key management
and let the servers do it for them.
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The next problem arises: how to use the secret key for authentication or signing procedures? The
answer is to realise the specific functionalities using MPC. This is one of the software solutions Un-
bound Tech offers [Tec19]. They distribute the key across different cloud providers such as Google
Cloud, Microsoft’s Azure or Amazon AWS at your choice and then execute authentication or threshold
signatures without reconstructing the original key.
1.1.4 Boston wage gap
MPC can be used for social good as well. Lapets et al. [LJA+18] show how they aggregated salaries
privately from the Boston Women Workforce Council (BWWC) to gather more informed decisions
regarding the problem of gender paygap in that institution. The problem arose that no third party wanted
to have the raw data of more than 30,000 salaries. The solution was to run a two party protocol between
a server hosted by the Boston University and one hosted by the BWWC using JIFF framework [Uni19].
Since MPC deals with what happen after the parties input their data, Lapets at el. added some extra
checks to the forms to ensure correctness along with many usability features for a less experienced tech
person to use the software.
1.1.5 Password breach
Recently Google has found a new use-case to safe-guard passwords using a more specialized two party
protocol denoted as Private Set Intersection (PSI) [Lak19]. PSI allows for two parties to input a list of
elements and learn only the output of the intersection. Since Google has access to a massive database
of leaked password from the dark web they have decided to put this to use: avoid leaking everyone’s
password in the plaintext to then force the users to update their credentials. Instead they have created
an Chrome Extension which allows anyone to enter an username and a password before the creation of
a new account and do a set intersection with Google’s giant database of leaked passwords. In this way
Google will not know the user’s password but still be able warn users to try a different combination of
username/password, one which is not compromised. Recently it was announced that they plan to roll
in this feature in every login service Google has [Mar19].
1.1.6 Where is this all going?
This is a question too hard to answer but we can certainly gather some clues. In 2009 it was the first
time non-researchers have applied MPC to settle sugar beet auctions in Denmark. From there it was
just a few steps for Partisia company to be built.
Although a bit hard to keep track throughout the years of all startups and companies which used
MPC within their software solutions there was recently announced the so-called MPC alliance calling
MPC a “disruptive technology showing great promise in multiple industries”. At the time of writing on
their website there are 25 companies claiming to use multiparty computation, where most of them are
using it for key management for block-chain wallets or applying it to privacy preserving data analytics.
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Some of the major corporations such as Facebook, Google or Microsoft are not yet in the Alliance
although they are applying MPC to some research projects or use it to some internal products [Fac19,
O’D19, Mic19].
1.2 Outline of the thesis
In Chapter 2 we give some basic notions which will help the reader understand the content of this thesis.
It starts with some notation, then reviews a basic protocol and proofs that is universally composable
using Canetti’s framework [Can01]. Chapter 3 offers a high level description of the dishonest majority
protocols used throughout the thesis. Although most of the chapters will deal with secret shared based
dishonest majority (SPDZ) the last chapter will show how to switch between SPDZ and other MPC
frameworks including garbled circuits with a focus on BMR style garbled circuits [BMR90]. Since all
the protocols used here work in the preprocessing model, we will describe how the online phases work
for BMR and SPDZ as well as sketch the preprocessing phase.
At the core of our thesis lies Chapter 4, which describes in more details how to produce efficiently
the so-called ’Beaver Triples’ for SPDZ over arithmetic circuits modulo p. The end of the chapter
contains some benchmarks on how the protocols described work when Beaver triples are instantiated
over the field F2k .
In the next three chapters we focus on building applications on top of the SPDZ engine. Building
applications in MPC is nowadays more easy due to an existing high-level language developed by Keller
et al. [KSS13a] and a continuous development ever since. Chapter 5 improves upon the state of the art
evaluations of PRFs in MPC for arithmetic circuits with characteristic two (F2k ). More concretely it
improves by a factor of 50 over prior work upon evaluating AES and 3-DES in SPDZ using lookup
table based protocols [DNNR17]. The next two parts, Chapter 6 and 7, focus on building special pro-
tocols PRFs and Authenticated Encryption (AE) over fields of prime characteristic. This is particularly
useful since computing the Beaver triples over Fp is faster than their variant over F2k , and switching to
evaluating AES over Fp would be prohibitively expensive since AES is designed for boolean circuits.
Throughout Chapter 8 we unify all the work on the dishonest majority MPC by showing an efficient
way to convert between different sharing schemes and garbled circuits. We then show the benefits of
switching between SPDZ and BMR based garbled circuits by improving the performance of a simple
machine learning algorithm on private data by an order of magnitude when evaluated over plain SPDZ.
Our method involves generating some new preprocessed material called daBits (or doubly authenticated
bits) improves upon the naive conversion from SPDZ to garbled circuits and vice-versa by a factor of
at least 50 in terms of communication making conversions in the realm of dishonest majority MPC
practical.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 9 with a few open questions that we consider relevant upon in
the next few years in order to make MPC even more practical.
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1.3 Contributions of the Author
Traditionally, the order of the authors in cryptography is done via an alphabetical ordering of their last
names. Since ideas are hard to quantify to check which are more valuable than others this removes
the un-necessary conflict of a discussion phase to agree on some other ordering [Soc04]. The ordering
was done alphabetically for the papers I have been a co-author of, and represent an equal contribution
amongst all the authors, unless stated otherwise. To conclude, the thesis content is mostly based on the
following publications in chronological order:
1. [GRR+16] MPC-Friendly Symmetric Key Primitives, published at CCS 2016, joint work with
Lorenzo Grassi and Christian Rechberger and Peter Scholl and Nigel P. Smart.
2. [KOR+17] Faster Secure Multi-Party Computation of AES and DES Using Lookup Tables,
published at ACNS 2017, joint work with Marcel Keller and Emmanuela Orsini and Peter Scholl
and Eduardo Soria-Vazquez and Srinivas Vivek.
3. [RSS17] Modes of Operation Suitable for Computing on Encrypted Data, published at ToSC
2017, joint work with Nigel P. Smart and Martijn Stam.
4. [KPR18] Overdrive: Making SPDZ Great Again, published at EUROCRYPT 2018, joint work
with Marcel Keller and Valerio Pastro.
5. [RW19a] MArBled Circuits: Mixing Arithmetic and Boolean Circuits with Active Security,
published at INDOCRYPT 2019, joint work with Tim Wood.
Although any of my results would have been hard or sometimes impossible to achieve without my great
co-authors, for transparency reasons I will list my contributions to the above papers:
1. Role in [GRR+16] was to implement and benchmark the protocols of Naor-Reingold PRF,
MiMC, AES and LowMC (the M4R variant) in SPDZ as well as proving the security reduc-
tion for the Legendre PRF.
2. Role in [KOR+17] was to implement, optimize and benchmark all the 3-DES and AES variants
using SPDZ.
3. Role in [RSS17] was to investigate existing modes of operation which are highly parallelizable
and transfer the security proofs from the Boolean field case F2k to Fp. I also implemented and
benchmarked MiMC and Legendre inside all proposed modes (PMAC, HtMAC and OTR).
4. Role in [KPR18] was to optimize the SHE code in SPDZ to work for LowGear protocol and do
a more thorough analysis of the ZK proofs involved.
5. Role in [RW19a] was to co-design the daBits protocol, come up with several optimizations and
implemented the protocols using MP-SPDZ framework.
In this thesis I have added some more details where it was needed in order to be able to follow the
ideas completely without skimming through different papers. These details include a more complete
description of the Overdrive protocols, more details on evaluating SBoxes in [KOR+17] and a few
updates on the Marbled Circuits [RW19a] paper on how to realise different share conversions. I have
also been a co-author of the following publications:
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1. [KRSW18] Reducing Communication Channels in MPC, published at SCN 2018, joint work
with Marcel Keller and Nigel P. Smart and Tim Wood.
2. [MRSV19] EPIC: Efficient Private Image Classification (or: Learning from the Masters), pub-
lished at CT-RSA 2019, joint work with Eleftheria Makri and Nigel P. Smart and Frederik Ver-
cauteren.
3. [AGP+19] Feistel Structures for MPC, and More, published at ESORICS 2019, joint work with
Martin R. Albrecht and Lorenzo Grassi and Léo Perrin and Sebastian Ramacher and Christian
Rechberger and Arnab Roy and Markus Schofnegger.
4. [AOR+19] Zaphod: Efficiently Combining LSSS and Garbled Circuits in SCALE, published at
WAHC 2019, joint work with Abdelrahaman Aly and Emmanuela Orsini and Nigel P. Smart and
Tim Wood.
There are three more unpublished manuscripts which have been submitted to Eurocrypt 2020 [RST+19,
GLR+19, CKR+19]. A special mention goes to the plenty of ideas that did not work and here I am
thankful to my supervisor for having huge amounts of patience and enthusiasm to convince me that





In this chapter we provide some basic notation necessary to follow the content of the thesis. Most of the
notation can be understood by following basic undergraduate Computer Science textbooks. Then we
proceed with informally describing the UC framework of Canetti [Can01] used throughout the security
proofs of our protocols. The last two sections contain proof descriptions of two essential protocols, as
used to realise commitments and secure coin-tossing within the UC model.
2.1 Notation
To define various arithmetic used here, one needs to start with a finite ring R equipped with the usual
addition and multiplication (+, ·). Next, the notation R/(nR) represents the quotient group generated
by the ideal (nR) inside R, thus splitting R into n distinct classes. Sometimes this is also denoted as
Rn. In the next chapters we have various flavours of finite fields: i) Fp ∼= R/pR where p is a prime, ii)
F2k ∼= R2[X]/f(X) where R2[X] is the set of polynomials with binary coefficients over R and f(X)
is a irreducible polynomial of degree 2k (deg(f) = 2k) or iii) Fk2 which is the set of bit-strings of length
k where addition and multiplications are defined as the component-wise XOR and AND respectively.
Sets are usually written using capital letters unless stated otherwise. We define R as the set of real
numbers and R+ the set of positive real numbers. As usual N and Z are the set of natural numbers
and integer values respectively. The x := y operator is used to define certain variables whereas x← y
denotes that x is assigned value y. We also define |x| the absolute value of x. On the other hand |X|
denotes the number of elements in the set X .
At different times we would need to sample according to a certain distribution which we denote
x
$← X . If the distribution is not specified then assume that it is uniform across X , or each element in
the set X has an equal chance of being chosen. We will often denote A as an adversary or the set of
corrupted parties and H as the set of honest parties.
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2.2 Some complexity theory
Here we recall few definitions used to measure the complexity of an attacker or the efficiency of a
protocol. This is also called the asymptotic notation:
Definition 1. (Polynomial function) We say that f : N 7→ R is a polynomial function in N or f ∈
poly(n) if there exists a polynomial p : N 7→ R such that for every c ∈ N there is a constant n0 ∈ N:
∀c ∈ N, ∃n0 ∈ N such that ∀n > n0, f(n) ≤ p(n).
We can now proceed to the meaning of a negligible function:
Definition 2. (Negligible function) We say that f : N 7→ R is a negligible function or f ∈ negl(n) if
for every positive polynomial p : N 7→ R, for all c ∈ N we have




Sometimes we also need to give worst case complexity of our protocols using the big-oh notation:
Definition 3. (Big-oh notation) We say that f : R 7→ R belongs to O(g(n)) or f ∈ O(g(n)) if and
only if there exists two positive constants n0 ∈ N and M ∈ R+:
∃n0 ∈ N, ∃M ∈ R+, such that ∀n > n0, |f(n)| ≤Mg(n).
The next basic notion we need is an informal definition of a Turing Machine (TM). A deterministic
Turing Machine is a finite state machine with an auxiliary tape onto which it can read or write according
to an internal state. A deterministic TM is able to do one step at a time, whereas a non-deterministic TM
can branch out on multiple actions, i.e. going from one state to a finite number of state in a single step.
A probabilistic polynomial Turing Machine (PPT) is able to branch out non-deterministically from a
single state to multiple states with specific probabilities and make random decisions with the additional
condition that its running time is polynomial. These TM flavours (deterministic TM, non-deterministic
TM, PPT) are all equivalent sometimes with an exponential increase in the number of states.
2.3 Probabilities
Proving the security of MPC protocols often reduces to some indistinguishability arguments between
two transcripts or distributions. In this thesis there are two variants of these arguments being done:
computational security indexed by parameter κ and statistical security indexed by parameter sec.
We now need to quantify the distance between two distributions:
Definition 4. (Statistical distance) We define the statistical distance between two distributions D and
E over a sample space Ω:














To define statistical indistinguishability we first need to index the distributions by their statistical pa-
rameters sec ∈ N:
Definition 5. (Statistical indistinguishability) Let {D}sec∈N and {E}sec∈N be two sets of distributions
indexed by sec. We say that these two distributions are statistically indistinguishable (close) with sta-
tistical parameter sec if there exists a negligible function negl : N 7→ R and there exists an integer S
such that for all sec > S :
∆(D, E) < negl(sec).
For computational indistinguishability the distributions are now indexed by κ ∈ N and quantified
against any PPT machine Adv(1κ) running in polynomial time poly(κ). This means that if a challenger
samples a polynomial number of samples poly(κ) from any family of distribution (either D or E)
then any PPT Adv(1κ) is unable to distinguish from which distribution those samples came from,
given a polynomial computing power poly(κ). The definition given below is equivalent to |Pr[t $←
D; Adv(1κ,D) = 1]− Pr[t $← E; Adv(1κ, E) = 1]| ∈ negl(κ).
Definition 6. (Computational indistinguishability) Let {D}κ∈N and {E}κ∈N be two sets of distributions
indexed by κ. We say that these two distributions are computational indistinguishable (close) with
computational parameter κ if for any PPT adversary Adv, there exists a negligible function negl :
N 7→ R and there exists an integer K such that for all κ > K:
∆(Adv(1κ,D),Adv(1κ, E)) < negl(κ).
2.4 Universal Composability
In order to prove the security of MPC protocols throughout this thesis we will use Canetti’s frame-
work [Can01] of Universal-Composability (UC) security. Since it is hard to define what it means for a
protocol to be “secure” this is modeled more formally as a protocol which securely realizes a specific
functionality. The UC framework is an essential tool for cryptographers who wish to prove complex
protocols by breaking them down into sub-protocols in a modular way, compose their smaller proofs
and still be secure even under concurrent executions.
Stripping away the complexity of a real world MPC protocol, ideally to compute a joint function
we would have parties submit their inputs to a trusted third party F and wait for the trusted party
to send the output of the function back to the parties. Since the ideal world does not exist we would
like to create a protocol Π which behaves as if it would emulate a trusted third party but keeping the
parties’ inputs private. Roughly speaking, proving security using Canetti’s framework [Can01] reduces
to construct a simulator S which can act on behalf of the honest parties without knowing their inputs and
just interacting with the ideal functionality F . If any external environment Z is unable to distinguish
between a transcript created by S interacting with the ideal functionality computing f and the real
protocol Π then we say that the protocol is secure. All the entities involved here such as the environment
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Z , simulator S or the parties P1, . . . , Pn running the protocol are Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs,
more details in [Can01]) where each party has two types of tapes: incoming and outgoing tapes through
which they send messages between each other.
The real world (or the concrete protocol) consists of n ITMs P1, . . . , Pn which are also known as
the parties executing the protocol Π. The adversary Adv controls a subsetA ⊂ {P1, . . . , Pn}. The setA
is called the set of corrupted parties. The ITMs in A execute all the instructions given by the adversary
Adv through the I/O tapes.
The ideal world consists of the ideal functionality F , simulator S and adversary Adv as well as
the n dummy parties P̂1, . . . , P̂n which only role is to forward their inputs to F and get the output.
The simulator’s task is to emulate the protocol Π using just the information from F - the functionality
description usually involves some adversary and that is S. To be able to create a consistent transcript S
plays the role of the adversary as well by executing Adv commands on behalf of the corrupted parties.
The Simulator also has the additional power of extracting the corrupted parties inputs since they are
forwarded by the adversary Adv. Note that Adv simply acts as a proxy for the adversarial environment
Z .
The experiment flow is the following. The challenger flips a coin b $← {0, 1}. If b = 0 then environ-
ment Z will interact with the real world, otherwise Z will play with the ideal world. The environment
will first set the inputs of the parties P1, . . . , Pn. Note that at this point from Z’s point of view the
execution is the same for all possible b’s. After setting the inputs then it is the simulator job (if b = 1)
to make the transcript distribution be indistinguishable from the real transcript. The protocol is secure
if the environment has no better strategy than flipping a random coin to reply with the correct bit b
chosen by the challenger. More formally, the UC security of a protocol is defined as follows:
Definition 7. We say that a protocol Π implements UC securely an ideal functionality F if for any
possible PPT Adv there exists a PPT simulator S such that any PPT environment Z , any input z then
the following distributions are equivalent:
REALΠ,Adv,Z(z) ≡ IDEALF ,S,Z(z).
One key-point of UC security is that it is composable. To start composing functionalities we need to
define the UC hybrid model. In particular, to prove that Π realizes a functionality F in the G-hybrid
model the parties have access to some black-box functionality G for which the simulator S can program
its output. Although the simulator S has this extra power it needs to satisfy the output distribution of G
as in the real world otherwise the environment can trivially distinguish between real and ideal world.
All of our proofs are constructed in the FRO-hybrid model (Random Oracle Model, see Figure 2.1)
which means that in the idela worl S can program the FRO outputs on parties inputs, including the
adversary calls to FRO. Due to the infeasibility of keeping track of all incoming inputs in polynomial
time, the FRO is implemented using a hash function such as SHA-256 or SHA-3. Throughout its exis-




Init: On input (Init, X, sid) from all parties initialize an empty dictionary LT with codomain X .
Random: On input (sid, x) if (sid, x) ∈ LT set o ← LT[sid, x]. Otherwise sample o $← X and
store it into LT[sid, x]. Send o to all parties.
Figure 2.1: FRO random oracle functionality.
in the FRO-hybrid model but cannot be securely instantiated by any hash function. Nevertheless, it is
widely believed that using a hash function mitigates any practical attacks on FRO.
To summarize this section, proving the UC security of a protocol requires to build a simulator
which needs to extract corrupted parties’ inputs. The additional power is given through a setup assump-
tion, i.e. working in the FRO-hybrid model or parties sharing some Common Reference String (CRS)
programmed by the simulator. Since simulator’s knowledge is limited, then it must make use of the
functionality F as much as possible hence in practice there is usually a race between the efficiency of
a protocol and how much a functionality leaks to an adversary/simulator.
2.5 Communication channels
When an MPC protocol is executed parties have to communicate to each other to realise certain func-
tionalities, often to multiply secrets since linear operations are for free. In some cases one player Pi
has to send data which can only be known by the other player Pj and no other player - this is called a
secret channel. Throughout this thesis parties will need access to authenticated channels which allows
for parties to send authenticated data between each other with no attacker being able to tamper with it.
Note that sending data over an authenticated channel does not imply communication secrecy.
Once the parties are able to send data individually over authenticated channels then it is straight-
forward to build a broadcast channel assuming a collision resistant hash function h. This channel gives
the ability for parties to broadcast i.e. to send and receive data from all parties. The broadcast channel
functionality FBroadcast is described in Figure 2.2 along with its protocol implementation ΠBroadcast in
Figure 2.3.
2.6 Two simple UC proofs
Having the broadcast functionality described above we now proceed with two simple examples of




Init: On input (Init, sid) from all parties set Abortsid ← False.
Broadcast: On input (Broadcast, sid, xi) from Pi or from S if i ∈ A:
1. If i ∈ H then send xi to all other parties Pj where j 6= i (including S).
2. If i ∈ A then wait for the adversary to input the values xj for honest parties Pj where
j ∈ H . If any of xj 6= xi then set Abortsid ← True.
Verify: On input (Verify, sid) from all parties (including S) await for S to message back: if reply
is OK and Abortsid is set to False then send OK to all parties. Otherwise send Abort to all
parties and halt.
Figure 2.2: FBroadcast functionality.
ΠBroadcast
Init: On input (Init, sid) from all parties, each Pi initializes stri with an empty string and agree to
a collision resistant hash function H .
Broadcast: On input (Broadcast, sid, x) from Pi
1. Party Pi sends x to all parties over an authenticated channel.
2. All parties Pj for j 6= i update str ← str||x where a||b denotes concatenation of two
strings a, b.
Verify: On input (Verify, sid) for all parties, each party Pi does the following:
1. Compute hi = H(stri) and send hi to all parties Pj where j 6= i over an authenticated
channel.
2. Await for hj for all j 6= i. If any hj 6= hi then send Abort to all parties and halt.
Figure 2.3: Broadcast protocol.
2.7 Commitments
Commitments are a useful cryptographic tool to ensure that parties do not change their inputs once
they commit to them. Perhaps the straightforward analogy is that commitments are similar to sealed
envelopes: once you send it via post the content is hidden and cannot be changed until the envelope
reaches its destination. Intuitively speaking, cryptographic commitments must satisfy two properties:
1. Binding: opening two commitments: Commit(m) and Commit(m′) where m 6= m′ should yield
two different values with high probability.
2. Hiding: two commitments Commit(m) and Commit(m′) are indistinguishable to an adversary.
This is the equivalent to the CPA property of an encryption scheme for commitments.




Init: On input (Init, X, sid) from all parties do the following:
1. Start an instance of the Random Oracle by calling FRO with input (Init, sid, {0, 1}2·κ).
2. Start an instance of the Broadcast channel by calling FBroadcast with input (Init, sid).
Commit: To commit on input x party Pi does the following:
1. Sample r $← {0, 1}2·κ and call FRO with input (sid||i||x||r) where a||b denotes
the concatenation two strings a, b. Store the output of FRO as τx ∈ {0, 1}2·κ into
LT[sid, i, τx] := (x, r).
2. Calls FBroadcast with input (Broadcast, sid, τx).
Open: In order to open a commitment with identifier τx:
1. Party Pi retrieves (x, r) := LT[sid, i, τx] then uses FBroadcast with input
(Broadcast, sid||i||x||r). As a result each party Pj receives a message mj .
2. Parties now check whether the broadcast was correct by calling FBroadcast with input
(Verify, sid). If they receive OK then continue, otherwise abort.
3. All parties Pj call FRO with input mj to get the output τ jx .
4. If τ jx = τx then party Pj parses x from mj and outputs x on its local tape. Otherwise
call FBroadcast with (Broadcast,Abort, sid), output locally ⊥ and then halt.
Figure 2.4: FRO based commitment protocol.
it was proved by Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] that in order to universally compose commitments one
needs to downgrade the security from unconditionally to computationally hard problems and have
some setup assumptions such as a CRS. The commitments used throughout most MPC protocols (also
used in Figure 2.4) are based on the Random Oracle assumption proposed by Hofheinz and Müller-
Quade [HM04].
Theorem 8. Protocol ΠCommit implements UC securely FCommit in the FRO,FBroadcast-hybrid model
against any static, malicious and computationally bounded adversary which corrupts at most n − 1
parties.
Proof. We need to construct a simulator S such that no adversary environment is able to distinguish
between the real protocol ΠCommit where Adv is controlling n − 1 parties and S interacting with
FCommit. It might be useful to remind that the simulator is acting as a proxy between the adversary
and the corrupted parties, delivering messages back-and-forth according to the adversary wishes. All
that needs to be done is to show how the simulator creates the messages for the honest parties such that
the transcript is indistinguishable from the real protocol.
The trivial case is when the corrupted parties follow the protocol honestly. Since the simulator has
the extra power to program the random oracle inputs to FRO then the simulation can be done in the fol-




Init: On input (Init, X, sid) from all parties create an empty dictionary LT which indexes a tuple
of the form (sid, i, τx) where sid is the session identifier, i is the party id and τx is an unique
handle associated to some value x ∈ X .
Commit: On input (Commit, sid, i, x) from Pi and (Commit, sid, i,⊥) from the other parties the
functionality creates a new handle idx and stores values x into a dictionary LT[sid, i, τx] := x.
Then output idx to all parties (including S).
Open: On input (Open, sid, i, idx) from party Pi then retrieve x := LT[sid, i, τx] and output x to
S and all honest parties. Otherwise wait for S to output OK or Abort. If message is OK then
output x to all honest parties. If message from S is Abort then send Abort to parties and halt.
Figure 2.5: Commitment functionality.
τx
$← U({0, 1}2·κ) and emulates FBroadcast with the adversary Adv. To simulate the (Open, sid, i, τx)
command the simulator S waits for the FCommit to output the secret x. Then the simulator samples
r
$← U({0, 1}2·κ) and programs the output of FRO to be LT[sid, i, τx] := (x, r). The remaining mes-
sages are delivered by the simulator when S emulates FBroadcast with Adv on behalf of the honest
parties by sending the string (sid||i||x||r).
There are two corner cases here. Since r is sampled randomly at each run by the simulator there
might be situations when some rprev = r was sampled before. In this case the environment Z will
detect that its playing with the ideal world. The case when there is a collision on r is very low though:
if Adv queries the simulator q times then, using birthday bound, there will be a chance of collision of
approximatively q2/22·κ which is negligible in κ assuming the adversary has access to q ∈ poly(κ)
queries.
The second case is when a corrupted party executes the Open command without querying FRO by
producing a fake τx. In this situation the simulator has no information on how to open the commitment
so it will send Abort to the FCommit. In the real world the parties will abort as well unless the adversary
comes up with some string (sid||i||x||r) later for which FRO would output τx. Using the fact that the
random oracle outputs random strings of length 2 · κ then the probability of the adversary finding a
pre-image to FRO is 2−2·κ hence negligible in κ.
In both cases the probability of Z distinguishing between the ideal and real world are negligible in
κ which concludes our proof.
2.8 Coin tossing
Originally introduced by Blum [Blu82], and motivated by flipping a coin using a telephone, this shortly




Init: On input (Initialise, sid,F) from all parties wait for incoming messages.
Random: On input (Random, sid) from all parties sample r $← U(F) and send it to S . Await for
S to message back: if reply is OK then send r to all parties. If reply is Abort then send Abort
to honest parties and halt.
Figure 2.6: Functionality for generating a random number
a trusted third party. For this purpose, Blum used one way functions based on the quadratic residues
problem.
In Blum’s protocol there are two parties: Alice and Bob who first agree on a public modulus n = p·q
which is a product of two distinct primes where only Bob knows p and q. The protocols goes as follows:
Alice selects a random value x mod n and sends to Bob x2 mod n. Unlike Alice, Bob knows the
prime factors p, q so he can compute all four square roots of x2 (two modulo p and two modulo q):
(x, n − x) and (x′, n − x′). Yet Bob has no idea which group Alice’s root comes from. Bob makes a
guess (x∗, n−x∗) and sends this to Alice. If the value x∗ that Alice receives is different from x then she
can compute the factorization of N and output p, q to Bob and set a global random coin to 1. Otherwise
if Alice receives x∗ = x then both parties output the coin 0.
For our case we need an efficient n party coin-toss protocol which is secure against a dishonest
majority of malicious parties. In the context of a dishonest majority to realise a secure coin-toss we
need stronger some stronger assumptions such as a trapdoor or random oracle [Can01, CLOS02]. One
folklore protocol which is used in our constructions as well is for parties to select a random seed to then
commit to it. After this all parties open their commitments and the random coin is the XOR sum of the
opened seeds. The drawback of the following method is that parties need to commit per each random
coin sampled incurring a large communication cost from the commitments. Instead they can use the
opened value as a global seed to a random oracle. In practice the oracle will be implemented via AES
in counter mode where the symmetric key is instantiated as the global seed.
Theorem 9. Protocol ΠRand implements FRand in the FRO,FCommit-hybrid model against any UC
static, malicious and computationally bounded adversary which corrupts at most n− 1 parties.
Proof. We need to construct a simulator S such that any environment Z cannot distinguish between
ΠRand or S interacting with FRand. To simulate a Random command the simulator constructs dummy
inputs by selecting rHi at random for the honest parties i ∈ H as well as handles τrHi and inputs
them to FCommit. After the emulation of FCommit with the adversary the simulator obtains rAj for all
j ∈ A. After emulating FCommit, S is instructed to open the commitements via (Open, sid, i, τri) for




Init: On input (Init, sid,F) from all parties do the following:
1. Call FRO with (Init, sid,F).
2. Call FCommit with (Init, sid,F).
3. Set the output coins to be values in F.
Random: On input (Random, sid) from all parties do the following:
1. Each party samples ri
$← {0, 1}2·κ.
2. Each party calls FCommit with input (Commit, sid, i, ri) to receive a handle τri . Then
they open the commitments through the (Open, sid, i, τri) command.
3. Next parties call FRO with input (sid,⊕ni=1ri) to get a string o ∈ {0, 1}2·κ.
4. Output o as the public coin toss result.








j . In the end S calls FRand to get the x and programs the output of FRO to o in the
last step of the protocol.
The only things we need to argue now are transcript distribution and abort probability. The transcript
Z sees is uniform since o has at least one random rHi (the setH is non-empty). Next, as in the simulation
of FCommit the adversary will notice that is interacting with the functionality if it receives more than
once the same output from FRand on two different inputs or predicts the output of ⊕ii=1ri. This will
only happen with non-negligible probability as the inputs to FRO are 2 ·κ bits long, hence the chance of
two inputs yielding the same output is q2/22·κ (using the birthday bound) where q ∈ poly(κ) represents
the number of queries an adversary can make to FRO.
As a side note, the coins that ΠRand outputs are going to be biased since there is no way honest
parties can prevent malicious parties to abort. One way to decrease the bias is to repeat the protocol
a number of times [BOO10] if adversary aborts. Although an adversary can abort at any point we can
push corrupted parties out of the computation if identifiable abort is applied to introduce incentives for
cheaters to behave correctly [BOS16] at some extra complexity cost. Nevertheless, the coins will have
zero bias as long as all parties follow the protocol.
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Chapter 3
Multiparty computation for dishonest
majority
Most modern MPC protocols where a majority of the parties are corrupt can be split into two phases
called the preprocessing phase and the online phase [DPSZ12,BDOZ11,DKL+13,WRK17a,WRK17b,
DGN+17, HIMV19]. In the preprocessing phase parties work together to produce some correlated
randomness using public key cryptography, then using it later in the online phase in order to compute
the actual function on secret inputs. In this chapter we review two protocols for realising MPC with
dishonest majority: one based on secret sharing (SPDZ [DPSZ12]), and the other based on garbled
circuits (BMR [BMR90]). Description of the SPDZ protocol will focus on the online phase: while in
the next chapters we show how to obtain more efficient preprocessing (Chapter 4), while also building
applications on top of SPDZ (Chapters 5, 6, 7). The BMR protocol will be useful to understand the
contributions in Chapter 8 to switch efficiently between SPDZ and constant round protocols such as
BMR.
3.1 Secret Sharing
One can secret share x amongst a set of n parties by giving away some shares x(i) to all parties Pi such
that there is a reconstruction algorithm to fully recover x but individual parts x(i) reveal no information
about the original secret x. Perhaps the most popular secret sharing scheme, is the one known as Shamir
secret sharing scheme [Sha79] where the secret reconstruction is done through polynomial interpolation
of t+1 secrets since the share xi of each party represents a point on a t-degree curve. In our protocols we
will use something simpler called additive secret sharing scheme where all parties need to contribute
with their share to reconstruct the secret. That is, each party will get a random x(i) subject to x =
x(1) + · · ·+ x(n). We define a secret shared value of x as the tuple





CHAPTER 3. MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION FOR DISHONEST MAJORITY
3.2 Authentication
To prevent malicious parties mounting some additive attacks or changing their shares in the protocol, all
the protocols will use a global MAC key αwhich no one knows and is secret shared amongst all parties,
i.e. JαK. This should not be confused with the traditional sense of a MAC (message authentication
code) scheme [BGR95] which ensures integrity and confidentiality when one party sends an encrypted
message to another party. This extra sharing JαK of an unknown MAC key mitigates additive attacks on
the original secret JxK when parties cheat on their shares. To relate JxK and JαK parties need to produce
a sharing of Jα · xK called γ(x) such that γ(x) =
∑n
i=1 γ
(i)(x). We define an authenticated share, or
an additive share with the corresponding shares of the MAC on x as
JxK := (x(1), . . . , x(n), γ(1)(x), . . . , γ(n)(x), α(1), . . . , α(n)).
Whenever parties broadcast their shares x(i) to reconstruct the secret JxK an extra equation is checked
to ensure share consistency, namely whether Jα · xK − JαK · JxK = 0. This procedure is called a MAC
check and will be described later in this section.
Finally, the Share command gives parties access to random, additive shares of a secret value stored
in FABB. This essentially assumes the underlying MPC protocol uses additive secret sharing, but is
only used for the Naor-Reingold PRF protocol (Section 6.4).
3.3 Arithmetic Black Box Model
To model MPC in a modular way we first need to define the ideal functionalities with their specific arith-
metic. In the ideal world parties input their values to the functionality and then call various commands
to compute any functions. The standard arithmetic blackbox makes use of a generic field F denoted by
FABB given in Figure 3.1. Each value stored in this functionality is associated with a unique identifier
that is given to all parties. As specified in the prevous section, let JxK denote the identifier for an au-
thenticated value x that is stored by the functionality and A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the index set of corrupted
parties. Note that FABB is built in the FPrep hybrid model described in Figure 3.2. One can think of
FABB as a better abstraction of FPrep as in the latter the functionality operates on shares rather than on
secrets since for every secret generated it has to wait from the simulator’s response and then sample the
honest shares such that they sum up to the intial sampled secret.
3.3.1 How to evaluate circuits using FABB
The usual computation model most CS graduates are used to is the Random Access Memory (RAM)
based model. In the RAM model there are two finite state machines represented by a Computer Process-
ing Unit (CPU) and a random access memory which can store some registers. To execute instructions,
the CPU fetches the instruction code from RAM along with the registers indicated by the instruc-
tion [Sav98]. For example when accessing an array A using C-style programs we need specify the
index of the array i to fetch the value at that position.
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Functionality FABB[F]
Initialize: On input (Init,F) from all parties, call FPrep with input (Init,F).
Input: On (Input, sid, id, i, x) from Pi and (Input, i, sid, id,⊥) from all othe parties, if id /∈
Regsid.Keys then set Regsid[id] := x.
Add(JxK, JyK): On input (Add, sid, id, idx, idy) if idx, idy ∈ Regsid.Keys, retrieve x :=
Regsid[idx], y := Regsid[idy], compute z = x+ y and store z into Regsid[id].
Multiply(JxK, JyK): On input (Multiply, sid, id, idx, idy) if idx, idy ∈ Regsid.Keys retrieve x :=
Regsid[idx], y := Regsid[idy]. compute z = x · y and store z into Regsid[id].
Output(JxK): On input (Output, sid, id) from all parties, if id ∈ Regsid.Keys retrieve x :=
Regsid[id] and send x to S. If S replies with Abort then halt, otherwise send x to all other
parties and continue.
Figure 3.1: Ideal functionality for MPC arithmetic.
When computing on encrypted data the index might be secret as well as the data in the array A
of length m. How can we retrieve the secret A[i] without knowing the index i? Fortunately there are
multiple answers to this question such as Oblivious RAM [SvS+13]. We will consider the simplest
approach, just by using FABB operations. Given that for every TM M there exists a circuit C which can
compute M using just additions and multiplications (see Chapter 11 in [AB09]).
If one has access to Feq which takes as input two secret registers and returns in secret shared form
J1K if the registers are equal or J0K otherwise then we can build easily a protocol which can retrieveA[i]
where the index is secret shared as JiK. The solution is simple: iterate through all indices j ∈ [1 . . .m]
and compute
∑m
j=1A[j] · Feq(JiK, j). Since all indices j that are compared to JiK are unique it is
guaranteed that Feq will return 1 in a single position which is when j = JiK, adding A[i] to the final
sum. This has an O(m) complexity since computing the sum touches every element in A.
This simple example was selected to illustrate that there is a gap between the RAM model of com-
putation and computing on arithmetic circuits with secret data. Another example to illustrate the gap
between the two models is branching on data. Branching is a very easy task in traditional programming
languages which can be done in constant time whereas branching on a secret value x is an expensive
task since it requires to compute the circuit on every possible value x can have.
In the end, how should we compute programs in MPC? The short answer is to unroll the program
to an arithmetic circuit and let FABB do the job. In practice this is slightly more complicated as the
programmer has to rewrite chunks of the code to eliminate branching and write specific protocols (see
the lookup table approach) to realise the program more efficiently.
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Functionality FPrep[F]
Initialize: On input (Init,F) from all parties agree and store a session identifier sid and a finite
field F.
Input: On (Input, sid, id, i, x) from Pi if id /∈ Regsid.Keys store it into Regsid[id] := x. For every
other party Pj 6= Pi send JxK.
InputTuple: On (InputTuple, sid, id, i) from Pi if id /∈ Regsid.Keys sample r
$← U(F), store it
into Regsid[id] := r and send r to Pi. For every other party Pj 6= Pi send JrK.
Add: On input (Add, sid, id, idx, idy) if idx, idy ∈ Regsid.Keys, retrieve x := Regsid[idx], y :=
Regsid[idy], compute z = x+ y and store z into Regsid[id].
Multiply: On input (Multiply, sid, id, idx, idy) if idx, idy ∈ Regsid.Keys retrieve x :=
Regsid[idx], y := Regsid[idy]. compute z = x · y and store z into Regsid[id].
Linear Combination: On input (LinComb, id, id1, . . . , idl, c1, . . . , cl, c) from all parties where
idk ∈ Reg.Keys() store Reg[id] =
∑l
k=1 Reg[idk] · ck + c.
RandomEntry: On input (RandomEntry, sid, id) if id /∈ Regsid.Keys sample r
$← F and store
Regsid[id] := r.
RandomBit: On input (RandomBit, sid, id) if id /∈ Regsid.Keys sample b
$← {0, 1} ∈ F and store
Regsid[id] := b.
Triple: On input (Triple, sid, ida, idb, idc) if ida, idb, idc /∈ Regsid.Keys sample a, b
$← U(F), set
c = a · b and store the registers Regsid[ida] := a, Regsid[idb] := b, Regsid[idc] := c. Output
the triple (a, b, c) to all parties.
Open: On input (Open, sid, id, i) from all parties, if id ∈ Regsid.Keys,
• if i = 0 then send Regsid[id] to the adversary and run the procedure Wait. If the message
was (OK, sid), await an error ε from the adversary. Send Regsid[id] + ε to all honest
parties and if ε 6= 0, set the internal flag Abortsid to true.
• if i ∈ A, then send Regsid[id] to the adversary and then run Wait.
• if i ∈ [n]\A, then call the procedure Wait, and if not already halted then await an error
ε from the adversary. Send Regsid[id] + ε to Pi and if ε 6= 0 then set the internal flag
Abortsid to true.
Check: On input (Check, sid) from all parties send Abort to all parties if Abortsid is set to True
and halt. Otherwise continue and send OK to all parties. Internal procedure:
Wait: Await a message (OK, sid) or (Abort, sid) from the adversary; if the message is (OK, sid)
then continue; otherwise, send the message (Abort, sid) to all honest parties and ignore all
further messages to FABB with this sid.




Damgård et al. [DPSZ12] introduced a novel way of computing over secret data against a dishonest
majority of parties using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE). They avoided the computational
expensive Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) machinery of Gentry [Gen09] and the complex Zero
Knowledge (ZK) proofs of BDOZa [BDOZ11]. In the FHE case parties could just encrypt their inputs,
evaluate a circuit C using bootstrapping and then distribute decrypt the output to obtain a share of the
final result. Due to the costly operation of bootstrapping SPDZ circumvents this by only evaluating
depth-1 computation using a homomorphic encryption scheme. This comes at a cost of incurring an
O(d) communication increase where d is the circuit depth parties want to evaluate. Nevertheless, after
the costly preprocessing phase is done the SPDZ online phase is fast as it is information theoretical
requiring just basic field arithmetic.
In this section we will only focus on the online phase protocol as the next chapter deals with how
to obtain better preprocessing. The online phase will be securely realised by illustrating the protocols
implementing theFABB commands such as to provide inputs and perform additions and multiplications.
We illustrate the online phase of SPDZ in Figure 3.3. Note that the protocol is described in the FPrep-
hybrid model which assumes black box access to a functionality which outputs random Beaver triples
and also checks the partially opened values throughout the computation. The protocol specifics of these
procedures are described later in the next chapter.
3.5 Preprocessing for SPDZ using Oblivious Transfer (OT)
For sake of completeness we briefly describe how to realise Triple command from FPrep using the
MASCOT subroutines introduced by Keller et al. in [KOS16]. We give these constructions in the
FOT,FROT-hybrid model where we assume the OT and Random OT (ROT) functionality:
F1,kOT : ((s0, s1), b) 7→ (⊥, sb)
F1,kROT : (⊥, b) 7→ ((r0, r1), rb)
where r0, r1
$← {0, 1}k and b ∈ {0, 1} is the receiver’s input bit.
In F1,kOT one party PS (the sender) inputs two k-bit strings s0, s1 while the receiver PR inputs a
choice bit b ∈ {0, 1}. As a result F1,kOT outputs the string sb corresponding to the choice of PR while
keeping s1−b secret.
In F1,kROT the receiver inputs a choice bit b. The functionality F
1,k
ROT then samples two random k
bit-strings r0, r1
$← {0, 1}k and sends them to PS while sending only rb to PR.
To multiply two random secrets, MASCOT uses a generalization of these two functionalities: F l,kOT
and F l,kROT where they denote l sets of k-bit string OTs. The two functionalities can be efficiently in-
stantiated using a malicious OT extension protocol [KOS15]. These ideas can be traced back from the
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ΠOnline[SPDZ]
Init: On input (Init,F) from all parties call FPrep.Init(F) to get an additive sharing of the MAC




Input: To provide an input x party Pi retrieves an input tuple by calling FPrep.Input(Pi) which
outputs an authenticated shared mask JrK such that only Pi knows the secret r. After Pi broadcasts
x+ r then parties adjust the sharing of x accordingly:
1. Party P1 computes x(1) ← (x+r)−r(1) while all other parties do x(i) ← (x+r)−r(i), ∀i > 1.
2. Compute MAC shares: γ(i)(x)← α(i) · (x+ r)− γ(i)(r), ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n].
and store JxK as the tuple (x(1), . . . , x(n), γ(1)(x), . . . , γ(n)(x)).
Add: To add two shared values JxK, JyK parties locally add their shares and assign Jx+ yK ←
JxK + JyK.
Mult: To multiply two values JzK ← JxK · JyK parties call FPrep.Triple to retrieve a random au-
thenticated triple JaK, JbK, JcK such that c = a · b. Then they:
1. Call FPrep.Open on JxK− JaK and JyK− JbK to get ε and ρ respectively.
2. To compute the sharing of the product Jx · yK they set JzK← JcK + ε · JbK + ρ · JaK + ε · ρ.
Output: To output a secret JxK parties:
1. Call FPrep.Check on all previous opened values. If the result is Abort then parties abort.
Otherwise continue and
2. Broadcast xi and call FPrep.Check on the opened value x using the MAC shares. Abort if
FPrep.Check fails.
Figure 3.3: Online phase protocol of SPDZ.
TinyOT line of work [NNOB12, LOS14, FKOS15] designed for dishonest majority multiparty compu-
tation for Boolean circuits (fields of characteristic two).
The high-level idea can be explained with a small example for the two party case, say PA and PB
each having some secret MAC keys ∆A,∆B ∈ Fk. First, PA samples a vector of τ field elements
a
$← Fτ while PB samples a single field element b
$← F. Denote with k = log |F|. Then parties
optimistically multiply a · b using Fτk,kROT where PA inputs a and PB inputs b to get a sharing of their
product c = cA + cB = a · b. This is described as the Multiply step in Figure 3.6. After the Multiply
stage parties call theFRand functionality to get 2 random vectors r, r̂ ∈ Fτ which are used to “collapse”
the vectors into field elements a, b, c, â, â · b described in Step 3.5 from Figure 3.6.
In the Authenticate phase (Step 3.5) parties call FPrep.Input to add MACs on the previous data
using Figure 3.5. At the core of this method lies the protocol called Correlated Oblivious Produce
Evaluation with errors (COPEe) described in Figure 3.4. In this step an adversary can introduce some
additive errors which are later mitigated by checking a random linear combination of the vector entries,
similar to the MAC-checking procedure in SPDZ, described in more detail later on in Chapter 4.
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Protocol ΠCOPEe
A PRF F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}k is used for OT Extension. We write F2k ∼= F2[X]/(f)
where f ∈ F2[X] is an irreducible polynomial of degree k in F2.
Initialize:






b ∈ {0, 1}λ for all (i, b) ∈ [k]× {0, 1}.




1)i∈[k]) and PB inputs ∆B =
(∆0, . . . ,∆k−1) ∈ {0, 1}k.
3. Fk,λOT outputs (k
i
∆i
)i∈[k] to PB .
Extend: On (local) input (x,F) ∈ F× {Fp,F2k} from PA, the parties do the following:




2. For each i = 0 to k − 1, the parties do the following:
a) PA computes
t0i ← 〈g, F (k0i ||j)〉 and t1i ← 〈g, F (k1i ||j)〉
and PB computes
t∆ii ← 〈g, F (k
i
∆i ||j)〉
b) Both parties compute and store j ← j + 1.
c) PA computes ui ← t0i − t1i + x and sends ui to PB .
d) PB computes qi ← ∆i · ui + t∆ii .
e) PA computes ti ← −t0i .
3. PA locally outputs t← 〈g, (t0, . . . , tk−1)〉 and PB locally outputs q ← 〈g, (q0, . . . , qk−1)〉.
Figure 3.4: Protocol ΠCOPEe from MASCOT [KOS16].
Finally, to mitigate a possible additive error on c, i.e. all the above procedures authenticated c =
a · b + ε instead of a · b, Keller et al. use a standard Beaver sacrifice trick with a small twist since the
multiplier b is fixed here. The reader can consult their paper to see details on security proofs, in this
thesis we aim to give just a brief overview on how triple generation protocols work using OT. Note that
in [KOS16] the triple generation when F := F2k is slightly faster than when F := Fp due to the binary
nature of OT though the performance for characteristic p closely matches the one for characteristic 2.
As described in Chapter 4 the difference between the two fields is much larger when the preprocessing
is done with Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption.
3.6 Brief overview of Garbled Circuits
The other major paradigm through which MPC can be achieved is using garbled circuits. The benefit of
using garbled circuits is that the number of communication rounds required to evaluate any circuit C is
constant as opposed to linear secret sharing schemes such as SPDZ where the communication rounds
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Protocol ΠJ·K
Initialize: Each party Pi samples a MAC key ∆(i) ∈ F and call FCOPEe.Init(F) with all other
parties Pj , j 6= i where each Pj inputs ∆(j) (see functionality in [KOS16] as the protocol is
described in Figure 3.4).
Input: On input (Input, id1, . . . , idl, x1, . . . , xl, Pj) from party Pj and (Input, id1, . . . , idl, Pj)
from all players Pi where i 6= j:
1. Pj samples x0
$← F.




h = xh and sends x
(i)
h to party Pi.
3. For all i 6= j, Pi and Pj execute FCOPEe where Pj inputs (x0, . . . , xl) ∈ Fl+1.
4. Pi gets q
(ij)







h = xh ·∆
(i), for h = 0, . . . , l.
5. All parties Pi, i 6= j compute the MAC shares m(i)h = q
(ij)
h while Pj computes the corre-





h to obtain JxhK for all h = 0, . . . , l.
6. Parties call r $← FRand(Fl+1).










9. Parties run FPrep.Check with y and the authentication shares {m(i)}i∈[n] (this is instantiated
with ΠMACCheck from Figure 4.9).
10. Store the shares and MAC shares under handles id1, . . . , idl.
Figure 3.5: Protocol ΠJ·K from MASCOT [KOS16].
is proportional to the circuit depth. Garbled circuits also have the benefit that the current constructions
are the most efficients to evaluate Boolean circuits, that is the circuit gates operations as additions and
multiplications are represented by the traditional XOR/AND operations over F2 [HSS17, WRK17a,
WRK17b, KY18].
The main focus of this section is to describe garbled circuits for the multiparty case while following
the two-party closely to ease the explanation. In this thesis garbled circuits are needed just for for
Chapter 8 as it deals with mixed-protocols, the rest of the chapters can be read without having any
knowledge GC techniques. Moreover we only need a light introduction to GC since the methods in
Chapter 8 use them in a black-box way, the benefit of this being able to plug in any modern GC
protocol to make conversions faster.
Garbled circuits were implicitly introduced by Yao in 1986 [Yao82, Yao86]. Interestingly enough,
their explicit construction was only given during Yao’s talks related to those two papers [Yao19] while a
full security proof was published in 2004 by Lindell and Pinkas [LP04]. Yao’s garbled circuits adversary
model was for two-parties semi-honest case. From a high level point of view, to evaluate a function
26
3.6. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF GARBLED CIRCUITS
Protocol ΠTriple
An integer τ ≥ 3 which specifies the number of triples generated for a single output triple.
Multiply:
1. Each party Pi samples a(i)
$← Fτ and b(i) $← F.
2. All ordered pair of parties (Pi, Pj) does the following:
a) Call Fτk,kROT where Pi inputs (a
(i)
1 , . . . , a
(i)
τk) = g
−1(a(i)) (a τk-bit string).











, for h = 1, . . . , τk.







(j), h ∈ [τk] to Pi.










(j), for h = 1, . . . , τk. Set q(ji)h = q
(ji)
0,h .
e) Parse (t(ij)1 , . . . , t
(ij)
τk ) and (q
(ji)
1 , . . . , q
(ji)
τk ) as a concatenation of τ vectors, each of length
k, i.e. (t1, . . . , tτ ) and (q1, . . . ,qτ ).
f) Pi sets c
(i)
i,j = (〈g, t1〉, . . . , 〈g, tτ 〉) ∈ Fτ .
g) Pj sets c
(j)
i,j = −(〈g,q1〉, . . . , 〈g,qτ 〉) ∈ Fτ .






(i) · b(j) ∈ Fτ .
3. Now each party Pi computes the sharing of the cross-product a · b:







j,i ) ∈ F
τ
Combine:
1. Sample r, r̂ $← FRand(Fτ )
2. Party Pi sets
a(i) = 〈a(i), r〉, c(i) = 〈c(i), r〉 and â(i) = 〈a(i), r̂〉, ĉ(i) = 〈c(i), r̂〉
Authenticate: All parties call FPrep.Input (implemented using ΠJ·K from Figure 3.5) on their
shares to obtain JaK, JbK, JâK, Jb̂K, JcK.
Sacrifice:
1. Call r ← FRand.
2. Call FPrep.LinComb for r · JbK− Jb̂K and store them as JρK.
3. Reveal ρ← FPrep.Open(JρK).
4. Call FPrep.Open(·) on σ ← r · c− ĉ− ρ · a. If σ 6= 0 then abort; else continue.
5. Call FPrep.Check an all opened values. If any check fails then abort, otherwise continue the
protocol.
Output: JaK, JbK, JcK as a valid triple.
Figure 3.6: Protocol ΠTriple from MASCOT [KOS16].
27
CHAPTER 3. MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION FOR DISHONEST MAJORITY





















Table 3.1: Garbling an AND gate.
C(x, y) where x and y are joint inputs, one party (also denoted as the garbler) takes the circuit C,
garbles it and sends the garbled version Ĉ along with the garbled input x̂ to the other party (called the
evaluator). The evaluator can get the output of C(x, y) by executing several OTs (Oblivious Transfers)
with the garbler to get the decryption keys of the circuit corresponding to input y without revealing it.
A couple of years later Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [BMR90] extended the Yao GC construction
to multiple parties being able to jointly evaluate a circuit. This multiparty protocol for garbled circuits
is known in the literature as the BMR protocol. Since in the BMR protocol parties sample jointly some
random coins and perform secret shared multiplications they used the GMW protocol as a subroutine
[GMW87] which works for an honest majority. To bootstrap BMR against malicious parties they had
to use costly zero knowledge proofs for parties to prove that they have computed some PRGs correctly.
This was mitigated for the first time in the SPDZ-BMR paper by Lindel et al. [LPSY15] which replaced
the PRG calls to PRF calls, enforcing parties to correctly garble through the SPDZ MAC check.
3.6.1 Two-party GC
We now proceed with a brief description of Yao’s two-party garbled circuit framework presented more
formally by Lindell and Pinkas [LP04]. Consider the two parties Alice and Bob acting as the garbler
and the evaluator respectively. Suppose that Alice and Bob want to compute a function F(xA, xB)
where xA is Alice’s input whereas xB is Bob’s input. The first step is for Alice to create a garbled
version of F which is represented as a boolean circuit C.
The main task is to show the garbling and evaluation process of an AND gate and XOR. After these
two procedures are shown every function F can be evaluated after split into ANDs and XORs.
We now proceed with the most primitive form of garbling an AND gate: two inputs u, v and one
output u · v. A garbled version of this gate is to have a set of random keys associated to each possible
input wire ku, kv and output the key associated to the AND of the previous input wires, see Table 3.1.
Garbling an XOR gate is done in an identical manner with the tiny modification that the output key is
ku⊕vw instead of k
u·v
w . After Alice garbles the entire circuit, she then shuffles all four entries within each
garbled table ĝ ∈ Ĝ and sends them to Bob along with the associated input keys of kxAuA . The next step
is for Alice and Bob to execute OTs for each input wire which is dependent on Bob’s input. In each
OT, Alice places the input wire keys kxBuB and Bob inputs his bit b to get the corresponding wire key to
Bob’s input choice.
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There are a couple of improvements which can reduce drastically the cost of garbling an XOR gate
as well as the number of calls to E done by the garbler. Moreover in the two-party case there is another
optimization called half-gates introduced by Zahur, Rosulek and Evans [ZRE15] which make the row-
reduction trick described by [NPS99, PSSW09] compatible with the free-XOR optimization reducing
the cost of an AND gate to 2 ciphertexts while also maintaining the cost of a garbled XOR gate to zero
ciphertexts.
Point and Permute. Note that once Bob has obtained the garbled table from Alice then he needs
to perform four decryptions and see which one results in a valid plaintext. This valid plaintext can be
considered a random key to which some "OK" string was appended by Alice in the garbling procedure.
If Bob uses an incorrect key to decrypt then with high probability the plaintext will contain no "OK"
string. In order to reduce Bob’s effort to decrypt each entry of the garbled table during the evaluation
phase a technique called point-and-permute was introduced in the BMR paper [BMR90]. To enable
point-and-permute Alice samples for every input wire u some random mask λu. To garble a gate g ∈ G
with input wires (u, v) Alice encrypts Ekλu⊕u(Ekλv⊕v(kλw⊕w||λw ⊕ w)) where w is the output of
g(u, v). For each garbled truth table Alice sorts the entries lexicographically by the masked output wire
λw ⊕ w and then sends all entries to Bob along with the masked inputs λa ⊕ a of Alice and the masks
of Bob λb. The parties will run an OT for each of Bob’s inputs where Alice inputs the keys kλb as
k0 and kλb⊕1 as k1 and Bob inputs b ⊕ λb. After Bob obtained kλb⊕b he can proceed to decrypt the
entry corresponding to (λa ⊕ a) ⊕ (λb ⊕ b). Once Bob decrypted kλa⊕b⊕a⊕b along with the signal bit
λa⊕b⊕ a⊕ b he can continue with the next output gate using the signal bit and the newly obtained key.
The masked bits Λa := λa ⊕ a or Λb := λb ⊕ b are sometimes denoted in the literature as signal bits.
Free XOR. Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08] introduced one of the most popular optimizations for
garbled circuits which allows to compute XOR gates at virtually no cost, making Boolean additions
just local operations as in the linear secret shared based MPC. The central idea of their construction is
to correlate the input wire keys by a global difference ∆, i.e. k0u ⊕ k1u = ∆. After the global difference
is sampled ∆ $← {0, 1}κ then the correlation is realised by sampling every zero key at random k0u
$←
{0, 1}κ and setting the wire key for input 1 to be k1u ← k0u ⊕ ∆. One can combine the free-XOR
optimization with the point-and-permute easily: for every input wire (u, v) to an XOR gate to obtain
the signal bit of the output compute Λw := Λu ⊕ Λv.
3.6.2 BMR Garbling
As opposed to the two-party garbling schemes, in the multiparty setting with a dishonest majority every
party must contribute to the garbling procedure as well as in the process of evaluating the garbled truth
tables. After introducing the main optimizations used for GC nowadays we will now describe Keller
and Yanay [KY18] garbling protocol which is closely modeled after the SPDZ-BMR [LPSY15]. The
main difference from the traditional SPDZ-BMR scheme is that Keller and Yanay support free-XOR
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u v gu,v ciphertexts
0 0 Eku,0,kv,0(kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(0, 0)⊕ λw), gid)
0 1 Eku,0,kv,1(kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(0, 1)⊕ λw), gid)
1 0 Eku,1,kv,0(kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(1, 0)⊕ λw), gid)
1 1 Eku,1,kv,1(kw,0 ⊕∆ · (g(1, 1)⊕ λw), gid)
Table 3.2: Free-XOR BMR garbled truth table. Parties will have a garbled table of 4 · n entries since
the keys k and global difference ∆ are vectors.
optimization and has better preprocessing time per AND gate since it uses MASCOT [KOS16] as an
MPC subroutine. Nevertheless, the techniques explained in Chapter 8 work for any kind of garbling
schemes.
In the free-XOR active BMR described in [KY18], each of the n parties Pi holds two set of keys
for each wire w:
kw,0 := (k
1





w,1, . . . , k
n
w,1)
and such that they are shifted by an unknown global difference ∆ := (∆1, . . . ,∆n), i.e. kw,1 = kw,0⊕
∆. To achieve 128-bit computational security each wire key kiw,j has to sampled randomly from the
key space {0, 1}128. Hence each kiw,0 is going to be generated using FPrep calls to RandomEntry and
then opened to party i. The same process is for sampling the global difference ∆: for each i ∈ [n] call
J∆iK ← FPrep.RandomEntry() command and then FPrep.Output(J∆iK, i) to party Pi. To make the
garbling actively secure one has to instantiate FPrep with some active secure protocol such as SPDZ or
MASCOT. To have more efficient preprocessing, in practiceFPrep[F] is replaced with SPDZ/MASCOT
over a finite field of characteristic two (SPDZ[F2k ]) where k = 128 to have computational security
κ = 128 in the PRF used for garbling.
To garble a binary gate g : {0, 1} 7→ {0, 1} with an unique identifier gid we need to use the input
keys to mask the output wire key (see Table 3.2 using a generic encryption algorithm E).
Given the shared masking bits JλaK, JλbK of the input wires, and the keys ku,kv associated to them,
for each possible input value α, β parties will mask the key corresponding to the output wire kw, to








(α⊕ JλuK) · (β ⊕ Jλw)K
)
where Fkl,kr(m) is a PRF which takes as input two keys and a message m. To benefit the AES-
NI instructions pipeline, AES with fixed key is used on a permutation of a transformed message
(m, kl, kr) 7→ M using (kl, kr) ∈ F22128 [GKWY19]. First apply the transformation M = m ⊕ (kl ·
X)⊕ (kr ·X2) ∈ F2128 and set the PRF output as
Fkl,kr(m) := M ⊕ AES0(σ(M)).
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ΠOnline[BMR]
Evaluate: On input (Evaluate, ĜC, sid) from all parties sort the garbled gates g ∈ ĜC in topolog-
ical order. Moreover, consider that g has two input wires u, v and output wire w. The case where g
is an unary gate is simple do deal with by sampling an extra key but we omit it since our protocols
do not use unary gates - see [WRK17b] for more details on unary gate garbling. If g is and AND
gate and gjα,β = Open(Jg
j
α,βK then all parties:





(gid||j) for all j ∈ [n].




w,1} computed in the garbling procedures. If the
check fails Pi aborts. Otherwise continue.
3. Set the signal bit Λw,u·v := c for which kiw,c = k
i
w,Λu·Λv .
If g is an XOR gate then:
1. Set the signal bit Λw,u⊕v := Λu ⊕ Λv.
2. Set the output key kjw,Λu⊕Λv := k
j
w,Λu
⊕ kjw,Λv for all j ∈ [n].
Figure 3.7: BMR protocol for evaluating a GC.
where AES0 represents fixed key AES with zero key and σ(Ml||Mr) = (Mr ⊕Ml)||Ml which splits
the input message M ∈ F2128 into two halves Ml||Mr which outputs the XOR of the two blocks
concatenated with the first half.
What is left to show is how to compute Jgjα,βK. The answer is relatively straightforward: after parties
agreed on the gate number gid with input wires u, v and the parties indices, then every party j ∈ [n], for




(gid||i) and calls FPrep.Input(Fkju,α,kjv,β (gid||i))




(gid||i)K. The rest of the garbled table can be
obtained by performing secret shared multiplications using 4 · n calls to FPrep.Multiply()
JλuK · J∆jK JλvK · J∆jK JλuK · (JλvK · J∆jK) JλwK · J∆jK
and a few calls to FPrep.Add() which are local computations. To summarize, computing all 4n cipher-
texts in Table 3.2 has a total cost of n2 calls to FPrep.Input and 4 · n calls to FPrep.Multiply.
To evaluate the circuit parties open the gates by calling FPrep with (Open, Jgjα,βK) for each α, β ∈
{0, 1}. Then each party Pi involved in the computation which has an input wire ui computes the signal
bit corresponding to their input wires Λui = λui ⊕ ui and broadcast Λui along with the input wire key
kiu,Λui
to all parties. Parties are now ready to un-peel the PRF outputs using the broadcasted wire keys





This chapter is based on joint work with Marcel Keller and Valerio Pastro [KPR18] which was pre-
sented at EUROCRYPT 2018.
4.1 Contributions
In this chapter we show some overlooked methods for SHE can be better than the state-of-the-art triple
generation for dishonest majority using MASCOT by Keller et al. [KOS16]. Concretely we give two
improved protocols which:
1. Are up to 6 times faster over a LAN setting and up to 20x faster on a WAN for the two party case
due to a reduction in communication.
2. Scale better when increasing the number of parties due to a new ZK proof, doubling the perfor-
mance for 16 parties.
We also give improved descriptions of the protocols in [KPR18] and more accurate bounds on the SHE
ciphertexts sizes using an updated analysis from Baum et al [BCS19]. We also give a UC simulator
description instead of the limited UC simulator in the original paper.
4.2 Overview
The core idea of SPDZ is that, instead of encrypting the parties’ inputs, it is easier to work with ran-
dom data, conduct some checks at the end of the protocol, and abort if malicious behavior is detected.
In order to evaluate a function with private inputs, the computation is separated in two phases, a pre-
processing (or offline) phase and an online phase. The latter uses information-theoretic algorithms to
compute the results from the inputs and the correlated randomness produced by the offline phase.
The correlated randomness consists of secret-shared random multiplication triples, that is (a, b, a·b)
for random a and b. In SPDZ, the parties encrypt random additive shares of a and b under a global pub-
lic key, use the homomorphic properties to sum up and multiply the shares, and then run a distributed
decryption protocol to learn their share of a · b. With respect to malicious parties, there are two require-
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ments on the encrypted shares of a and b. First, they need to be independent of other parties’ shares,
otherwise the sum would not be random, and second, the ciphertexts have to be valid. In the context of
lattice-based cryptography, this means that the noise must be limited. Both requirements are achieved
by using zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and bounds of the plaintext and encryption randomness.
It turns out that this is the most expensive part of the protocol.
The original SPDZ protocol [DPSZ12] uses a relatively simple Schnorr-like protocol [CD09] to
prove knowledge of plaintext and correctness of ciphertexts, but the later implementation [DKL+13]
uses more sophisticated cut-and-choose-style protocols for both covert and active security. We have
found that the simpler Schnorr-like protocol, which guarantees security against active malicious parties,
is actually more efficient than the cut-and-choose proof with covert security.
Intuitively, it suffices that the encryption of the sum of all shares has to be correct because only
the sum is used in the protocol. We take advantage of this by replacing the per-party proof with a
global proof in Section 4.9. This significantly reduces the computation because every party only has to
check one proof instead of n− 1. However, the communication complexity stays the same because the
independence requirement means that every party still has to commit to every other party in some sense.
Otherwise, a rushing adversary could make its input dependent on others, resulting in a predictable
triple.
Section 4.8 contains our largest theoretical contribution. We present a replacement for the offline
phase of SPDZ based solely on the additive homomorphism of BGV. This allows to reduce the com-
munication and computation compared to SPDZ because the ciphertext modulus can be smaller. At
the core of our scheme is the two-party oblivious multiplication protocol by Bendlin et al. [BDOZ11],
which is based on the multiplication of ciphertexts and constants. Unlike their work, we assume that the
underlying cryptosystem achieves linear targeted malleability introduced by Bitansky et al. [BCI+13],
which enables us to avoid the costliest part of their protocol, the proof of correct multiplication. Instead,
we replace this check by the SPDZ sacrifice, and argue that BGV with increased entropy in the secret
key is a candidate for the above-mentioned assumption.
We do not consider the restriction to BGV to be a loss. Bendlin et al. suggest two flavors for the
underlying cryptosystem: lattice-based and Paillier-like. For lattice-based cryptosystems, Costache and
Smart [CS16] have shown that BGV is very competitive for large enough plaintext moduli such as
needed by our protocol. On the other hand, Paillier only supports simple packing techniques and makes
it difficult to manipulate individual slots [NWI+13]. Another advantage of BGV over Paillier is the
heavy parallelization with CRT and FFT since in the lattice-based cryptosystem the ciphertext modulus
can be a product of several primes (see more in Section 4.6).
To see how the two protocols combine ideas from different papers in a novel way, check Figure 4.2.
In a nutshell HighGear borrows ideas from two papers but adds the global Zero Knowledge proof
to achieve a better scalability with the number of parties. On the other hand LowGear avoids some
ZK proofs for HE plaintext-ciphertext multiplication and replaces Paillier cryptosystem with a BGV
























Figure 4.1: Paper dependencies for HighGear and LowGear.
4.3 Algebra
Let R = Z[X]/〈f(x)〉 be the ring of polynomials with integer coefficients modulo an irreducible
monic polynomial f(x). Throughout this chapter we will use f(x) = Φm(X) which denotes the m-th
cyclotomic polynomial. Since we mostly work with cyclotomic polynomials reduced modulo an integer
q recall that Φm(X) mod q =
∏
i∈(Z/mZ)∗(X − ωim) mod q where ωim is the m-th rooth of unity of
Z/qZ i.e. (ωim)m = 1 mod q. In the context of the BGV scheme we are interested in the case when m
is a power of two (due to hardness of underlying Ring-LWE problem and plaintext slot manipulation).
When this happens then Φm(X) = Xm/2 + 1 and has degree N = φ(m) which is |(Z/mZ)∗|.
4.3.1 Plaintext space
Consider the case when the plaintext modulus is R/pR ∼= R/〈(Φm(X), p)〉. If p and m are carefully
chosen such that pd ≡ 1 mod m then Φm(X) “splits” into ` := N/d distinct irreducible polynomials,
each with degree d, i.e. Φm(X) ∼= F1(X) · · ·F`(X) . Since in our MPC protocols the inputs are in a
large field Fp, the plaintext space where the triples are produced has to be isomorphic with Fp. This is
achieved by setting d = 1, find a p ≡ 1 mod m, hence the cyclotomic polynomial splits into ` copies
of Fp.
As noticed by Gentry et al. [GHS12], one can see a ring elementRp as an array a = (a1, . . . , aφ(m))
with φ(m) entries where each value is a coefficient modulo p of a degree φ(m) polynomial. Another
way to get a representation of the polynomial is by evaluating it in every root of unity from (Z/mZ)∗,
i.e. b = (b1, . . . , bφ(m)) where each bi = a(ωim) for each i ∈ (Z/mZ)∗. Note that bi = a mod (X −
ωim) ∈ Z/pZ. The second representation allows plaintexts or ciphertexts to be multiplied efficiently
similar with the FFT multiplication.
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4.3.2 Canonical embedding
One of the key insights Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [LPR10] used for introducing the Ring-
LWE problem was to switch from the traditional view of coefficient wise embedding to the canonical
embedding κ : R 7→ Cφ(m) in order to bound the error distributions more tightly. One can think of
the embedding κ as a map from an element a 7→ (κ1(a), . . . , κn(a)) where each κi(a) evaluates the
polynomial a in every m-th order root of unity. We denote ‖a‖can = κ(a) and the coefficient embedding
as ‖a‖. These are equipped with the traditional lp norms where p = 1, . . . ,∞, i.e. ‖a‖canp and ‖a‖p.
Next we highlight some inequalities which are going to be used to determine the ZK and SHE
parameters:




∞ (known as the triangle inequality),
• For any a ∈ R: ‖a‖can∞ ≤ ‖a‖1,
• For any a ∈ R: ‖a‖1 ≤ φ(m) · ‖a‖∞.
From the last two inequalities it can be deduced that ‖a‖can∞ ≤ φ(m) · ‖a‖∞.
4.3.3 Probability distributions
We now describe the sampling procedures required to encrypt a message. Note that the procedure is
called for each of the φ(m) polynomial coefficients.
• U(Rq): draws a random element from a
$← Rq. This is achieved by sampling a random integer
mod q for each component of a.
• DG(σ2, Rq): generates each coefficient from the Gaussian centered at zero and variance σ2. In
practice this is approximated using binomial distribution as in NewHope [ADPS16]: sample a
few elements uniformly from {−1, 1} and then sum them.
• ZO(0.5): samples each coefficient with values from {−1, 0, 1} where p0 = 1/2 and p−1 =
p1 = 1/4.
• HWT (h): outputs a polynomial with random coefficients from {−1, 0, 1} where h of them are
non-zero.
In order to bound the expected canonical norm of an element we need to compute the variance of κi(a)
for each sampled a ∈ Rq. If a
$← U(Rq) then its variance V = φ(m)q2/12 since each coefficient has
variance q2/12. If a is sampled from DG(σ2, Rq) then the variance is σ2φ(m). Next, if a
$← ZO(0.5)
then V = φ(m)/2. Lastly, when a $← HWT (h) since it has h non-zero coefficients then V = h.
Since κi(a) is the sum of φ(m) (many) independent and identical distributed variables, then by the
law of large numbers it behaves similar with a Gaussian variable with standard deviation
√
V . In order





V ] is ≈ 2−55. To compute this probability they used what is called in the literature
as complementary error function erfc [AA92]. The function erfc(x) measures the chance of a Gaussian
variable with zero mean and variance σ =
√
0.5 (or standard normal distribution) to fall outside the
bounds [−x, x]. Notice that erfc(6) ≈ 2−55.
36
4.4. RING LEARNING WITH ERRORS
We then denote c1 ·
√
V as a high probability bound of the canonical embedding of an element
sampled with variance V . Next ‖a1 · a2‖can∞ ≤ c2 ·
√
V1 · V2 is the canonical bound on the product of
two elements, first sampled with variance V1 and the other with variance V2. We set ci = eii for which
erfc(ei)
i ≤ 2−55.
For example, when using the NewHope parameters for the standard deviation, i.e. σ =
√
10 then the
infinity norm of ‖a‖∞ where a
$← DG(10, Rq) is equal to 6
√
10 which is at most 20. On the other, when
multiplying two ciphertexts with variance V1 and V2 then the expected noise bound on their product is
18 ·V1 ·V2 as erfc(4.2)2 ≈ 2−55 and 4.22 ≈ 18. In the analysis throughout we will call the noise bound
of individual randomness components as NewHopeB as in SCALE documentation [ACK+19].
4.4 Ring Learning with Errors
The problem of learning with errors was introduced by Regev in 2005 [Reg05] in which the main task
is to decide whether a set of linear equation modulo p related by a secret s to which some error is
added is any different than sampling a random number modulo p. More concretely, the main theorem
in [Reg05] is the following:
Theorem 10. (Informal) Let p ≤ poly(n) be a prime integer and n samples of the form 〈ai, s〉 + ei
where s ∈ Znp and every ai
$← U(Znp ), bi
$← U(Zp) and ei
$← Dχ is sampled independently. The
decision-LWE problem states that it is computationally hard to distinguish between
(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei) ≈c (a, bi).
Regev’s main result was that under specific p and error distributions Dχ then the DLWE[p, χ] can
be reduced to an instance of the decision SIVP (Shortest Independent Vector Problem) for which it is
conjectured that this there is no quantum algorithm to solve the problem in polynomial time [AKS01,
Sch87]. Recently it was shown that using classical reductions (i.e. on a classical computer) LWE is at
least as hard as worst-case standard lattice problems [BLP+13].
Due to the large public key size and small encryption rate of LWE based cryptosystems, Lyuba-
shevsky et al. [LPR10] proposed a more efficient variant of LWE called Ring-LWE independently
and concurrently with Stehlé et al. [SSTX09]. In this case a Ring-LWE sample is given by sampling
a
$← U(Rq), e
$← Dχ(Rq) and output a · s+ e.
In our HighGear protocol (Section 4.9), which we view it as a more efficient version of SPDZ, we
need some specific assumptions which were used before in the original SPDZ paper namely
1. Hardness assumption of Ring-LWE with a sparse secret.
2. Key-dependent-message (KDM) assumption.
First we state the sparse-secret Ring-LWE assumption in Definition 11. Stehlé et al. [BLP+13] showed
in Theorem 4.1 that the problem of solving LWE with a secret of size n and a modulus q is equivalent to
solving the sparse-secret LWE problem with a Hamming weight of at least n log q and some additional
constant [MP13]. The state of the art of LWE cryptanalysis with sparse secrets is presented in [CP19,
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SC19]. Although the attacks are described for the LWE problem they transfer to the Ring-LWE with
the same complexity.
Definition 11. (Ring-LWE sample with sparse secret key). Let s $← HWT (h) then
(a, a · s+ p · e) ≈c (a, u)
where e $← DG(σ2, Rq) and a, u
$← U(Rq).
Second we state the KDM assumption in Definition 12. For a more formal definition one should check
Boneh et al. paper [BHHO08] where they used linear dependence on the secret key for DDH based
cryptosystem. Note that Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11] proved the KDM assumption for a more
general case when f is a d-degree polynomial by expanding the ciphertext to d + 1 components and
proved that it’s secure assuming hardness of Polynomial LWE (PLWE). Recently is was shown by
Roşca et al. that decision/search versions of RLWE and PLWE are equivalent [RSW18].
The difference between the KDM definition used in SPDZ-2 [DKL+13] (Definition 12) and the
one by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11] is that in SPDZ-2 the key switching material contains a
quadratic function over additive shares of the secret key i.e. Enc(s2) where each party Pi has knowledge
of si such that s =
∑n
i=1 si. If one uses this special key switch material under the assumption given
in Definition 12 then a ciphertext c is a simply pair of Rq × Rq elements. Note that it is not known
how to use the KDM security definition from [BV11] in our case without expanding the ciphertext to
3 components (R3q) since they require d+ 1 ciphertext components where d is the degree of the secret
key correlation. This is why in SPDZ-1 [DPSZ12] there was little use for the extra KDM assumption
since the ciphertexts were elements in R3q .
Definition 12. (KDM security assumption [DKL+13]). Let s $← HWT (h) where s =
∑n
i=1 si and f
is any two-degree polynomial then
(a, a · s+ p · e+ f(s1, . . . , sn)) ≈c (a, u)
where e $← DG(σ2, Rq) and a, u
$← U(Rq).
In SPDZ-2 each party would sample si
$← HWT (n) whereas after modifying the key generation to
be actively secure [RST+19] this definition can be updated so that only the final secret has specific
Hamming weight and all shares si are random and add up to s.
4.5 Somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme
In the following section we describe the underlying cryptosystem used in our actively secure protocols
(LowGear and HighGear). The SHE scheme used throughout is called BGV and was introduced by
Brakerski et al. [BGV12]. This cryptosystem has been used throughout different versions of covert and
active secure n-party computations such as SPDZ-1 [DPSZ12] or SPDZ-2 [DKL+13].
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4.5.1 BGV procedures
KeyGen(λ): The algorithms depend on some public parameters parameters p, h, q, σ. In our usecase
we need to support at most one ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication where the plaintexts live modulo a
large prime number p. The ciphertexts are elements modulo a ring Rq where q is a product of two large
primes p0 · p1. For the ease of notation we denote q0 := p0 and q1 := p0 · p1. Due to some internal
procedures of BGV which are described later we require that p1 ≡ 1 mod p. The key generation
algorithm outputs a tuple (pk, sk). First compute
s← HWT (h), a← U(Rq), e← DG(σ2, Rq), and b← a · s+ p · e.
The public key and secret key pair corresponds to (pk, sk)← (b, s).
One should note that in practice the Hamming weight of the secret key is chosen to be 64 and
σ =
√
10. These parameters are related to the hardness of Ring-LWE and can be tuned using Albrecht
et al. estimator [APS15].
Encpk(m): To encrypt a message m ∈ Rp, generate a small v ← ZO(0.5), the errors e0, e1 ←
DG(σ2, Rq) and compute c0 ← m+ b · v+ p · e0 ∈ Rq followed by c1 ← a · v+ p · e1 ∈ Rq. The final
ciphertext is c← (c0, c1) ∈ R2q .
Decsk(c): To decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ R2q compute the m ← (c0 − s · c1 mod q) mod p. This
works because:
c0 − s · c1 = m+ b · v + p · e0 − s · (a · v + p · e1)
= m+ (a · s+ p · e) · v + p · e0 − s · a · v − s · p · e1
= m+ p · (e0 − s · e1 + e · v).
Hence, performing the operations modulo q and then reducing it mod p extracts the encrypted plaintext
m.
Correctness. Decryption succeeds as long as the noise associated with the ciphertext c is less than q/2
or more formally: ‖m+ p · (e0 − s · e1 + e · v)‖∞ < q/2.
Expected noise. Next we bound (probabilistically) the expected noise of a ciphertext over a random
secret key s with the canonical embedding using the decryption formula:
‖c0 − s · c1‖can∞ = ‖m+ p · (e0 − s · e1 + e · v)‖
can
∞
≤ ‖m‖can∞ + p · (‖e0‖
can
∞ + ‖s · e1‖
can
∞ + ‖e · v‖
can
∞ )
≤ φ(m) · p/2 + p · (c1 ·
√
σ2 · φ(m) + c2 ·
√
h · σ2 · φ(m) + c2 ·
√
σ2 · φ(m) · φ(m)/2)
= φ(m) · p/2 + p · σ · (c1 ·
√
φ(m) + c2 ·
√





To multiply two ciphertexts c = (c0, c1) and c′ = (c′0, c
′
1) at level one do the following:
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Mult(c, c′):




3. (d0, d1, d2)← (c0 · c′0, c0 · c′1 + c1 · c′0,−c1 · c′1)
4. c′′ ← SwitchKey(d0, d1, d2)
5. Output c′′.
Note that the tuple (d0, d1, d2) represents an encryption of m ·m′ w.r.t to the secret key s. One can see
this easily by expanding the following expression:
m ·m′ = (c0 − s · c1)(c′0 − s · c′1) = c0 · c′1 − s · (c0 · c′1 + c1 · c′0)− s2(−c1 · c′1)
Assuming the inputs to the Mult procedure have noise ν and ν ′ respectively then the noise of the new
ciphertext c′′ becomes
ν ′′ = (ν/p1 +BScale) · (ν ′/p1 +BScale) + (BKS · q0/p1 +BScale)
since the first and second noise term come from the two calls to the SwitchMod procedure whereas the
last is from one call to SwitchKey.
4.5.2.1 Key Switching
Given a ciphertext (d0, d1, d2) and a key-switching matrix Wt = (b, a)T where a
$← Uq1 and b =
a · s+ p · e− p1 · s2 mod q1 then the procedure works as follows:
SwitchKey(d0, d1, d2):
1. c0 ← (p1 · d0 + b · d2) mod q1
2. c1 ← (p1 · d1 + a · d2) mod q1
3. c′0 ← Scale(c0, q1, q0)
4. c′1 ← Scale(c1, q1, q0)




To see why this is correct we write the following expression modulo q1:
(c0 − c1 · s) = p1 · d0 + b · d2 − (p1 · d1 + a · d2) · s
= p1 · (d0 − d1 · s) + (a · s+ p · e− p1s2) · d2 − s · d2 · a
= p1 · (d0 − d1 · s− d2 · s2) + p · e · d2
Assuming the input to SwitchKey has noise ν then the noise bound on c′ becomes ν ′ = ν + BKS ·
q0/p1 + BScale where BKS · q0 = ‖p · e · d2‖∞. These bounds are derived using the same arguments
as in [GHS12, DKL+13, ACK+19]. Note that the only time the condition p1 ≡ 1 mod p comes into





This procedure starts with a ciphertext c mod q1 having a noise ν and re-interprets it as a ciphertext
c′ mod q0 encrypting the same message as c. For a complete description of the Scale procedure the
reader can check Appendix D. of [GHS12].
SwitchMod(c):
1. c′0 = Scale(c0, q1, q0)
2. c′1 = Scale(c1, q1, q0)
3. c′ = (c′0, c
′
1)
4. Output c′ where the fresh noise is ν ′ = ν/p1 +BScale.
4.6 Why BGV?
One can ask the obvious question whether BGV is a good candidate to bootstrap multiparty compu-
tation for SPDZ. And the answer is yes for a number of reasons, for example the efficiency of SIMD
(Single Instruction Multiple Data) operations to batch many triples in one go and for the ciphertext
size. Compared with BFV/FV and other BGV has a smaller ciphertext [CS16] although in the case of
FV we could get away with a smaller ZK proof since we don’t need to prove the plaintext bounds, only
the randomness bounds.
For the LowGear protocol described in Section 4.8 one could also use Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99,
DJ01] or Benaloh [Ben94], Kawachi et al [KTX07] and many others. For a more comprehensive study
on the semi-homomorphic encryption schemes the reader can consult [AAUC18]. One interesting open
question would be to survey the efficiency of recent improvements of all these semi-homomorphic
encryption schemes, provide additional zero knowledge proofs of plaintext and compare their perfor-
mance. For example, in Monza [CDFG20] they achieve multiparty computation over a ring Z2k by
considering an unusual encryption scheme, namely the JL cryptosystem [BHJL17] which is based on
the quadratic residues problem.
We leave this survey out of the scope of this thesis as we will focus on comparing only Paillier with
BGV. One problem with Paillier scheme is that it is hard to support native computation over plaintexts
modulo p. Moreover, operating many plaintexts within a single ciphertext to allow batching seems
highly non-trivial as we need to multiply slots with different values for the triple generation. The only
candidate good-for-all seems to be BGV.
4.7 Proofs of knowledge
The concept of proving a statement about a secret without revealing the secret was introduced in 1985
by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85]. The authors formalize the idea of interactive proof sys-
tems and how to quantify the information communicated between the Interactive Turing Machines
(ITMs) - for this case a prover (P) and a verifier (V) acting as ITMs. A language L is zero-knowledge
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Let R a binary relation and an error function κ : {0, 1}∗ 7→ [0, 1]. Let V an interactive function
which is computable in PPT. We say that V is a knowledge verifier for the relation R with a
knowledge error κ if the following properties hold:
1. Non-triviality: there exists a interactive function P∗ such that for every word in the language
x ∈ LR, every possible verifier V then P∗ can produce a valid transcript trx associated with
input x such that Pr [ accept(V, trP∗,V(x)) = 1 ]. Or put it into plain words, there exists a P∗
that can produce a transcript for V to accept for any given x ∈ LR.
2. Validity (with error κ). There exists a constant c > 0 and an oracle PPT machine K such




= Pr [ accept(V, trPx,V(x)) = 1 ]) > κ(x)
then K will output a string from R(x) with probabilty bounded by |x|
c
p(x)−κ(x) when K has
black-box query accesses to Px. This means that K can extract the secret x.
We note that hereK is called in the literature as the knowledge extractor and its associated knowl-
edge error κ.
Figure 4.2: Proof of knowledge definition [BG93].
if for each x ∈ L the prover reveals to the verifier that x ∈ L and nothing else. The paper break-
through consisted in proving for the first time an NP language (quadratic residue problem) using a
zero-knowledge protocol between P and V .
For the triple generation we will focus on a subset of ZK proofs, namely Σ protocols. In this case
the prover has a secret x, publishes y = f(x) and wants to prove to V that y was computed correctly
without revealing x. In previous SPDZ protocols [DPSZ12, BDOZ11] this was done via a classic 3-
round Schnorr [Sch91] protocol, assuming a homomorphic commitment function f :
1. Prover P samples a random s and commits to it by sending to V the value a← f(s).
2. Verifier samples a random challenge e $← F and sends it to P .
3. P computes z ← s+ e · x and sends it to V . The verifier checks whether f(z) = a+ e · y. If the
check passes then V accepts the proof, otherwise rejects it.
4.7.1 Definition
Proofs of Knowledge (PoKs) were informally introduced and used in 1985 by Goldwasser, Micali
[GMR85]. Later they were formalized in 1992 by Bellare and Goldreich [BG93]. We restate their
definition in Fig. 4.2. Note that the soundness property of a knowledge system is seen as an additional
feature, i.e. for all words x /∈ L then most of the transcripts given to the verifier will fail to accept
(Pr[accept(V, trP,V(x)) = 1)] < 1/2). Although this soundness property is seen as a feature to a proof
of knowledge system and avoided in the definition from Fig. 4.2 it is an important tool to limit the
power of a cheating prover.
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What this means in layman’s terms is that the only two things required to prove the security of a
PoK is that for all x ∈ L the prover must convince the verifier (non-triviality) with a valid transcript and
computable in PPT. The non-triviality means that non-triviality and validity (or knowledge extractor)
[BG93]. In multiparty computation the soundness parameter plays a crucial role when measuring the
security of protocol.
4.7.2 Proving the security of a Σ protocol
Due to the cumbersome way of constructing a knowledge extractor for a Σ-protocol the easier way to
do this is using special soundness. The existence of a knowledge extractor is implied by the special
soundness property: the oracle K queries the prover Px twice using the forking lemma [PS00]. Bellare
and Neven [BN06] give a more general definition of the forking lemma (3.1 in the full version of
[BN06]) in which they decouple the forking lemma from the hardness reductions. Although they keep
the structure similar: Px has fixed randomness and the goal of K is to find two accepting transcripts for
the same secret but different random oracle queries.
We will show step-by-step how one proves the security of a Σ protocol using the template from
[Ber14]. There are three steps to follow here: i) correctness, ii) security for the prover, iii) security
for the verifier. The last two steps need to build two different simulators, one for the prover and one
for the verifier.
Correctness. Follows straightforward from the additive homomorphism of f .
Security for the prover. Sometimes called honest-verifier zero knowledge. For this case, the simulator
S has to build a transcript that is indistinguishable between a real interaction ofP and V . To accomplish
this, S acts as a prover with the additional power of rewinding the verifier. After S gets the challenge
e from the verifier it samples a random z $← F. Then S rewinds V before the commitment phase and
sends a ← f(z) − e · y and continues from there with the same challenge e. The check of V passes
because the commitment was computed after z instead of before as in the real protocol.
Security for the verifier. Also referred to as special soundness. Here the simulator has to extract the
secret s given two pairs of (a, e, z), (a, e′, z′) accepting transcripts between P and V with different
challenges ie e 6= e′. Since F is a field then the simulator can compute (z − z′)/(e− e′), yielding:
((s+ e · x)− (s+ e′ · x))/(e− e′) = x(e− e′)/(e− e′) = x
Special soundness implies 1/|F| soundness where |F| is the challenge set size. To see why this is
true, consider a verifier that just received P’s commitment and now has to select a challenge. For each
challenge e ∈ F the prover has a probability p(e) of providing a transcript which is going to be accepted





that (a, e, z) gets accepted by the verifier although f was computed incorrectly i.e. y 6= f(x) or x /∈ L.
Using proof by contradiction this means that at most one term of p(e) is non-zero. The contradiction
comes from that if there were more than one non-zero probability terms p(e) then we could extract the
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ΠpairZKPoK
Let Bplain, Brand defined in Figure 4.4. Let V = 2 · sec − 1 and Me ∈ {0, 1}V×sec the be matrix
associated with the challenge e such that Mkl = ek−l+1 for 1 ≤ k − l + 1 ≤ sec and 0 in all
other entries. The randomness used for encryptions of x(i),y(i) is packed into matrices r(i) ←
(r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
sec) and s(i) ← (s(i)1 , . . . , s
(i)
V ). Hence r
(i),∈ Zsec×3 and s(i) ∈ ZV×3 (each row has 3
entries according to Enc defined in Section 4.5.1). Recall that here x(i) is a vector with sec entries:
(x
(i)
1 , . . . ,x
(i)
sec) and y(i) has V entries: (y
(i)
1 , . . . ,y
(i)
V ).
To improve readability we replace Me · xᵀ with Me  x.
1. Each party Pi broadcasts E(i) = Encpki(x
(i), r(i)) where x(i), r(i) ← Sample(Honest).
2. Each party Pi privately samples each entry of y(i) and s(i) by calling y(i), s(i) ←
Sample(LowGear). Then Pi uses the random coins s(i) to compute a(i) ← Encpki(y
(i), s(i))
and broadcasts a(i).
3. The parties compute e← h(a(i), E(i)) using sec bits of output from a hash function h.
4. Each party Pi computes z(i) = y(i) +Me  x(i) and T (i) = s(i) +Me  r(i). If there is any
j ∈ [V ] for which ‖z(i)j ‖∞ > BLG ·p− sec ·p or ‖T
(i)
j ‖∞ > BLG ·ρ− sec ·ρ then Pi restarts
the protocol as a prover.
5. If the checks have passed then Pi broadcast (z(i), T (i)).
6. Each party Pi now acts as a verifier for the proof of part Pj and computes e← h(a(j), E(j))
and d(ij) = Encpkj (z
(j), t(j)) for each j 6= i where t(j) ranges through the rows of T (j).
7. Each party Pi compute the following checks:
d(ij) = a(j) +Me  E(j), ‖z(j)‖∞ ≤ BLG · p ‖T
(j)‖∞ ≤ BLG · ρ
8. If all checks pass, parties output E(j) as valid ciphertexts otherwise reject.
Figure 4.3: Protocol for pairwise proof of knowledge of a ciphertext.
secret x according to the special soundness property, implying that x ∈ L - but we first assumed that
x /∈ L. To conclude, since at most one of the p(e) terms is non-zero and p(e) ≤ 1 then the special
soundness implies a soundness of at most 1F .
4.7.3 Proofs of plaintext knowledge
In the context of multiparty computation for dishonest majority, we need to be able to prove the knowl-
edge of plaintext inside an SHE ciphertext. In fact, what is actually proved is that the plaintext and
randomness used to produce the ciphertexts are bounded. This approach by bounding data used to pro-
duce the ciphertext forces dishonest parties to produce encryptions which have a correct noise w.r.t to
the SHE scheme (see Section 4.5.1). Intuitively, the slack is defined as the difference between the hon-
est prover’s language and the dishonest prover language. For example, one honest party will encrypt
using a correct bound τ , whereas the final ZK proof check can only guarantee that the dishonest prover
plaintext was bounded by B · τ . In this case the slack is B.
We sometimes need to produce ciphertexts where the plaintext and randomness used to produce
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Sample(TypeZK)
If TypeZK = Honest:
1. Generatem $← RNp and the triple (v, e0, e1) where v
$← ZO(0.5, N), e0, e1
$← DG(σ2, N)
and N represents the number of slots. This implies that ‖m‖∞ ≤ p/2, ‖v‖∞ ≤ 1 and
‖ei‖∞ ≤ 20 - assuming that these are generated using NewHope algorithm for gaussian
sampling [ADPS16]. We let ρ = (1, 20, 20) be the tuple which bounds randomness, some-
times denoted as ρ = (1,NewHopeB,NewHopeB).
2. Output (m,v, e0, e1).
If TypeZK = LowGear, set BLG = 128 ·N · sec2:
1. Generatem $← BLG · p and the triple (v, e0, e1) where v
$← BLG and ei
$← BLG · 20.
2. Output (m,v, e0, e1).
If TypeZK = HighGear, set BHG = 2sec:
1. Generatem $← BHG · p and the triple (v, e0, e1) where v
$← BHG and ei
$← BHG · 20.
2. Output (m,v, e0, e1).
Figure 4.4: Sampling algorithms for plaintexts.
them was sampled according to some special (bounded) distributions. For the two zero knowledge
proofs we give these bounds are distinct to each of the proof due to achieving different slack sizes. The
sampling algorithms are given in Figure 4.4.
In Figure 4.3 we state the pairwise proof protocol from SPDZ-1 to prove ciphertext correctness.
Note that in SPDZ-1 [DPSZ12] there is a single global public key whereas in Figure 4.3 we describe
the protocol where each party has its own public key. Moreover the slack is much smaller than the one
used for HighGear due to rejection sampling technique by Lyubashevsky [Lyu09]. The way rejection
sampling works, as the name hints, is to generate masking coefficients with smaller norm then commit
to the chipertexts. If the challenge reveals to have a large norm then abort the proof and start again.
The first step when designing such protocols is to first set the abort probability and afterwards
compute the plaintext and randomness bounds. For example, setting an abort probability of 1/32, in
SPDZ-1, Damgård et al. end up with Bplain = 128 · N · τ · sec2 and Brand = 128 · N · ρ · sec2 and
a soundness slack S = (N · τ · sec22sec/2+8, d · ρ · sec2 · 2sec/2+8) where the first component is the
plaintext slack whereas the second is the randomness slack. We omit the security proofs of ΠpairZKPoK
as these are identical to the ones done in SPDZ-1 [DPSZ12].
4.8 LowGear - Triples from Semi-Homomorphic Encryption
The main challenge to produce secret shared multiplication triples is to be able to perform pairwise
secret multiplications. The two-party multiplication protocol can be then bootstrapped to one that pro-
duces sharings (ai, bi, ci) of (a, b, c) for each party Pi such that (
∑n





can view the product in reverse order: if each party Pi samples randomly ai, bi and engages in a two-
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FKeyReg FAuth FTriple
ΠpairAuth ΠpairTriple||ΠpairZKPoK
Figure 4.5: Functionality dependencies for LowGear.
party protocol with every other party Pj which computes ai · bj then the additive share of the product is
ci =
∑
j 6=i ai·bj . This technique was applied successfully when the two-party multiplication protocol is
instantiated with different building blocks: in BDOZa [BDOZ11] with semi-homomorphic encryption
and Paillier cryptosystem and in MASCOT [KOS16] using oblivious transfer and OT extension.
The two-party protocol with Paillier works as follows: party PA sends Enc(a) encrypted with PA’s
own public key to party PB . Next, party PB multiplies its input and adds some extra noise encrypted
with PA’s public key, i.e. it computes C = b · Enc(a) − Enc(cB) and sends the ciphertext C to PA.
Finally, if party PA decrypts it will hold cA = b · a− cB . We can see that this is an additive sharing of
the product a · b = cA + cB .
Our method draws inspiration from both BDOZa and MASCOT: we replace the Paillier cryptosys-
tem with BGV [BGV12] as the underlying encryption scheme. Moreover we use less zero-knowledge
proofs by adding an extra assumption of “linear target malleability” of an encryption scheme. This
extra notion assumes that given a BGV ciphertext with plaintext modulo p then an adversary is capable
of performing only linear homomorphic operations on the plaintext using the ciphertext.
In Figure 4.19 we give an overview of achieving FTriple which represents the Triple command in
FPrep from Figure 3.2 in the preliminaries section.
4.8.1 Key registration
Following the template of BeDOZa [BDOZ11] in the beginning of our protocol we need some setup
procedure which generates the keys for the honest and corrupted parties. Since the simulator has to be
able to decrypt the corrupted parties ciphertexts, the functionality FKeyReg in Figure 4.6 receives an
extra input from the adversary which is the randomness source to generate the keys.
4.8.2 Input authentication
One building block in realizing MPC for dishonest majority is to be able to authenticate inputs. The
authentication process ensures that if any party tries to cheat then this will be detected later in a MAC
check procedure before revealing the outputs. Once the authentication is done one can proceed with
creating authenticated random Beaver triples which are required to multiply secret shares.
The authentication step boils down to multiply a secret input with a global unknown MAC key ∆.
There are multiple ways of achieving this:
• Somewhat homomorphic property of the BGV encryption scheme in the SPDZ line of work
[DPSZ12, DKL+13],
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FKeyReg
The functionality does the key generation setup KeyGen in the following way:
Registration (honest): On input (Register, Pi) from an honest party Pi the functionality samples
(pki, ski)← KeyGen() and sends (Registered, pki, ski) to party Pi and (Registered, pki,⊥)
to all other parties.
Registration (corrupted): On input (Register, Pi, r∗) from a corrupted party Pi it samples
(pki, ski)← KeyGen() where the randomness seed for the key generation is r∗. Functional-
ity then sends (Registered, pki, ski) to party Pi and (Registered, pki,⊥) to all other parties.
Figure 4.6: Functionality for key registration.
• Semi-homomorphic property of Paillier cryptosystem in BDOZa [BDOZ11],
• Oblivious transfer in MASCOT [KOS16] or TinyOT [NNOB12].
We now illustrate the protocol for authenticating a secret in Figure 4.7 where most of the steps
are taken verbatim from the paper [KPR18]. Note that in the original description of Keller et al. their
protocol only supports a limited UC-functionality. We fix this shortcoming by having parties commit to
their inputs in Step 2 using their own public key and then execute the protocol as described originally.
The protocol ΠpairAuth implements the functionality FAuth given in Figure 4.10.
Correctness. If parties follow the protocol correctly then what remains to be verified is whether the
check in Step 4.8.2 from Figure 4.7 passes:



























k ) = 0
for all i 6= j.




k = xk ·
∑
i ∆


































k + xk ·∆
(j) = xk ·∆
Security: In Figure 4.11 we include the full UC description of the simulator for ΠpairAuth whereas in
Overdrive there is only the limited UC version.
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ΠpairAuth
Initialize: Each party Pi does the following:
1. Sample a MAC key ∆(i) $← F.
2. Parties register their keys using FKeyReg each receiving receiving (pki, ski)
3. Using ΠpairZKPoK party Pi sends an encryption Encpki(∆
(i)) to every other party where
∆(i) denotes a plaintext with all slots set to ∆(i).
Input: On input (Input, id1, . . . , idl, x1, . . . , xl, Pj) from Pj and (Input, id1, . . . , idl, Pj) from all
Pi where i 6= j:
1. We assume that l < m where m is the number of ciphertext slots in the encryption
scheme. Let x denote the vector containing xk in the first l entries and a random number
in the m-th one.
2. Party Pj commits to its inputs by broadcasting Encpkj (x).
3. For each input xk where k ∈ [1 . . . l] Pj samples randomly x
(i)
k
$← F and sends them to
the designated party i. Then Pj sets its corresponding share x
(j)




4. For every party Pi:
a) Pj computesC(i) = x·Encpki(∆
(i))−Enc′pki(e
(i)) for random e(i) and sendsC(i)
to Pi. Enc′ denotes encryption with noise p · 2sec larger than in normal encryption.
b) Pi decrypts d(i) = Decski(C
(i)).







(j) and each party





6. The parties use FRand(Fm) to generate random tk for k = 1, . . . ,m.
7. Pj broadcasts ρ =
∑m





8. Parties now call ΠMACCheck with ρ and σ(i). If check fails abort otherwise continue.
9. All parties store their authenticated shares x(i)k ,m
(i)
k as JxK under the identifiers
id1, . . . , idl.
Linear Combination: On input (LinComb, id, id1, . . . , idl, c1, . . . , cl, c) from all parties, every Pi














ck ·m(xk)(i) + c ·∆(i)
where s(i)1 denotes a fixed sharing of 1, for example, (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Continued in Figure 4.8
Figure 4.7: Protocol for n-party input authentication, part 1.
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ΠpairAuth
Open: On input (Open, id) from all parties, each Pi looks up the share x(i) with identifier id and




Check: On input (Check, id1, . . . , idl, x1, . . . , xl) from all parties:
1. Sample public vector r ← FRand(Fl).










3. Run ΠMACCheck with y,m(y)(i).
Figure 4.8: Protocol for n-party input authentication, part 2. (continued from Figure 4.7)
ΠMACCheck
Each party Pi uses y,m(y)(i),∆(i) in the following way:
1. Compute σ(i) ← m(y)(i) −∆(i)y.
2. Call FCommit with (Commit, σ(i)) to receive handle τi.
3. Broadcast σ(i) to all parties by calling FCommit with (Open, τi).
4. If σ(1) + · · ·+ σ(n) 6= 0 then abort and output ⊥; otherwise continue.
Figure 4.9: Protocol for MAC checking
FAuth
Input: On input (Input, id1, . . . , idl, x1, . . . , xl, Pj) from party Pj and (Input, id1, . . . , idl, Pj)
from all players Pi where i 6= j wait for adversary’s input. If receives OK then store
Reg[idk]← xk for all k ∈ [1 . . . l] otherwise abort.
Linear Combination: On input (LinComb, id, id1, . . . , idl, c1, . . . , cl, c) from all parties where
idk ∈ Reg.Keys() store Reg[id] =
∑l
k=1 Reg[idk] · ck + c.
Open: On input (Open, id) from all parties, send Reg[id] to the adversary; wait for input x from
the adversary and then send x to all parties.
Check: On input (Check, id1, . . . , idl, x1, . . . , xl) from all parties, wait for the adversary’s input. If
the input is OK and Reg[idk] = xk for all k ∈ [1 . . . l] then send OK to every party, otherwise
send ⊥ and terminate.
Abort: On input Abort from the adversary send ⊥ to all parties and terminate.
Figure 4.10: Functionality FAuth
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SJ·K
Let H denote the set of honest parties and A the complement thereof.
Init:
1. EmulatingFKeyReg, generate (pki, ski)← KeyGen() for all parties, using the corrupted
randomness seed r∗ received from the adversary when calling KeyGen for i ∈ A. S
then sends the keys (pkj , skj) for j ∈ [n] to all parties (including A).
2. Emulating ΠpairZKPoK, send Encpki(∆
(i)) for random ∆(i) to the adversary for all i ∈
H .
Input: We assume that j ∈ A, i ∈ H . Simulator can decrypt the input vector Encpkj (x) as it
knows secret key of corrupted parties. Simulator S plays on behalf of the honest parties.
1. S receives C(i) and decrypts d(i) = Decski(C(i)) for all honest Pi.
2. Emulating FRand, sample random ti for i = 1, . . . ,m.
3. Receive (ρ, σ(i)) from the adversary for all i ∈ H .
4. Check whether σ(i) +
∑m
k=1 tk · d
(i)
k = 0 for all i ∈ H and abort if not.
5. Computem(j)k for every j ∈ A by first setting e
(i) ← d(i)−x(j) ·∆(i) and then proceed




k + xk ·∆
(j)
k .
6. Input (x1, . . . , xl) to FAuth.
Linear Combination: For every i ∈ A, compute shares and MACs as an honest party would.
Open:
1. Receive the value x from the functionality FAuth.
2. If x is a linear combination of previously computed shares then the simulator adjusts
the honest parties’ shares accordingly. Otherwise, sample new random shares {xi}i∈H .
3. Emulate the broadcast with the adversary using the simulated honest parties’ and re-
ceive the corrupted parties’ shares.







forward x∗ back to FAuth while also updating the dictionaries of HS and CS.
Check:
1. Emulate FRand, send r to corrupted parties.
2. Emulate FCommit receive σ(i) for all i ∈ A, and adjust honest parties’ shares σ(i) =




(i) does not match the result computed from stored shares, abort FAuth.
Figure 4.11: Simulator for ΠAuth.
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ΠpairTriple
Multiply:
1. Each party Pi samples a(i),b(i), b̂(i)
$← F (such that the length of every vector matches
the number of slots in the encryption scheme).
2. Every unordered pair (Pi, Pj) executes the following:
a) Pi uses ΠpairZKPoK to send Pj the encryption Encpki(a
(i)).
b) Pj computes C(ij) = b(j) · Encpki(a
(i)) − Enc′0(e(ij)) for random e(ij)
$← F
and sends it to Pi. Enc′0 denotes encryption with noise p · 2sec larger than nor-
mal encryption times the slack in the zero-knowledge proof. More concretely,
Enc′0(e
(ij)
k ) = (e
(ij)
k + p · e0, p · e1) where for each slot k ∈ [N ] sample
e0, e1
$← U(p · 2sec ·Bdishonestclean−lg )
c) Pi decrypts d(ij) = Decski(C
(ij)).
d) Repeat the last two steps with b̂(i) to get ê(ij) and d̂(ij).
3. Each party Pi computes c(i) = a(i) · b(i) +
∑
j 6=i(e
(ij) + d(ij)) and ĉ(i) similarly.
Authenticate: Party Pi calls FAuth.Input with (a(i),b(i), b̂(i), c(i), ĉ(i)) and then FAuth.LinComb
to get vectors of handles of the sum of shares. E.g., we denote by JaK the vector of handles
for the respective sums of elements {a(i)}i=1...n.
Sacrifice: The parties do the following:
1. Call r ← FRand.
2. Call FAuth.LinComb for r · JbK− Jb̂K and store them as JρK.
3. Reveal ρ← FAuth.Open(JρK).
4. Call FAuth.Open(·) on τ ← r · c− ĉ− ρ · a. If τ 6= 0 then abort; else continue.
5. CallFAuth.Check an all opened values. If any check fails then abort, otherwise continue
the protocol.
Output: (JaK, JbK, JcK) as a vector of valid triples.
Figure 4.12: Protocol for random triple generation.
4.8.3 Triple generation protocol
Recall that the goal is to produce random authenticated triples (JaK, JbK, JabK) such that a, b are ran-
domly sampled from F as described in Figure 4.13. Our protocol in Figure 4.12 is modeled closely
after MASCOT [KOS16], replacing oblivious transfer with semi-homomorphic encryption. The con-
struction of a “global” multiplication from a two-party protocol works exactly the same way in both
cases. The Sacrifice step is exactly the same as in SPDZ and MASCOT and essentially guarantees that
corrupted parties have used the same inputs in the Multiplication and Authentication steps. This is
the only freedom the adversary has because all other arithmetic is handled by FAuth at this stage.
Theorem 13. ΠpairTriple implements FTriple in the (FAuth,FRand)-hybrid model with a dishonest ma-
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FTriple
FTriple offers the same interface as FAuth and the following function:
Triple: On input (Triple, ida, idb, idc) from all parties sample a, b
$← F and store
(Val[ida],Val[idb],Val[idc]) = (a, b, c) where c = a · b.
Figure 4.13: Functionality for random triple generation.
jority of parties.
Sketch. For the proof we use SpairTriple in Figure 4.14. The simulator is based on two important facts.
First, it can decrypt C(ji) for a corrupted party Pj because it generates the keys emulating FKeyReg.
Second, the adversary is committed to all shares of corrupted parties by the input to FAuth in the
Authenticate step. This allows the simulator to determine exactly whether the Sacrifice step in ΠAuth
will fail. Furthermore, the adversary only learns encryptions of honest parties’ shares, corrupted parties’
shares, ρ, and the result of the check. If the check fails, the protocol aborts, ρ is independent of any
output information because b̂ and ĉ are discarded at the end, and finally, an environment deducing
information from the encryptions can be used to break the enhanced-CPA security of the underlying
cryptosystem. In addition, the environment only learns handles to triples in the Output steps, from
which no information can be deduced.
4.8.4 Enhanced CPA Security
We want to reduce the security of our protocol to an enhanced version of the CPA game for the en-
cryption scheme. In other words, if the encryption scheme in use is enhanced-CPA secure, then even a
selective failure caused by the adversary does not reveal private information.
We say that an encryption scheme is enhanced-CPA secure if, for all PPT adversaries in the game
from Figure 4.15, Pr[b = b′]− 1/2 is negligible in κ.
Achieving enhanced-CPA security. The game without zero-checks in step 3 clearly can be reduced to
the standard CPA game. Furthermore, we have to make sure that the oracle queries cannot be used to
reveal information about m. The cryptosystem is only designed to allow affine linear operations limit-
ing the adversary to succeed only with negligible probability due to the high entropy of m. However,
if the cryptosystem would allow to generate an encryption of a bit of m from Encpk(m), the adversary
could test this bit for zero with success probability 1/2. Therefore, we have to assume that non-linear
operations on ciphertexts are not possible. To this end, Bitansky et al. [BCI+13] have introduced the
notion of linear targeted malleability. A stronger notion thereof, linear-only encryption, has been con-
jectured by Boneh et al. [BISW17] to apply to the cryptosystem by Peikert et al. [PVW08], which is
based on the ring learning with errors problem. The definition by Bitansky et al. is as follows:
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SpairTriple
Let H denote the set of honest parties and A the complement thereof.
Initialize: Emulating FKeyReg, for every i ∈ A and j ∈ H , generate all key pairs (pki, ski) and
send the relevant parts to the corresponding party.
Multiply:
1. For every i ∈ A and j ∈ H , emulate two instances of ΠpairZKPoK:
a) When Pj is the prover: send Encpkj (0) to the adversary and receive C
(ji).
b) When Pi is the prover: receive Encpki(a
(i)). S decrypts and obtains a(i). Next the
simulator replies to the adversary with −Enc′pkj (e
(ij)) for random e(ji). This way
they will obtain a sharing of zero.
Authenticate: Emulating FAuth, receive a(i),b(i), b̂(i), c(i), ĉ(i) for all i ∈ A from the adversary
and return the desired handles.
Sacrifice:
1. Emulating FRand, sample r
$← Fp and send it to the adversary.
2. Sample ρ $← Fmp and send it to the adversary emulating FAuth.Open. Set Fail if the
adversary inputs a different value in response.
3. Given the adversary’s inputs in Authenticate and Decskj (C(ji)), we can compute τ .
Send it to the adversary emulating FAuth.Open. If the response is different, or τ 6= 0,
set Fail.
4. Emulating FAuth.Check, abort if Fail is set.
Figure 4.14: Simulator for FTriple (LowGear).
Gcpa+
1. The challenger samples (pk, sk)← KeyGen(κ), sends pk to the adversary.
2. The challenger sends c = Encpk(m) for a random message m.
3. For j ∈ poly(κ):
a) The adversary sends cj to the challenger.
b) The challenger checks if Decsk(cj) = 0; if this is the case the challenger sends OK to
the adversary; else, the challenger sends FAIL to the adversary and aborts.
4. The challenger samples b $← {0, 1} and sends m to the adversary if b = 0 and a random m′
otherwise.
5. The adversary sends b′ ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger and wins the game if b = b′.
Figure 4.15: Enhanced CPA game.
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Definition 14. An encryption scheme has the linear targeted malleability property if for any polynomial-
size adversary A and plaintext generatorM there is a polynomial-size simulator S such that, for any
sufficiently large λ ∈ N, and any auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), the distributions
pk,









(s, a1, . . . , am)←M(pk)
(c1, . . . , cm)← (Encpk(a1), . . . ,Encpk(am))
(c′1, . . . , c
′










a1, . . . , am,
s,





(s, a1, . . . , am)←M(pk)
(Π,b)← S(pk; z)
(a′1, . . . , a
′
k)
> ← Π · (a1, . . . , am)> + b

are computationally indistinguishable where Π ∈ Fk×m, b ∈ Fk, and s is some arbitrary string
(possibly correlated with the plaintexts).
In the context of BGV, the definition can easily be extended to vectors of field elements. Further-
more, verifying whether a ciphertext is the image of the encryption (ImVer) can be trivially done by
checking membership in Rq ×Rq, which is possible without the secret key.
It is straightforward to see that linear targeted malleability allows to reduce the enhanced-CPA game
to a game without a zero-test oracle. We simply replace the decryption of the adversary’s queries by
a′1, . . . , a
′
k computed using S according to the definition, which can be tested for zero without knowing
the secret key. The two games are computationally indistinguishable by definition, and the modified
one can be reduced to the normal CPA game as argued above.
We now argue that BGV as used by us is a valid candidate for linear targeted malleability. First,
the definition excludes computation on ciphertexts other than affine linear maps. Most notably, this
excludes multiplication. Since we do not generate the key-switching material used by Damgård et
al. [DKL+13], there is no obvious way of computing multiplications or operations of any higher order.
Second, the definition requires the handling of ciphertexts that were generated by the adversary
without following the encryption algorithm. For example, Decsk(0, 1) = s mod p. The decryption of
such ciphertexts can be simulated by sampling a secret key and computing the decryption accordingly.
However, to avoid a security degradation due to independent consideration of standard CPA security
and linear targeted malleability, we add sec bits of entropy to the secret key.
4.8.5 A different conjecture
We now describe a different conjecture from Appendix A. of BDOZa paper [BDOZ11] which looks
similar to the enhanced CPA security but given for Paillier’s scheme. Suppose we have an adversary A
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MultSec
1. Challenger generates (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(κ), chooses y, s $← Fp and samples r. Addi-
tionally it samples b and set zb = y if b = 0 or zb = s otherwise. Next, B computes
Y = Encpk(y, r) and sends it to A.
2. Adversary outputs x and a ciphertext C, where x is small enough such that x · y fits in the
plaintext space.
3. B checks whether Decsk(C) = x · y. If the check passes B sends zb to A.
4. A outputs a bit b′ as the guess whether it thinks that zb = y or s. A wins if b = b′.
Figure 4.16: Multiplication security property.
and a challenger B. They call an encryption scheme “multiplication secure” if for all PPT adversaries
A the probability of winning the game in Figure 4.16 is 1/2 + negl(κ). Note that traditional Paillier
encryption scheme is insecure w.r.t to the definition. The proposed fix that would potentially (and
conjectured) make Paillier multiplication secure is by setting ˆEncpk(y) := Encpk(y + vp) where v is a
random element and p is the prime field characteristic.
4.8.6 Parameter analysis
Recall the soundness slack bound guarantees on a valid ciphertext after a ZK proof was verified suc-
cessfully:
‖m‖∞ ≤ N ·p/2·sec
2·2sec/2+8 ‖v‖∞ ≤ N ·sec
2·2sec/2+8 ‖e0, e1‖∞ ≤ N ·NewHopeB·sec
2·2sec/2+8
To be able to bound the noise on a freshly generate ciphertext after the ZK proof, as in Section 4.9.3
we compute the worst case noise as
‖c0 − s · c1‖can∞ = ‖m+ p · (e0 − s · e1 + e · v)‖
can
∞
≤ ‖m‖can∞ + p · (‖e0‖
can
∞ + ‖s · e1‖
can
∞ + ‖e · v‖
can
∞ )
≤ φ(m)2 · p · sec2 · 2sec/2+8 + p · φ(m) · sec2 · 2sec/2+8·
· (φ(m) · NewHopeB + c1 ·
√
h · NewHopeB · φ(m)+
+ c1 ·
√
σ · φ(m) · φ(m))
= φ(m)2 · p · sec2 · 2sec/2+8 · (NewHopeB + c1 ·
√




Note that in Protocol 4.12, step 2b every party will multiply b ·Enc(a) and add an encryption of e $← F
with 2sec · p larger noise than Bdishonestclean−lg . The p factor comes from multiplying the noise of Enc(a) by
b ∈ F whereas 2sec is from statistically hiding the noise of b ·Enc(a). This means that our SHE modulus
q0 has to fulfill:
2sec · p ·Bdishonestclean−lg < q0/2.
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ΠHighGear
Initialize: Parties call FKeyGen.Init from Figure 4.18 where each obtains privately a secret key ski
such that sk =
∑n
i=1 ski and a global public key pk corresponding to the SHE cryptosystem.
Multiply: Parties multiply and authenticate random additives shares.
1. Each party Pi samples ai, bi ← Sample(Honest).
2. Each Pi publishes the encryptions ctai , ctbi using the randomness from their samplers
along with the ΠglobalZKPoK proof that the ciphertexts are well formed.





4. They perform a distributed decryption ΠDDec(ctc,NewCiphertext) where each party
gets an additive share of the plaintext ci such that
∑n
i=1 ci = c. Given the additional
argument NewCiphertext, ΠDDec also outputs a fresh ciphertext ct′c that decrypts to c.
5. Now parties need to authenticate shares so they publicly multiply the ciphertexts
cta, ctb, ct
′
c with ctα to get cta·α, ctb·α, ct
′
c·α.
6. In order to get additive sharings of the authentications γi(a), γi(b), γi(c) they
call ΠDDec on each ciphertext cta·α, ctb·α, ct′c·α with the additional argument
NoNewCiphertext.
Sacrifice: Parties now check if the adversary inserted any errors on the triples. They do the fol-
lowing using a batch of 2 · nT triples:
1. Sample t← FRand(F).
2. Take every consecutive tuple of triples (Ja2iK, Jb2iK, Jc2iK), (Ja2i+1K, Jb2i+1K, Jc2i+1K)
for i ∈ nT and parse them as Ja1K, Jb1K, Jc1K and Ja2K, Jb2K, Jc2K.
3. Open t · Ja1K− Ja2K and Jb1K− Jb2K to get σ and ρ.
4. Compute τ ← Open(t · Jc1K− Jc2K− σ · Ja2K− ρ · Jb2K− σ · ρ).
5. If τ 6= 0 parties abort, otherwise output Ja1K, Jb1K, Jc1K as a valid triple.
Figure 4.17: SPDZ triple generation protocol with global ZKPok (HighGear).
4.9 HighGear: SPDZ With a Global ZKPoK
The HighGear protocol is essentially SPDZ-1 with a better zero knowledge proof. Our protocol re-
duces the proving cost by a factor of n where n is the number of parties. To produce a triple in
SPDZ [DPSZ12] parties encrypt their randomness ctai , ctbi along with a zero knowledge proof that
they are well formed. In the next phase, they sum the ciphertexts cta ←
∑n
i=1 ctai and ctb ←
∑n
i=1 ctbi
and publicly multiply ctc ← cta·ctb. In the final step they perform a distributed decryption the ciphertext
ctc to obtain an additive sharing of the share product. One also has to ensure the MAC authentication
on these additive shares but for a more detailed description, check the protocol in Figure 4.17. We skip
the security proofs as they follow through from the original SPDZ-1 [DPSZ12] protocol once security
of the global ZK proof is provided in the next subsection.
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FKeyGen
Init: 1. On input (Init,KeyGen) from all parties run (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(). Send pk to the
adversary.
2. Receive corrupted shares ski∈A. Sample honest parties’ shares ski∈H such that∑n
i=1 ski = sk. Note this is always possible as there is at least one honest party.
3. Send secret key shares ski to party Pi.
Figure 4.18: Key Generation functionality for HighGear.
FKeyGen FTriple
ΠglobalZKPoK||ΠDDec||ΠHighGear
Figure 4.19: Functionality dependencies for HighGear.
4.9.1 Global proof of plaintext knowledge
One of the key insights in the HighGear protocol is that parties can do a single ZK proof verification
for all the ciphertexts at once. In the SPDZ protocol [DPSZ12] each party has to verify every other
party’s proof doing n−1 checks. We notice that since every proof is done using the same public key pk
then parties can first sum all n− 1 proofs together and then do a final check. In this way we reduce the
computational complexity because summing the proofs is faster then checking each of it individually
whereas the communication complexity stays the same - one proof broadcasted per party. The protocol
is described in Figure 4.20, and shares many similarities with the pairwise proof while the difference
being in the final check. Next, we argue the correctness and security of the global ZK proof from
Figure 4.20.
Correctness. The proof goes similar to Damgård et al [DPSZ12]. If the prover is honest then for each
j = 1, . . . , V :
























































































= Encpk(zj , Tj).
The equality in step 6 follows trivially from the linearity of the encryption. It remains to check the
probability that an honest prover will fail the bounds check on ‖z‖∞ and ‖t‖∞ where the infinity norm
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‖ · ‖∞ denotes the maximum of the absolute values of the components.
Remember that the honestly generated E(i) are (τ, ρ) ciphertexts. The bound check will succeed





k=1(Mejk · x(i))) is at most 2 · n · Bplain. This is always true
because y(i) is sampled such that ‖y(i)‖∞ ≤ Bplain and ‖Me · x(i)‖∞ ≤ sec · τ ≤ 2sec · τ = Bplain. A
similar argument holds regarding ρ and Brand.
Special soundness. To prove this property one must be able to extract the witness given responses from
two different challenges. In this case consider the transcripts (x,a, e, (z, T )) and (x,a, e′, (z′, T ′))
where e 6= e′. Recall that each party has a different secret x(i). Because both challenges have passed
the bound checks during the protocol, we get that:
(Me −Me′) · Eᵀ = (d− d′)ᵀ
To solve the equation for E notice that Me −Me′ is a matrix with entries in {−1, 0, 1} so we must
solve a linear system where E = Encpk(xk, rk) for k = 1, . . . , sec. This can be done in two steps:
solve the linear system for the first half: c1, . . . , csec/2 and then for the second half: csec/2+1, . . . , csec.
For the first step identify a square submatrix of sec× sec entries in Me−Me′ which has a diagonal full
of 1’s or −1’s and it is lower triangular. This can be done since there is at least one component j such
that ej 6= e′j . Recall that the plaintexts zk, z′k have norms less than Bplain and the randomness used for
encrypting them, tk, t′k, have norms less than Brand where k ranges through 1, . . . , sec.
Solving the linear system from the top row to the middle row via substitution we obtain in the worst
case: ‖xk‖∞ ≤ 2k · n · Bplain and ‖yk‖∞ ≤ 2k · n · Brand where k ranges through 1, . . . , sec/2. The
second step is similar to the first with the exception that now we have to look for an upper triangular
matrix of sec × sec. Then solve the linear system from the last row to the middle row. In this way we
extract xk, rk which form (2sec/2+1 ·n ·Bplain, 2sec/2+1 ·n ·Brand) or (23sec/2+1 ·n · τ, 23sec/2+1 ·n ·ρ)
ciphertexts. This means that the slack is 23sec/2+1.
Honest verifier zero-knowledge. Here we give a simulator S in Figure 4.21 for an honest verifier
(each party Pi acts as one at one point during the protocol). The simulator’s purpose is to create a
transcript with the verifier which is indistinguishable from the real interaction between the prover and
the verifier. To achieve this, S samples uniformly e $← {0, 1}sec and then creates the transcript ac-
cordingly: sample z(i) such that ‖z(i)‖∞ ≤ Bplain and T (i) such that ‖T (i)‖∞ ≤ Brand and then fix
a(i) = Encpk(z
(i), T (i)) − (Me · E(i)), where the encryption is applied component-wise. Clearly the
produced transcript (a(i), e(i), z(i), T (i)) passes the final checks and the statistical distance to the real
one is 2−sec, which is negligible with respect to sec.
Recently a successor of HighGear, TopGear [BCS19], obtained a smaller soundness slack which
reduces the parameters even further from 23sec/2+1 to 2sec+1. Their contribution is taken into account
inside SCALE engine and well documented [ACK+19].
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ΠglobalZKPoK
Follows the same notations as in ΠpairZKPoK but with different bounds: BHG instead of BLG from
Figure 4.4. As in the pairwise proof, we prove the bounds for sec ciphertext at once, x is actually a
vector of sec ciphertexts each containing N items due to BGV batching.
1. Each party Pi broadcasts E(i) = Encpk(x(i), r(i)) where x(i), r(i) ← Sample(Honest).
These ciphertexts come from ctai or ctbi or from the output of ΠDDec protocol with
NewCiphertext in the SPDZ protocol from Figure 4.17.
2. Each party Pi samples each entry of y(i) and s(i) using Sample(HighGear) w.r.t to the bounds
Bplain, Brand. Then Pi uses the random coins s(i) to compute a(i) ← Encpk(y(i), s(i)) and
broadcasts a(i). Note that y(i) is a plaintext vector of length V = 2 · sec− 1 whereas s(i) has
the same length containing the randomness associated to produce the encryption a(i) of y(i).
3. The parties use FRand to sample e ∈ {0, 1}sec.
4. Each party Pi computes z(i) = y + Me  x(i) and T (i) = s(i) + Me  r(i) and broadcasts
(z(i), T (i)).
5. Each party Pi computes d(i) = Encpk(z(i), t) where t ranges through all rows of T (i), then

















the checks (allowing the norms to be 2n times bigger to accommodate the summations):
d = a +Me  E, ‖z‖∞ ≤ 2 · n ·BHG · p, ‖T‖∞ ≤ 2 · n ·BHG · ρ.
7. If the check passes, the parties output the global sum E as a ciphertext with valid encryption
bounds.
Figure 4.20: Protocol for global proof of knowledge of a ciphertext.
SSglobalZKPoK
Let A denote the set of corrupted parties, and H the set of honest ones.
1. Receive E(i) for all i ∈ H .
2. Sample e $← {0, 1}sec.
3. Use the honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator above to generate transcripts
(a(i), e, (z(i), T (i))) for i ∈ H .
4. Send {a(i)}i∈H to the adversary.
5. Receive (E(i),y(i),a(i)) for every corrupted party Pi from the adversary.
6. Emulating FRand, send e to the adversary.







(i) meets the bounds. Abort if not.
9. Rewinding the adversary, sample ẽ 6= e and conduct the same check for the adversary’s
responses {z̃(i), T̃ (i)}i∈A until the check passes.





Figure 4.21: Simulator for global proof of knowledge of ciphertext.
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ΠDDec
If the second argument is NewCiphertext then parties also get a "fresh" (i.e. level 1) ciphertext ct′m
which decrypts to the same plaintext as ctm.
Input is a ciphertext Encpk(m) or ctm with some additional arguments such as NewCiphertext or
NoNewCiphertext. Players need to parse the ciphertext as a tuple (c0, c1) ∈ R2q . All sub-routines
output an additive sharing mi such that
∑n
i=1mi = m.
MAC DDec: On input (Encpk(m),NoNewCiphertext) from all parties:
1. Each Pi samples fi
$← [0 . . . BDec · 2DDsec ].
2. P1 sets v1 = (c0 − s1 · c1)− f1, whereas every other Pi sets vi = −si · c1 − fi.
3. All parties broadcast vi mod q0.
4. P1 set its share m1 ←
∑n
i=1 vi + f1 mod p. All other parties set their share mi ←
fi mod p.
Fresh DDec: On input (Encpk(m),NewCiphertext) from all parties
1. Each Pi samples fi
$← F.
2. Parties broadcast encryptions of their partial shares ctfi ← Encpk(fi) along with their
proofs of correctness using ΠglobalZKPoK(ctfi).
3. Using the output of ΠglobalZKPoK they can now compute ctm+f ← ctm + ctf using
publicly available information. Parse ctm+f as (c0, c1).
4. P1 sets v1 = (c0−s1 ·c1) mod q0 whereas all other parties Pi set vi = −si ·c1 mod q0.
5. All parties broadcast their vi + p · ri where ri
$← [0 . . . BDec · 2DDsec/p].
6. Parties sum up the broadcasts and set m + f ← (
∑n
i=1(vi + p · ri) mod q0) mod p.
7. Adjust the shares the following: P1 does m1 ←m+f−f1 whereas all the other parties
i 6= 1 set their share as m(i) ← −fi.
8. Finally, they adjust the encryption of m as Encpk(m) ← Encpk(m + f) − ctf where
the randomness used in producing Encpk(m + f) was sampled using FRand.
Figure 4.22: Distributed decryption for SPDZ.
4.9.2 Distributed decryption
In Figure 4.22 we describe two methods of producing additive sharings of a given ciphertext. The first
method is used for generating additive MAC shares whereas the second one (Fresh DDec command
in Figure 4.22) is used to produce a fresh ciphertext after multiplying cta · ctb to be able to multiply
further with ctα and place a MAC on top of the product.
One may wonder what is the reason behind sampling ri from an interval which is p times smaller
than Bdec · 2DDsec . In the case of Fresh DDec command in Figure 4.22 the decryption output is public
so there is no need to mask it! We only need to mask the secret noise which is stretched up by a factor
of p in the decryption.
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4.9.3 Parameter analysis
We now follow similar steps as SCALE documentation [ACK+19]. Following the introduction of BGV
noise analysis in Section 4.5.1 this becomes an easy task. We recap what are the bound guarantess on a
valid ciphertext after the ZK proofs:
‖m‖∞ ≤ n · p · 2
3sec/2+1, ‖v‖∞ ≤ n · 2
3sec/2+1, ‖e0, e1‖∞ ≤ n · NewHopeB · 2
3sec/2+1.
First we need to bound the noise of a ciphertext generated dishonestly which passed the ZK proof
checks:
‖c0 − s · c1‖can∞ = ‖m+ p · (e0 − s · e1 + e · v)‖
can
∞
≤ ‖m‖can∞ + p · (‖e0‖
can
∞ + ‖s · e1‖
can
∞ + ‖e · v‖
can
∞ )
≤ φ(m) · p · 23sec/2+1 · n+ p · 23sec/2+1·
· (φ(m) · n · NewHopeB + c1 ·
√
h · n · NewHopeB · φ(m)+
+ c1 ·
√
σ · φ(m) · n · φ(m))
= φ(m) · p · n · 23sec/2+1(NewHopeB + c1 ·
√




where we used the following facts:
1. ‖e‖∞ = c1
√
σ · φ(m) as this is honestly generated public key,
2. ‖s‖∞ = c1
√





i=1 ‖e1‖∞ ≤ n · φ(m) · 23sec/2+1 · NewHopeB,
4.
∑n
i=1 ‖v‖∞ ≤ n · 23sec/2+1.
4.9.4 The impact of modulus switching on the slack
Now that we obtained an exact form of Bdishonestclean−hg it is time to see what happens to the noise of a cipher-
text in the triple generation protocol. By inspection of the protocol ΠHighGear there is one ciphertext-
ciphertext multiplication and then a re-sharing for computing the MAC shares. To compute a sharing
of the product c = a · b there is one ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication to which one fresh ciphertext is




clean−hg/p1 +BScale) · (Bdishonestclean−hg/p1 +BScale) +BKS · p0/p1 +BScale.
After this we add a fresh proven ciphertext via ΠglobalZKPoK to get the final noise
U2 = U1 + (B
dishonest
clean−hg/p1 +BScale).
The reason why the original noise is scaled down is that before performing the addition between the
two ciphertexts we need to scale down from q1 to q0 the newly generated ciphertext in Fresh DDec.
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Now the only condition that needs to be fulfilled comes from the fact that we are masking the c0−s · c1
with a value larger by a factor of 2sec to statistically hide the noise:
(4.1) U2 + U2 · n · 2sec < q0/2
which means that the modulus q0 has to be at least of size 2 · U2 · (1 + n · 2sec).
In practice, if one needs to produce Beaver triples over a prime field Fp where p ≈ 2128 with a
batching parameter φ(m) = 32768 the prime p1 turns out to be around 224 bits long using the Albrecht
et al. estimator, which means that Bdishonestclean−hg/p1 disappears completely after the modulus switching op-
eration. It turns out that even for larger values of sec the slack will have no impact over the size of q0
because BScale is much bigger than the bound on the dishonest parties’ ciphertext noise. Even though
TopGear has a zero knowledge slack smaller by a factor of
√
2sec than HighGear it gives no improve-
ments over the ciphertext size. Where TopGear shines is in memory usage as it gains more soundness
using the SHE slots. Nevertheless we give the ciphertext sizes for both LowGear and HighGear com-
puted at the time of writing Overdrive in Table 4.1 The primes p0 and p1 are selected heuristically in the
following way: brute force through each possible q′ = p0 · p1 less than the one given by the Albrecht et
al. estimator, then find minimal p0 = q0 such that Equation 4.1 is fulfilled. In the last step p1 is chosen
as the minimum number for which p1 ≡ 0 mod (2 ·N) and p1 ≡ 1 mod p.
4.9.5 Concrete parameters
In the Overdrive paper the slack estimations were taken verbatim from SPDZ-1 [DPSZ12] which used
Bclean instead of Bdishonestclean−hg and gave a noise bound of
Bdishonestclean−hg∗ = (Bclean − φ(m) · p/2) · 23sec/2+1 + φ(m) · p/2.
According to the calculations done in this thesis, as well as TopGear paper or SCALE documentation
the slack in Overdrive is slightly mistaken due to some incorrect bounds. Nevertheless, the ciphertext
size only decreases slightly due to the modulus switching operation which removes the slack by a large
amount.
Damgård et al. [CDXY17] presented an improved version of the cut-and-choose proof used in a
previous implementation of SPDZ [DKL+13], but the reduced slack does not justify the increased
complexity caused by several additional ciphertexts being computed and sent in the proof. Consider
that, even for sec = 128 and N = 215 (the latter being typical for our parameters), logS is about 100,
increasing the ciphertext modulus length by less than 25 percent.
In Table 4.1 we have calculated the ciphertext modulus q’s bit length for various parameters and
for our protocol with semi-homomorphic encryption (supporting only plaintext-ciphertext multiplica-
tion) and SPDZ (using somewhat homomorphic encryption which supports ciphertext-ciphertext mul-
tiplication as well). Then we instantiated both protocols with several ZK proofs like the Schnorr-like
protocol [CD09,DPSZ12] and the recent cut-and-choose proof [CDXY17]. Table 4.1 shows the results





[CD09] [CDXY17] 1 [DPSZ12] 2 [CDXY17] 2 [DKL+13] HighG TopG
238 199 330 330 332 291 291 40 64
367 327 526 526 526 490 490 40 128
276 224 378 378 N/A 340 340 64 64
406 352 572 572 N/A 540 540 64 128
504 418 700 700 N/A 660 660 128 128
Table 4.1: Ciphertext modulus bit length (log(q)) for two parties.
cut-and-choose instead of the Schnorr-like protocol does not make any difference for SPDZ. This is
because the scaling (also called modulus switching) involves the division by a number larger than the
largest possible slack of the Schnorr-like protocol (roughly 2200), hence the slack will be eliminated.
For our LowGear protocol, the slack has a slight impact, increasing the size of a ciphertext by up to 25
percent. However, this does not justify the use of a cut-and-choose proof because it involves sending
seven instead of two extra ciphertexts per proof.
Table 4.1 also shows LowGear ciphertexts are about 30 percent shorter than SPDZ ciphertexts. Con-
sider that Table 4.3 in Section 4.10 shows a reduction in the communication from SPDZ to LowGear of
up to 50 percent. The main reason for the additional reduction is the fact that for one guaranteed triple,
SPDZ involves producing two triples (a, b, c), (d, e, f), of which (a, b, d, e) require a zero-knowledge
proof. In LowGear on the other hand, we produce (a, b, c, b̂, ĉ), of which only a requires a zero-
knowledge proof. We have also updated the table containing the correct slack analysis of HighGear
from Section 4.9.4 along with the TopGear parameters [BCS19] where HighGear is denoted as HighG
and TopGear as TopG to then compare with the old analysis done in Overdrive. It turns out that using
a more rigorous methodology to analyze the SHE bounds give rise to smaller ciphertexts, a little more
than 5% of improvement.
4.10 Implementation
We have implemented all three approaches to triple generation in this paper and measured the through-
puts achieved by them in comparison to previous results with SPDZ [DKL+12, DKL+13] and MAS-
COT [KOS16]. We have used the optimized distributed decryption in for SPDZ-1, SPDZ-2, and High-
Gear. Our code is written in C++ and uses MPIR [MPI19] for arithmetic with large integers.1 We use
Montgomery modular multiplication and the Chinese reminder theorem representation of polynomials
wherever beneficial. See Gentry et al. [GHS12] for more details.
1We extensively use the function mpn_addmul_1, which we found to be 10–20 percent faster in MPIR compared to
GMP. Both libraries have implemented this function in Assembly but MPIR has a more specialized version, including a
specific one for Sandybridge/Ivybridge and one for Broadwell/Haswell while GMP features one just for the latter.
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Triples/s Security BGV impl. log2(|Fp|)
SPDZ-1 [DKL+12] 79 40-bit active NTL 64
SPDZ-2 [DKL+13] 158 20-covert specific 64
SPDZ-2 [DKL+13] 36 40-bit active specific 64
MASCOT [KOS16] 5,100 64-bit active ⊥ 128
SPDZ-1 (ours) 12,000 40-bit active specific 64
SPDZ-1 (ours) 6,400 64-bit active specific 128
SPDZ-1 (ours) 4,200 128-bit active specific 128
SPDZ-2 (ours) 3,900 20-covert specific 64
SPDZ-2 (ours) 1,100 40-bit active specific 64
LowGear (Section 4.8) 59,000 40-bit active specific 64
LowGear (Section 4.8) 30,000 64-bit active specific 128
LowGear (Section 4.8) 15,000 128-bit active specific 128
HighGear (Section 4.9) 11,000 40-bit active specific 64
HighGear (Section 4.9) 5,600 64-bit active specific 128
HighGear (Section 4.9) 2,300 128-bit active specific 128
Table 4.2: Triple generation for 64 and 128 bit prime fields with two parties on a 1 Gbit/s LAN.
Note that the parameters chosen by Damgård et al. [DKL+13][Appendix A] for the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof imply that the prover has to re-compute the proof with probability 1/32 as part
of a technique called rejection sampling. We have increased the parameters to reduce this probability
by up to 220 as long as it would not impact on the performance, i.e., the number of 64-bit words needed
to represent p0 and p1 would not change.
All previous implementations have benchmarks for two parties on a local network with 1 Gbit/s
throughput on commodity hardware. We have have used i7-4790 and i7-3770S CPUs with 16 to 32
GB of RAM, and we have re-run and optimized the code by Damgård et al. [DKL+13] for a fairer
comparison. Table 4.2 shows our results in this setting. SDPZ-1 and SPDZ-2 refer to the two different
proofs for ciphertexts, the Schnorr-like protocol presented in the original paper [DPSZ12] and the cut-
and-choose protocol in the follow-up work [DKL+13], the latter with either covert or active security.
The c-covert security is defined as a cheating adversary being caught with probability 1/c, and by sec-
bit security we mean a statistical security parameter of sec. Throughout this section, we will round
figures to the two most significant digits for a more legible presentation.
To allow direct comparisons with previous work, we have benchmarked our protocols for several
choices of security parameters and field size. Note that the computational security parameter is set
everywhere to k = 128 and we highlight how the statistical parameter impacts the performance. The
main difference between our implementation of SPDZ with the Schnorr-like protocol to the previous
one [DKL+12], is the underlying BGV implementation because the protocol is the same.
In Table 4.3 we also analyze the communication per triple of some protocols with active security
and compared the actual throughput to the maximum possible on a 1 Gbit/s link (network through-
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Communication Security log2(Fp|) Triples/s Maximum
SPDZ-2 350 kbit 40 64 1,100 2,900
MASCOT [KOS16] 180 kbit 64 128 5,100 5,600
SPDZ-1 23 kbit 40 64 12,000 44,000
SPDZ-1 32 kbit 64 128 6,400 31,000
SPDZ-1 37 kbit 128 128 4,200 27,000
LowGear (Section 4.8) 9 kbit 40 64 59,000 110,000
LowGear (Section 4.8) 15 kbit 64 128 30,000 68,000
LowGear (Section 4.8) 17 kbit 128 128 15,000 60,000
HighGear (Section 4.9) 24 kbit 40 64 11,000 42,000
HighGear (Section 4.9) 34 kbit 64 128 5,600 30,000
HighGear (Section 4.9) 42 kbit 128 128 2,300 24,000
Table 4.3: Communication per prime field triple (one way) and actual vs. maximum throughput with
two parties on a 1 Gbit/s link.
put divided by the communication per triple). The higher the difference between actual and maximum
possible, the more time is spent on computation. The figures show that MASCOT has very low com-
putation; the actual throughput is more than 90% of the maximum possible. On the other hand, all
BGV-based implementations have a significant gap, which is to be expected. Experiments have shown
that the relative gap increases in LowGear with a growing statistical parameter. This is mostly because
the ciphertexts become larger and 32 GB of memory is not enough for one triple generator thread per
core, hence there is some computation capacity left unused.
4.10.1 WAN setting
For a more complete picture, we have also benchmarked our protocols in the same WAN setting as
Keller et al. [KOS16], restricting the bandwidth to 50 Mbit/s and imposing a delay of 50 ms to all
communication. Table 4.4 shows our results in similar manner to Table 4.3. As one would expect, the
gap between actual throughput and maximum possible is more narrow because the communication
becomes more of a bottleneck, and the performance is closely related to the required communication.
4.10.2 More than two parties.
Increasing the number of parties, we have benchmarked our protocols and our implementation of SPDZ
with up to 64 r4.16xlarge instances on Amazon Web Services. Figure 4.23 shows that both Low and
High Gear improve over SPDZ-1, with HighGear taking the lead from about ten parties. Missing figures
do not indicate failed experiments but rather omitted experiments due to financial constraints.
At the time of writing, one hour on an r4.16xlarge instance in US East costs $4.256. Therefore, the
number of triples per dollar and party varies between 190 million (two parties with LowGear) and 13
million (64 parties with HighGear).
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Communication Security log2(Fp|) Triples/s Maximum
MASCOT [KOS16] 180 kbit 64 128 214 275
SPDZ-1 23 kbit 40 64 1,800 2,200
SPDZ-1 32 kbit 64 128 1,400 1,600
SPDZ-1 37 kbit 128 128 1,100 1,400
LowGear (Section 4.8) 9 kbit 40 64 4,500 5,600
LowGear (Section 4.8) 15 kbit 64 128 3,200 3,400
LowGear (Section 4.8) 17 kbit 128 128 2,600 3,000
HighGear (Section 4.9) 24 kbit 40 64 1,600 2,100
HighGear (Section 4.9) 34 kbit 64 128 1,300 1,500
HighGear (Section 4.9) 42 kbit 128 128 700 1,200
Table 4.4: Communication per prime field triple (one way) and actual vs. maximum throughput with



















Figure 4.23: Triple generation for a 128 bit prime field with 64 bit statistical security on AWS
r4.16xlarge instances.
4.10.3 Vickrey Auction for 100 Parties
As a motivation for computation with a high number of parties, we have implemented a secure Vickrey
second price auction [Vic61], where 100 parties input one bid each. Table 4.5 shows our online phase
timings for two different Amazon Web Services instances. The Vickrey auction requires 44,571 triples.
In Table 4.6, we compare the offline cost of MASCOT and our High Gear protocol on AWS m3.2xlarge
instances.
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AWS instance Time Cost per party
t2.nano 9.0 seconds $0.000017
c4.8xlarge 1.4 seconds $0.000741
Table 4.5: Online phase of Vickrey auction with 100 parties, each inputting one bid.
Time Cost per party
MASCOT [KOS16] 1,300 seconds $0.190
HighGear (Section 4.9) 98 seconds $0.014
Table 4.6: Offline phase of Vickrey auction with 100 parties, each inputting one bid.
Triples/s Security BGV impl. F2n
SPDZ-1 [DKL+12] 16 40-bit active NTL 40
MASCOT [KOS16] 5,100 64-bit active ⊥ 128
SPDZ-1 (ours) 67 40-bit active specific 40
SPDZ-2 (ours) 24 20-covert specific 40
SPDZ-2 (ours) 8 40-bit active specific 40
LowGear (Section 4.8) 117 40-bit active specific 40
HighGear (Section 4.9) 67 40-bit active specific 40
Table 4.7: Triple generation for characteristic two with two parties on a 1 Gbit/s LAN.
4.11 Alternatives for fields of characteristics two
For a more thorough comparison with MASCOT, we have also implemented our protocols for the field
of size 240 using the same approach as Damgård et al. [DKL+12]. Table 4.7 shows the low performance
of homomorphic encryption-based protocols with fields of characteristic two. This has been observed
before: in the above work, the performance for F240 is an order of magnitude worse than for Fp with a
64-bit bit prime. The main reason is that BGV lends itself naturally to plaintexts modulo some integer
p. The construction for F240 sets p = 2 and uses 40 slots to represent an element whereas an element




PRFs for fields of characteristics two
This chapter is based on joint work with Marcel Keller and Emmanuela Orsini and Peter Scholl and
Eduardo Soria-Vazquez and Srinivas Vivek [KOR+17] which was presented at ACNS 2017.
5.1 Contributions
In this chapter we focus on evaluating traditional blockciphers (eg., AES and DES) in MPC using the
SPDZ protocol. We investigate several approaches which involve representing the specific S-boxes for
AES or DES as either a polynomial or a look-up table. We then improve on the TinyTable protocol
by Damgård et al. [DNNR17] (CRYPTO 2017) by at least a factor of 50 while also extending their
protocols to the multiparty setting.
5.2 Overview
The TinyTable protocol provides a very efficient online phase evaluation for S-boxes or lookup tables
by creating special correlated randomness in the preprocessing phase which is input independent. Their
online phase requires each party to send log2N bits to evaluate a look-up table of size N with a secret
index. The downside is that in the preprocessing phase they have to obtain a scrambled version of the
table for each individual entry. Hence for evaluating an AES table (256 entries) the price one needs to
pay for a fast online phase is increasing the overall runtime of the protocol by a factor of 256.
Our work extends the TinyTable by porting their protocol from the two-party semi-honest setting
to work with any number of partes and resistant against a dishonest majority. Moreover, we reduce
drastically the number of field multiplications in the preprocessing phase. When instantiating AES
with our improved TinyTable protocol for arithmetic circuits this approach turns out to be competitive
in the overall running time against the fastest known evaluations of AES while also preserving the
highest throughput performance.
We also look at some of the techniques from the side-channel countermeasures literature to take
the most efficient polynomial representation of an S-box. There is a rich work regarding the evaluation
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of blockciphers using masking (a popular technique against side-channel attacks) [CGP+12, RV13,
CRV14, PV16] which translates very well to the multiparty computation domain. In fact we are going
to use some of the techniques used by Pulkus and Vivek [PV16] to optimize DES S-box evaluation.
Since an DES S-box maps a 6 bit input to 4 bit output via a 62 degree polynomial it would take 62 field
multiplications to evaluate an S-box naïvely in MPC. Pulkus and Vivek showed that instead of looking
at the DES S-boxes as polynomials over F26 , one can interpret it as a string of bits in F28 where it can
be evaluated using only 3 non-linear multiplications. This brings a 25% improvement on the number
of multiplications (vs. evaluating the S-box traditional F26) which can be done in 4 multiplications (vs.
62 multiplications naïvely). This means that with Pulkus and Vivek method of embedding the S-box
calculation into F28 we can evaluate an entire DES round using 24 multiplications.
In the end we show how that our implementation using lookup tables achieves the highest online
throughput and lowest online latency whereas using the side-channel inspired techinques speeds up
the costly preprocessing phase achieving one of the fastest overall protocol execution for the discussed
blockciphers.
5.3 Preliminaries
5.3.1 Advanced Encryption Standard
The algorithm supports three security parameters: 128, 192 and 256 which represents the key-length as
the block size has always 128 bit length. In our work we will focus on the standard AES specification
which guarantees 128 bit security, i.e. has a key k size of 128 bits long. AES starts with a key-schedule
which expands the key into 10 sub-keys called round keys. During the encryption algorithm for each
round a state is produced by taking the previous state and applying the following steps:
1. SubBytes: applies the non-linear layer (S-box) for each consecutive byte in the state.
2. ShiftRows: simply rotates the state cyclically to the left.
3. MixColumns: computes a linear transformation of the state with a fixed matrix.
4. AddRoundKey: XORs the round key to the state which gives the state for the next round: sr+1.
Each round is described in more details in Figure 5.1 and it is iterated 10 times to get security level
of 128 bits. We do not describe how to obtain the round keys but the process is very similar to the
encryption: copy the key into an initial state and then apply AES encryption rounds using the key
k over the state a slightly different S-Box in the SubBytes step. The expanded key represents each
intermediary state at the end of each of the 10 AES iterations.
5.3.2 Data Encryption Standard and Triple-DES
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was introduced by the National Institute of Standards and tech-
nology (NIST) in 1977. The DES blockcipher has a key size is of 56 bits with a block size equal to 64
bits long. Unlike AES, DES uses a Feistel substitution network where for each round the input is split
70
5.3. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a round r with a 128 bit key kr and 128 bit state sr−1 output from round r − 1. If r = 1
then s0 := m where m is the initial message to be encrypted.
1: //SubBytes
2: for i = 0, len(s) do sr[i]← S-box(sr−1[i])
3: //ShiftRows
4: for i = 0, len(s) do sr[i ::]← Rotate(sr[i ::], i)
5: // Doing the MixColumns step
6: s′r[0]← 2 · sr[0]⊕ 3 · sr[1]⊕ 1 · sr[2]⊕ 1 · sr[3]
7: s′r[1]← 1 · sr[0]⊕ 2 · sr[1]⊕ 3 · sr[2]⊕ 1 · sr[3]
8: s′r[2]← 1 · sr[0]⊕ 1 · sr[1]⊕ 2 · sr[2]⊕ 3 · sr[3]
9: s′r[2]← 3 · sr[0]⊕ 1 · sr[1]⊕ 1 · sr[2]⊕ 2 · sr[3]
10: // AddRoundKey
11: sr ← s′r ⊕ kr
Figure 5.1: 1 AES encryption round.
in two equal halves: left (L) and right (R). At round i the left half Li ← Ri−1 and the right half takes
a non-linear function dependent on the round key and the previous half: Ri ← Li−1 ⊕ fi(ki, Ri−1).
This Feistel network process of switching input halves is iterated 16 times where the function
fi(ki, Ri−1) consists in:
1. Expansion: Compute a 48 bit vector R′i−1 which just duplicates some of the bits in the 32 bit
string Ri.
2. KeyMixing: Extracts from the original 56-bit key a 48-bit round key according to a key schedule
mechanism. This round key is then viewed as 8 consecutive pieces of 6 bit-string.
3. Substitution: A non-linear layer is applied to each 6-bit chunk and maps it to a 4-bit output. This
non-linear layer is slightly weaker than the one used in AES as it can be represented by a lower
degree polynomial.
4. Permutation. Takes the 32-bit output (8 chunks times 4-bit S-box output) from the previous
Substitution step and permutes the bits using a fixed permutation.
The advantage of a Feistel network is that during the decryption process f does not need to be invertible
as to compute DES−1 one needs to set (Li−1, Ri−1) as Ri−1 ← Li and Li−1 ← Li ⊕ fi(ki, Ri).





Although 3-DES has three independent keys, it is vulnerable to attacks based on the state length.
Due to its short 64-bit state, one of the newest attacks called Sweet32 exploits the vulnerability that
there is a high chance of state collisions, successfully mounting an attack using only 236.8 although
researchers were lucky to find a collision only after 220 queries [BL16]. Even though 3DES is entirely
broken, it is used by at least 3000 vendors as of end of 2019 [NISb] and more than 5000 supporting
AES [NISa].
71
CHAPTER 5. PRFS FOR FIELDS OF CHARACTERISTICS TWO
Consider an AES input block x ∈ F28 where F28 = F2/(x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1).
1: (x0, . . . , x7)← BitDec(x)
2: y0 ← ⊕7i=0xi
3: y1 ← x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7
4: y2 ← x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7
5: y3 ← x3 ⊕ x7
6: y4 ← x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7
7: y5 ← x5 ⊕ x7
8: y6 ← x6 ⊕ x7




Figure 5.2: F28 ↪→ K40 embedding.
5.4 MPC Evaluation of AES using polynomials
We now recap some previous work which focused on minimizing the number of non-linear multipli-
cations to evaluate in AES S-box. To be able to catch a cheating adversary with probability 1− 1
240
in
SPDZ we need to perform operations over F240 . If we choose to work over F28 (as AES natively does)
then the computation has to be repeated at least five times. As a consequence the online phase will be
considerably slower due to repeating the protocol several times hence we stick to evaluating the circuit
over F240 .
5.4.1 Embedding AES blocks into F240
AES algorithm consists in manipulating 16 blocks of 8-bit strings. The approach taken by Damgård et
al. [DKL+12] is to embed each block into
K40 = F2/(y40 + y20 + y15 + y10 + 1).
This embedding works by mapping each monomial Xi ∈ F28 to X5i + 1 ∈ K40. Concretely, after
having the bit-decomposition of an element x ∈ F28 , the algorithm is described in Figure 5.2.
To get the final output one needs to be able to invert the embedding. As its forward embedding
counterpart, first we do a bit decomposition and perform the operations from Figure 5.2 in reverse order.
The precise algorithm is described in Figure 5.3. One small optimization to reduce the communication
overhead is that we only need to 8 random bits to mask the embedded output y ∈ K40 since we know
that the remaining entries of y are useless.
After inputs are embedded into K40 the issue that needs to be solved is computing the AES S-box
in MPC. The AES S-box consists in mapping an element x ∈ F28 to its inverse x−1 or x254 in F28 ,
where zero element is mapped to zero, and then apply an affine transformation on x−1. There are other
ways of computing an S-Box using Keller and Damgård [DK10] method but we choose to avoid it since
that can make a malicious adversary detect zero inputs to S-box with a high probability of 1/28. When
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Consider an AES input block y ∈ K40 where K40 = F2/(x40 + x20 + x15 + x10 + 1).
1: (y0, . . . , y7)← BitDec(y, step = 5) // skip 5 bits at a time
2: x7 ← y7
3: x6 ← y6 ⊕ y7
4: x5 ← y5 ⊕ y7
5: x4 ← y4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7
6: x3 ← y3 ⊕ y7
7: x2 ← y2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7
8: x1 ← y1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7




Figure 5.3: K40 ↪→ F28 un-embedding.
computing x254 using the following two methods it can be seen that the only power an adversary has is
to find out the SPDZ MAC key which is can be guessed with probability 2−40.
5.4.2 Rivain-Prouff method [RP10]
The method below is a variant, also used by Gentry et al. [GHS12], of the method of Rivain–Prouff
[RP10] to evaluate the AES S-box polynomial using only 4 non-linear multiplications in F28 [X]. They
compute a sequence of monomials as below:
{X,X2} ×→ {X3, X12} ×→ {X14} ×→ {X15, X240} ×→ X254.
Although in Gentry et al. [GHS12] the squaring operation comes for free by doing in local operations
on the SHE slots, in MPC this requires some communication between the parties with additional pre-
processing. To square one authenticated element JxK, parties extract the bits of JxK by opening JxK⊕JrK
and then manipulate locally the bits of JrK and x+r to get any squaring of JxK. Fortunately generating a
single random shared bit JriK in a characteristic two field is extremely cheap, around log |F| times faster
than generating a multiplication triple in F. In our experiments we denote this method by AES-RP.
MPC complexity. The multiplication chain can be achieved using four multiplication triples and 7
communication rounds due to several bit-decompositions between multiplications. The four triples
come from computing X3, X14, X15, X254. Although we need to do a BitDec at each step, some of
them can be done in parallel resulting in a circuit with a multiplicative depth equal to six. To compute
MixColumns an extra call to BitDec will be used.
5.4.3 Bit-Decomposition method of Damgård et al. [DKL+12]
As described in previous section, squaring in MPC is for free as long as one has the shared bits of a
secret. The approach taken by Damgård et al. [DKL+12] tries to minimize the number of non-linear
multiplications by computing a higher number of squarings.
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The evaluation proceeds as follow: firstX is bit-decomposed so that all the squarings can be locally
evaluated, and then X254 is obtained as described in [DKL+12] via
X254 = ((X2 ·X4) · (X8 ·X16)) · ((X32 ·X64) ·X128).
This requires 4 rounds, out of which one is a call to BitDec. We also need an extra round for computing
the inverse of the field embedding F28 ↪→ F240 to evaluate the S-box linear layer. In our experiments
we denote this method by AES-BD.
5.5 MPC Evaluation of DES using polynomials
Recall that in each Substitution round DES applies eight 6-to-4 bit S-boxes. The naïve method of
evaluating a DES S-box is by constructing a polynomial over F26 where the input and output bit-
strings are elements in F26 . To get the DES S-box 4-bit output from such a polynomial evaluation one
has to remove the two most significant bits due to zero padding. Roy and Vivek [RV13] show that this
polynomial has a degree of at most 62.
To be able to evaluate DES S-boxes as a polynomials, we first recall the class of cyclotomic poly-





: j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1
}
for 0 < i < 2m.
Note that X2
m
= X in F2m [X]/(X2
m
+X).
In order to minimize the number of nonlinear multiplications, we can do a Breadth-First-Search
(BFS) over the cyclotomic classes. Each node will be represented by one class whereas edges are
drawn from one class Ca to another class Cb whether Cb can be derived from Ca using one non-linear
multiplication. In order to cover all monomials, a BFS search starting from C0 will reveal the mini-
mum number of non-linear operations. As previously mentioned, once a monomial is computed, it is
repeatedly squared to generate more monomials without costing additional non-linear multiplications.
Once the BFS computes the monomials graph, the S-box evaluation will consist in performing a linear
combination of the resulted monomials.
For example, if we compute 13 distinct classes of monomials then all the monomials can be used


























In this case C60 and C
6
1 can be computed directly from the input X , meaning the DES S-boxes can be
evaluated with at most 11 non-linear multiplications by combining different classes Cmi .
5.5.1 Embedding F26 multiplications in F242
The naïve method to compute a DES S-box is to first do a Lagrange interpolation on the S-box lookup
tables. Afterwards the 6-bit input block is embedded into F242 to have at least the amount of statistical
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Consider an DES input block x ∈ F28 where F26 = F2/(X6 +X4 +X3 +X + 1).
1: (x0, . . . , x5)← BitDec(x)
2: y0 ← ⊕5i=0xi
3: y1 ← x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5
4: y2 ← x2 ⊕ x3
5: y3 ← x3
6: y4 ← x4 ⊕ x5




Figure 5.4: F26 ↪→ F242 embedding.
security against a cheating party (as described for AES in the previous section). Since the Lagrange
polynomial has degree 62, in the end we can naïvely perform 62 the non-linear multiplications. This will
serve as the baseline for the blockcipher computation and is denoted in the experiments as 3DES-Raw.
It is straightforward to see that this can be done using 62 rounds with 62 triples in F242 .
In Figure 5.4 we describe how to embed:
F2[X]/(X6 +X4 +X3 +X + 1) ↪→ F2[X]/(X42 +X21 + 1)
via X 7→ X7 + 1.
5.5.2 Pulkus–Vivek Method [PV16]
Pulkus and Vivek [PV16] propose an improvement over the method Coron–Roy–Vivek line of work
[RV13, CRV14] to evaluate arbitrary polynomials over finite fields of characteristic two. They view
a DES S-box input as a field element over F28 instead of F26 where the most significant digits are
two zeros. To get the S-box output an F28 polynomial is evaluated and then discard the top-most four
coefficients to get a 4 bit output.
To understand their idea, a set of monomials L = C81 ∪C83 ∪C87 in F28 [X] is computed. We know
from Equation 5.1 that
C81 = {X,X2, X4, X8, X16, X32, X64},
C83 = {X3, X6, X12, X24, X48, X96, X65},
C87 = {X7, X14, X28, X56, X112, X97, X67}.
Consider that a polynomial P (X) represents the S-box computation. Then P (X) can be written down
in the following form
P (X) = p1(X) · q1(X) + p2(X)
where p1(X), q1(X), and p2(X) have monomials only from the set L. These three polynomials are
computed by first assigning to q1(X) a random set of monomials from L. After q1(X) is fixed they
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Functionality FABB−LUT
This functionality has all the features of FABB, operating over F2k , plus the following command.
Table Look-up: On command (T, id1, id2) from all parties, where T : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m, for
`,m ≤ k, and id1 is present in memory, retrieve (id1, x) and store (id2,T(x)).
Figure 5.5: The ideal functionality for MPC using lookup tables.
set up a linear system of equations for the coefficients of p1(X) and p2(X) obtained from evaluating
a DES S-box in each entry. Pulkus and Vivek noticed that using this process, with high probabilty we
obtain a valid P (X) equivalent to computing a DES S-box.
Pulkus and Vivek noticed that one can choose the same q1(X) for all S-boxes and end up with a
valid P (X). Alas, this has no impact on the performance of the MPC evaluation. Summing up, the PV
method requires 3 non-linear multiplications in F28 [X] to compute each DES S-box: two multiplica-
tions for computing C83 and C
8
7 and one to multiply p1(X) ·q1(X), the remaining operations are simply
linear computations and can be obtain by doing local computations in MPC.
MPC Complexity. Note that, although in side-channel world computing the squares is for free, since
it is an F2-linear operation, in a secret-shared based MPC with MACs this is no longer true and we




7 , are obtained locally after X,X
3, X7 are bit-
decomposed. Here we need two multiplications, since X3 = X · X2 and X7 = X3 · X4. The third
multiplication occurs when computing the product p1(X) · q1(X), resulting in an S-box cost of only 3
triples, 24 bits and 5 communication rounds.
The number of rounds is given by the 3 calls to BitDec (on X3, X7 and p1(X) · q1(X) + p2(X))
and 3 non-linear multiplications. Although at a first glance there seems to be six rounds, we have that
BitDec(X7) is independent of the BitDec(X3), as we can compute X7 without the call BitDec(X3),
resulting in only five rounds.
5.6 MPC Evaluation of Boolean Circuits using Look-up Tables
We now proceed to describe how to evaluate Look-up Tables in MPC over arithmetic fields of character-
istic two. The protocols are given in the preprocessing model and has the same online phase as [DZ16].
Furthermore, our protocols significantly improve over the preprocessing while also maintaining a com-
petitive online phase to [DNNR17]. For a table of size N parties need to communicate log2N bits in
the online phase.
The functionality that we implement isFABB−LUT (Figure 5.5), which augments the standardFABB
functionality with a table look-up command. The concrete online cost of each table look-up is just
log2N bits of communication per party, where N is the size of the table. Note that the functionality
FABB−LUT works over a finite field F2k , and has been simplified by assuming that the size of the range
and domain of the look-up table T is not more than 2k. However, our protocol actually works for general
76
5.6. MPC EVALUATION OF BOOLEAN CIRCUITS USING LOOK-UP TABLES
Functionality FPrep−LUT
This functionality has all of the same features as FABB, with the following additional command.
Masked Table: On Input (MaskedTable,T, id) from all parties, where
T : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m for `,m ≤ k, sample a random value s, set
(Val[ids],Val[idT(s)], . . . ,Val[idT(s⊕(2`−1))]) ← (s,T(s), . . . ,T(s ⊕ (2` − 1)), and return
(ids, (idT(s), . . . , idT(s⊕(2`−1)))).
Masked Function: On Input (MaskedFunction, f, id) from all parties denote with q
the number of non-linear operations in f . Next decompose the non-linear op-
erations of f into q successive evaluations of look-up tables T 1, . . . , T q where
T i : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m, sample a set of random values o1, . . . , oq and set
(Val[ido1 ],Val[idT1(o1)⊕o2 ], . . . ,Val[idoq ],Val[idTq(oq)], . . . ,Val[idTq(oq⊕(2l−1)].
Figure 5.6: Ideal functionality for the preprocessing of masked look-up tables.
Protocol ΠLT
Table Look-up: On Input JxK compute JT(x)K as follows.
1. Call FPrep−LUT on Input (MaskedTable,T), and obtain a precomputed masked table
(JsK, JTable(s)K).
2. The parties open the value h = x⊕ s.
3. Locally compute JT(x)K = JTable(s)K[h], where JTable(s)K[h] is the hth component
of JTable(s)K.
Figure 5.7: Secure online evaluation of SBox using look-up tables.
table sizes, and FABB−LUT can easily be extended to model this by representing a table look-up result
with several field elements instead of one.
We now show how Protocol 5.7 implements the Table Look-up command of FABB−LUT, given
the right preprocessing material. For any non-linear function T, with ` Input and m output bits, it is
well known that it can be implemented as a look-up table of 2` components of m bits each. To evaluate
T(·) on a secret authenticated value JxK, x ∈ F2` , the parties use a random authenticated T evalua-
tion from FPrep−LUT (Figure 5.6). More precisely, we would like the preprocessing to output values




JT(s)K, JT(s⊕ 1)K, . . . , JT(s⊕ (2` − 1))K
)
,
so that JTable(s)K[j], 0 ≤ j ≤ 2` − 1, denotes the element JT(s ⊕ j)K. Given such a table, evaluating
JT(x)K is straightforward: first the parties open the value h = x ⊕ s and then they locally retrieve the
value JTable(s)K[h] = JT(s⊕ h)K = JT(s⊕ s⊕ x)K = JT(x)K.
Correctness easily follows from the linearity of the J·K-representation and the discussion above.
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Privacy follows from the fact that the value s used in Table Look-up is randomly chosen and is used
only once, thus it perfectly blinds the secret value x.
5.6.1 More Efficient Variant with TinyTable
The method just described is similar to, but not quite as efficient as, the approach in the two-party
TinyTable protocol [DNNR16]. We can modify this to match the efficiency of TinyTable, generalized
to the multi-party setting. The online cost of a secure look-up to a table T : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m becomes
that of opening an m-bit value, whereas the above method requires opening ` bits. This reduces the
cost of an AND gate from opening 2 bits to just 1 bit, and the cost of a DES S-box from 6 bits to
4. Additionally, when implemented using SPDZ, the cost of linear operations becomes the same as
computing the same operation on clear data; there is no need to also compute on (much larger) MACs,
which gives a significant saving. The downside of this approach is that the preprocessing phase depends
on the precise function being computed, so is less general.
We assume the gates in the circuit to be evaluated are all either F2-linear operations on bit vectors,
or table look-up gates from {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m. During the online phase, for each wire of the circuit,
all parties will obtain a public value x ⊕ s, where x ∈ {0, 1}` is the actual value being computed on,
and s is a random mask for that wire. The previous table look-up preprocessing is modified so that the
i-th entry of the masked table contains a secret-sharing of T(s⊕ i)⊕ o, where s and o are the random
masks for the Input and output wires (resp.) of that table look-up gate.
This means that x⊕ s does not need to be opened in the online phase. Instead, the parties open the
(x⊕s)-th table entry, which is JT(x)⊕oK). This gives them the public value for the output wire, which
can be used in the next gate. Linear gates are computed in the clear on the public values. To obtain
outputs at the end of the computation, the parties open the shared mask JoK (from the preprocessing)
for every output wire. The online cost of each table look-up in this variant is that of opening an m bit
value, instead of ` bits for the previous method. The preprocessing for the m-bit variant can be done
with essentially the same cost as the previous section, but requires knowing the structure of the circuit
in advance. The full online protocol to evaluate a sequence of look-up tables is given in Protocol 5.8.
5.6.2 The Preprocessing Phase: Securely Generating Masked Look-up Tables
In this section we describe how to securely implement the Table Look-up command in FPrep−LUT
(see Figure 5.6), and in particular how to generate masked look-up tables which can be used for
the online phase evaluation. We omit the MaskedFunction command as that is a trivial extension
of Table Look-up. Recall that the goal is to obtain the shared values
JTable(s)K = (JT(s)K, JT(s⊕ 1)K, . . . , JT(s⊕ (2` − 1))K).
Protocol 5.9 begins by taking a secret, random `-bit mask JsK = (Js0K, . . . , Js`−1K). Then, the parties
expand s into a secret-shared bit vector (s′0, . . . , s
′
2`−1) which has a 1 in the s-th entry and is 0 else-
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Protocol ΠF−LT
Function Look-up: On input JxK compute JT(T(. . .T(x)))K (considering the table is evaluated n
times during f ) as follows:
1. Call FPrep−LUT on Input (MaskedFunction, f ), and obtain a set of precom-
puted masked tables (Jo1K, JTable(x)K ⊕ o1) and (Jo2K, JTable(x)⊕ o1 ⊕ iK ⊕
o2), . . . , JoqK, JTable(x⊕ oq−1 ⊕ i)K⊕ oq).
2. The parties open the value y1 ← JTable(x)⊕ o1K. Afterwards they open y2 ←
JTable(y1)K⊕ o2 and so on, until the last opening of yq ← JTable(yq−1)K⊕ oq.
3. Assign f(JxK)← yq ⊕ JoqK as the final function output.
Figure 5.8: More efficient online phase using look-up tables.
Protocol ΠMaskedTable
MaskedTable: On Input (MaskedTable,T, Pi) from all the parties, do the following:
1. Take ` random authenticated bits Js0K, . . . , Js`−1K, where each si is unknown to all the
parties.
2. Compute (Js′0K, . . . , Js
′
2`−1K)← Demux(Js0K, . . . , Js`−1K)
3. ∀i = 0, . . . , 2` − 1, locally compute
JT(i⊕ s)K = T(i) · Js′0K + T(i⊕ 1) · Js′1K + · · ·+ T((2` − 1)⊕ i) · Js′2`−1K
Figure 5.9: Protocol to generate secret shared table look-up.
where. We denote this procedure — the most expensive part of the protocol — by Demux, and describe
how to perform it in the next section.
Once this is done, the parties can obtain the i-th entry of the masked look-up table by computing
T(i) · Js′0K + T(i⊕ 1) · Js′1K + · · ·+ T(i⊕ (2` − 1)) · Js′2`−1K,
which is clearly JT(i⊕ s)K as required. Note that since the S-box is public, this is a local computation
for the parties. In the following we give an efficient protocol for computing Demux.
5.6.3 Computing Demux with Finite Field Multiplications
We now present a general method for computing Demux using fewer thanN/k+logN multiplications
over F2k , when k is any power of 2 and N = 2` is the table size. Launchbury et al. [LDDA12] previ-
ously described a protocol with O(N) multiplications in F2, but our protocol has fewer multiplications
than theirs for all choices of k.
As said before, Demux maps a binary representation (s0, . . . , s`−1) of an integer s =
∑`−1
i=0 si · 2i
into a unary representation of fixed length 2` that contains a one in the position s and zeros elsewhere.
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Protocol 1 (Js′0K, . . . , Js′N−1K)← Demux(k, Js0K, . . . , Js`−1K)
Require: k a power of two, u = N/k, ` = log2N
Input: Bit decomposition of s ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, with LSB first
Output: Satisfies s′s = 1 and s′i = 0 for all i 6= s
1: JpK = (1− Js0K, Js0K) // p starts in F22
2: for j = 1 to `− 1 do
3: JtK = JsjK · JpK // F2 × F2
j
2 multiplication, 1 round
4: JpK = (02j‖JtK) + (JpK− JtK)‖02j ) // p now in F2j+12
5: Write JpK = (Jb0K, . . . , Jbu−1K) // bi ∈ Fk2
6: for i = 0 to u− 1 do
7: (Js′kiK, . . . , Js
′
ki+k−1K) = BitDec(JbiK) // 1 round
8: return (Js′0K, . . . , Js′N−1K)







over F2N 1. Notice that if si = 1 then the i-th term of the product equals X2
i
, whereas the term equals
1 if si = 0. This means the entire product evaluates to s′ = Xs, where s is the integer representation
of the bits (s0, . . . , s`−1). Bit decomposing s′ obtains the demuxed output as required. Unfortunately,
this approach does not scale well with N , the table size, as we must exponentially increase the size of
the field.
We now show how to compute this more generally, using operations over F2k , where k is a power
of two. We will only ever perform multiplications between elements of F2 and F2k , and will consider






+ (1− si)) ∈ F2N
and note that pj+1(X) = pj(X) · (sj ·X2
j
+ (1− sj)), for j < `.
Note also that the polynomial pj(X) has degree < 2j , so pj(X) can be represented as a vector in




elements of Fk2 . This
is the main observation that allows us to emulate the computation of s′ using only F2k arithmetic.
Given a sharing of pj represented in this way, a sharing of pj(X) · X2
j
can be seen as the vector





and a vector representation of pj+1(X) is:
1A similar trick was used by Aliasgari et al. [ABZS13] for binary to unary conversion over prime fields.
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N k = 1 8 40 64 128
64 62 9 5 5 5
128 126 17 7 6 6
256 254 33 11 8 7
512 510 65 18 12 9
1024 1022 129 31 20 13













shared elements of F2k , we can compute Jpj+1K in MPC with⌈
2j/k
⌉
multiplications between JsjK and a shared F2k element, plus some local additions.
Starting with p1(X) = s0 · X + (1 − s0) we can iteratively apply the above method to compute
p` = s






< N/k + `
multiplications between bits and F2k elements.
Table 5.1 illustrates this trade-off between the field size and number of multiplications for some exam-
ple parameters. We note that the main factor affecting the best choice of k is the cost of performing
a multiplication in F2k in the underlying MPC protocol, and this may change as new protocols are
developed. However, we compare costs of some current protocols in Section 5.7.
We now show how to use the look-up table protocol from the previous section to evaluate AES and
DES in MPC. We use the more general method from Protocol 5.7, and leave an implementation of the
faster variant with circuit-dependent preprocessing to future work.
5.6.4 MPC Evaluation of AES
We require an MPC protocol which performs operations in F28 . In practice, we actually embed F28 in
F240 , since we use the SPDZ protocol which requires a field size of at least 2κ, for statistical security
parameter κ. We implement the AES S-box using the table look-up method from Figure 5.9 combined
with Demux (Protocol 1) over F240 , since this yields a lower communication cost (see Table 5.5). Notice
that the data sent is highly dependent on the number of bits, triples and the field size.
In a naive implementation of this approach, we would have call BitDec on JTable(s)K, in order to
perform the embedding F28 ↪→ F240 . This is required since the table output is not embedded, but the
MixColumns step from Figure 5.1 needs the bit decomposition of the input to perform multiplication
by X ∈ F28 on each state.
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With a more careful analysis we can avoid the BitDec calls by locally embedding the bit shares
inside Figure 5.9. We store the masked S-box table in bit decomposed form and then its bits are multi-
plied (in the clear) with Demux’s output (secret-shared). This trick reduces the online communication
by a factor of 8, halves the number of rounds required to evaluate AES and gives a very efficient online
phase with only 10 rounds and 160 openings in F240 .
5.6.5 MPC Evaluation of DES.
Using the fact that DES S-boxes have size 64, we chose to use the Demux given in Protocol 1 with
multiplications in F240 , based on the costs in Table 5.5. Like AES, we try to isolate the Input-dependent
phase as much as possible with no extra cost.
Every DES round performs only bitwise addition and no embedding is necessary here. The masked
table can be bit-decomposed without interaction, exactly as described above for AES, by multiplying
clear bits with secret shared values. This yields a low number of openings, one per S-box look-up, so
the total online cost for 3-DES is 46 rounds with 384 openings.
5.7 Performance Evaluation
This section presents timings for 3-DES and AES using the methods presented in previous sections. We
also discuss trade-offs and different optimizations which turn out to be crucial for our running-times.
The setup we have considered is that both the key and message used in the cipher are secret shared
across two parties. We consider the input format for each block cipher as already embedded into F240
for AES, or as a list of shared bits for DES. We implemented the protocols using the SPDZ software,2
and estimated times for computing the multiplication triples and random bits needed based on the costs
of MASCOT [KOS16].
The results, shown in Tables 7.2, 5.3 and 5.4, give measurements in terms of latency and throughput.
Latency indicates the online phase time required to evaluate one block cipher, whereas throughput
(which we consider for both online and offline phases) shows the maximum number of blocks per
second which can be evaluated in parallel during one execution. We also measure the number of rounds
of interaction of the protocols, and the number of openings, which is the total number of secret-shared
field elements opened during the online evaluation.
Benchmarking Environment. The experiments were ran across two machines each with Intel i7-4790
CPUs running at 3.60GHz, 16GB of RAM connected over a 1Gbps LAN with an average ping of
0.3ms (round-trip). The WAN experiments were simulated using the Linux tc tool with an average
ping latency of 100ms (round-trip) and a bandwidth of 50Mbps.
For experiments with 3–5 parties, we used three additional machines with i7-3770 CPUs at 3.1GHz.





Security Parameters and Field Sizes. Secret-sharing based MPC can be usually split into 2 phases —
preprocessing and online. In SPDZ-like systems, the preprocessing phase depends on a computational
security parameter, and the online phase a statistical security parameter which depends on the field size.
In our experiments the computational security parameter is λ = 128. The statistical security κ is 40 for
every cipher except for 3DES-Raw which requires an embedding into a 42 bit field.
Results. The theoretical costs and practical results are shown in Table 7.2 and Table 5.3, respectively.
Timings are taken only for the encryption calls, excluding the key schedule mechanism. AES-BD is
AES implemented by embedding each block into F240 , and then squaring the shares locally after the
inputs are bit-decomposed. In this manner, each S-box computation costs 5 communication rounds and
6 multiplications. This method was described in [DKL+12].
Surprisingly, AES-RP (the polynomial-based method from Section 5.4.2) has a better throughput
than AES-BD although it requires 20 more rounds and 2 times more shared bits to evaluate. The expla-
nation for this is that in AES-RP there are fewer openings, thus less data sent between parties. However,
for the WAN experiments in AES-RP the latency increases dramatically because of the extra rounds
and the round-trip time.
3DES-Raw represents the 3-DES cipher with the S-box evaluated as a polynomial of degree 62
over the field F26 = F2[x]/(x6 +x4 +x3 +x+1). To make the comparisons relevant with other ciphers
in terms of active security we chose to embed the S-box Input in F242 , via the embedding F26 ↪→ F242 ,
where F242 = F2[y]/(y42 + y21 + 1) and y = x7 + 1. The S-boxes used for interpolating are taken
from the PyCrypto library [Lit19]. 3DES-Raw is implemented only for benchmarking purposes and it
has no added optimizations. One S-box has a cost of 62 multiplications and 62 rounds.
3DES-PV is 3-DES implemented with the Pulkus-Vivek method from Section 5.5.2. Since it has
only a few multiplications in F240 , the amount of preprocessing data required is very small, close to
AES-BD. It suffers in terms of both latency and throughput due to the high number of communication
rounds (needed for bit decomposition to perform the squarings).
AES-LT and 3DES-LT are the ciphers obtained with the lookup table protocol from Section 5.6.
AES-LT achieves the lowest latency and the highest throughput in the online phase for both LAN and
WAN settings. The communication in the preprocessing phase is roughly twice the cost of the previous
method, AES-BD.
Packing optimization. We notice that in the online phase of AES-LT each opening requires to send
8 bit values embedded in F240 . Instead of sending 40 bits across the network we select only the rele-
vant bits, which for AES-LT are 8 bits. This reduces the communication by a factor of 5 and gives a
throughput of 236k AES/second over LAN and a multi-threaded MPC engine.
The same packing technique is applied for 3DES-LT since during the protocol we only open 6
bit values from Protocol 5.7. These bits are packed into a byte and sent to the other party. Here the
multi-threaded version of 3DES-LT improves the throughput only by a factor of 4.2x (vs. AES-LT
4.5x) due to the higher number of rounds and openings along with the loss of 2 bits from packing.
Computation vs. Communication. Notice that for AES the throughput in the WAN setting compared
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Cipher Online cost Preprocessing cost
Rounds Openings Field Triples Bits Field Comm.(MB)
AES-BD 50 2240 F240 960 2560 F240 4.3
AES-RP 70 1920 F240 640 5120 F240 2.9
AES-LT 10 160 F240 1760 42240 F240 8.4
3DES-Raw 2979 48024 F242 23808 2688 F242 112
3DES-PV 230 3456 F240 1152 9216 F240 5.2
3DES-LT 46 384 F240 1920 26880 F240 8.8
Table 5.2: Communication cost for AES and 3-DES in MPC.








AES-BD 5.20 64 758 1024 3164 16 30.7
AES-RP 7.19 1024 940 64 3872 16 46.1
AES-LT 0.928 1024 51654 512 236191 32 16.79
3DES-Raw 270 512 130 - - - 1.24
3DES-PV 36.98 512 86 512 366 32 25.6
3DES-LT 4.254 1024 10883 512 45869 16 15.3
Table 5.3: 1 Gbps LAN timings for evaluating AES and 3-DES in MPC.
to LAN decreases by at least 8 times. Surprisingly, the throughput of 3DES decreases by at most four
- single threaded 3DES-LT can perform around 10000 ops/s over LAN whereas over WAN it has
300 ops/s (with the same ratio for the multi-threaded variant). Profiling suggests that AES has a lower
computation cost than 3DES. This means that increasing the round-trip time between machines has a
slightly worse effect for AES than 3DES since the CPU can do more work between subsequent rounds.
General costs of the table look-up protocol. In Table 5.5, we estimate the communication cost for
creating preprocessed, masked tables for a range of table sizes, using our protocol from Section 5.6.2.
This requires multiplication triples over F2k , where k is a parameter of the protocol. When k = 1, we
give figures using a recent optimized variant [WRK17b] of the two-party TinyOT protocol [NNOB12].
For larger choices of k, the costs are based on the MASCOT protocol [KOS16]. We note that even
though MASCOT has a communication complexity in O(k2), it still gives the lowest costs (with k =
40) for all the table sizes we considered.
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AES-BD 2550 4096 79 2048 325 32 1.52
AES-RP 3569 4096 83 4096 346 32 2.28
AES-LT 510 4096 928 4096 29055 32 0.83
3DES-PV 11727 2048 35 512 185 32 1.27
3DES-LT 2344 4096 383 4096 12165 32 0.76
Table 5.4: 50 Mbps WAN timings for evaluating AES and 3-DES in MPC.
N k = 1 40 64 128
64 35.01 21.8 43.52 112.64
128 71.16 30.52 52.22 135.17
256 143.45 47.96 69.63 157.7
512 288.02 78.48 104.45 202.75
1024 577.17 135.16 174.08 292.86
Table 5.5: Total communication cost (kBytes) of the F2 × F2k multiplications needed in creating a
masked lookup table of sizeN , with two parties. The k = 1 estimates are based on TinyOT [WRK17b],
the others on MASCOT [KOS16].
5.7.1 Multiparty Setting
We also ran the AES-LT protocol with different numbers of parties and measured the throughput of
the preprocessing and online phases. Figure 5.10 indicates that the preprocessing gets more expensive
as the number of parties increases, whereas the online phase throughput does not decrease by much.
This is likely to be because the bottleneck for the preprocessing is in terms of communication (which is
O(n2) in total), whereas the online phase is more limited by the local computation done by each party.
5.7.2 Comparison with Other Works
We now compare the performance of our protocols with other implementations in similar settings.
Table 8.3 gives an overview of the most relevant previous works. We see that our AES-LT protocol
comes very close to the best online throughput of TinyTable, whilst having a far more competitive
offline cost. 3 Our AES-RP variant has a slower online phase, but is comparable to the best garbled
circuit protocols overall.
TinyTable Protocol. The original, 2-party TinyTable protocol [DNNR17] presented implementations
3The reason for the very large preprocessing cost of TinyTable is due to the need to evaluate the S-box 256 times per
table lookup.
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Figure 5.10: Table lookup-based AES throughput for multiple parties.
Protocol Online Comms. Notes
Latency (ms) Throughput (/s) (total)
TinyTable (binary) [DNNR17] 4.18 24500 3.07 MB
TinyTable (optim.) [DNNR17] 1.02 339000 786.4 MB
Wang et al. [WRK17b] 0.93 1075 2.57 MB 10 Gbps
Rindal-Rosulek [RR16] 1.0 1000 1.6 MB 10 Gbps
OP-LUT [DKS+17] 5 41670 0.103 MB passive
SP-LUT [DKS+17] 6 2208 0.044 MB passive
AES-LT 0.93 236200 8.4 MB
AES-RP 7.19 940 2.9 MB
Table 5.6: Performance comparison with other 2-PC protocols for evaluating AES in a LAN setting.
of the online phase only, with two different variants. The fastest variant is based on table lookup and
obtains a throughput of around 340 thousand AES blocks per second over a 1Gbps LAN, which is
1.51x faster than our online throughput. The latency (for sequential operations) is around 1ms, the
same as ours. We attribute the difference in throughput to the additional local computation in our
implementation, since we need to compute on MACs for every linear operation (this could be avoided
if we used the protocol from Section 5.6.1.
TinyTable does not report figures for the preprocessing phase. However, we estimate that using
TinyOT and the naive method suggested in the paper would need would need over 1.3 million TinyOT
triples for AES (34 ANDs for each S-box, repeated 256 times to create one masked table, for 16 S-
boxes in 10 rounds). In contrast, our table lookup method uses around 160 thousand TinyOT triples, or
just 2080 triples over F240 (cf. Table 5.1), per AES block.
Garbled Circuits. There are many implementations of AES for actively secure 2-PC using garbled
circuits [LR15, RR16, NST17, WRK17b]. When measuring online throughput in a LAN setting, using
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garbled circuits gives much worse performance than methods based on table lookup, because evaluating
a garbled circuit is much more expensive computationally. For example, out of all these works the
lowest reported online time (even over a 10Gbps LAN) is 0.93ms [WRK17b], and this does not improve
in the amortized setting.
Some recent garbled circuit implementations, however, improve upon our performance in the pre-
processing phase, where communication is typically the bottleneck. Wang et al. [WRK17b] require
2.57MB of communication when 1024 circuits are being garbled at once, while Rindal and Rosulek
need only 1.6MB [RR16]. The runtime for both of these preprocessing phases is around 5ms over a
10Gbps LAN; this would likely increase to at least 15–20ms in a 1Gbps network, whereas our table
lookup preprocessing takes around 60ms using MASCOT. If a very fast online time is not required, our
implementation of the Rivain–Prouff method would be more competitive, since this has a total amor-
tized time of only 23ms per AES block.
Secret-Sharing Based MPC. Other actively implementations of AES/DES using secret-sharing and
dishonest majority based on secret sharing include those using SPDZ [DKL+12, KSS13a] and Mini-
MAC [DZ13, DLT14]. Our AES-BD method is the same as [DKL+12] and obtains faster performance
than both SPDZ implementations. For DES, our TinyTable approach improves upon the times of the
binary circuit implementation from [KSS13a] (which are for single-DES, so must be multiplied by 3)
by over 100 times. Regarding MiniMAC, the implementation of [DLT14] obtains slower online phase
times than our work and TinyTable, and it is not known how to do the preprocessing with concrete
efficiency.
OP-LUT and SP-LUT. The proposed 2-party protocols by Dessouky et al. [DKS+17] only offer secu-
rity in the semi-honest setting. The preprocessing phase for both the protocols are based on 1-out-of-N
oblivious transfer. In particular, the cost of the OP-LUT setup is essentially that of 1-out-of-N OT,
while the cost of SP-LUT is the cost of 1-out-of-N random OT, which is much more efficient in terms
of communication.
The online communication cost of OP-LUT is essentially the same as our online phase, since both
protocols require each party to send log2N bits for a table of size N . However, we incur some addi-
tional local computation costs and a MAC check (at the end of the function evaluation) to achieve active
security. The online phase of SP-LUT is less efficient, but the overall communication of this protocol
is very low, only 0.055MB for a single AES evaluation over a LAN setting with 1GB network.
The work [DKS+17] reports figures for both preprocessing and online phase: using OP-LUT gives
a latency of around 5ms for 1 AES block in the LAN setting, and a throughput of 42000 blocks/s.
These are both slower than our online phase figures using AES-LT. The preprocessing runtimes of
both OP-LUT and SP-LUT are much better than ours, however, achieving over 1000 blocks per second
(roughly 80 times faster than AES-LT). This shows that we require a large overhead to obtain active
security in the preprocessing, but the online phase cost is the same, or better.
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Protocol 2 Jx′K← Mod2m(JxK, k, `), as in [sec]
Input: k is the bit-length of the input JxK
Output: Satisfies x′ = x mod 2`
1: JbK← 2k−1 + JxK
2: for i = 0 to `− 1 do
3: JriK = FPrep.RandomBit()





6: for i = 0 to k + sec− ` do




i · Jr′′i K
9: JrK← 2` · Jr′′K + Jr′K
10: c← Open(JbK + JrK)
11: c′ ← c mod 2`
12: JuK← BitLT(c′, Jr′KB) // BitLT takes log ` rounds and 2l − 2 openings
13: Jx′K← c′ − Jr′K + JuK · 2`
14: return Jx′K
Protocol 3 x′ ← Mod2m(Jx+ sK, `)
Input: x, s are l bit integers from the look-up table protocol
Output: Satisfies x′ = (x+ s) mod 2`
1: for i = 0 to sec + ` do
2: JriK← FPrep.RandomBit()
3: c← Open(Jx+ sK) + 2` ·
∑sec+`
i=0 JriK
4: return c mod 2`
5.8 Extension to Fp
We now give a new constant round protocol (independent of the table size) to evaluate the online phase
of a look-up table JTK of size 2` where each entry of T(i) ∈ Fp, ∀i ∈ [2`]. Recall again that our goal is
to obtain secret shares of
JTable(s)K = (JT(s)K, JT((s+ 1) mod 2`K, . . . , JT((s+ (2` − 1) mod 2`)K).
To evaluate such a look-up table on input JxK in the online phase we need to retrieve JsK and call
Open(JxK + JsK). In the Boolean case, the reduction modulo 2 happens automatically and the revealed
sum looks random to an adversary as s was sampled at random. When the arithmetic shares are in
Fp we need to work harder since opening x + s ∈ Fp can reveal some information about the input
x. The straightforward solution is to do the reduction mod 2` in MPC, as long as s $← {0, 1}` then
(x + s) mod 2` is also random. Computing Jx+ sK mod 2` is relatively costly though. This can be
done using techniques introduced by Catrina and de Hoogh [Cd10a] and [sec] illustrated in Figure 2.
Our improvement comes from noticing that for the look-up table protocol we need the public output
of Jx+ sK mod 2`. Hence we can devise something simpler described in Figure 3 and get the output
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in the public by first masking x+ s with enough random bits, open the result and then do the operation
modulo 2` in clear. This simple protocol reduces the cost from ` + sec random bits, ` triples, ` + 2




PRFs for fields of characteristics p
This chapter is based on joint work with Lorenzo Grassi and Christian Rechberger and Peter Scholl
and Nigel P. Smart. [GRR+16] which was presented at CCS 2016.
6.1 Contributions
In this chapter we focus on designing and evaluating efficient PseudoRandom Functions (PRFs) for
arithmetic circuits modulo a prime p using the SPDZ protocol. The use of PRFs in MPC has broad
implications when dealing with encrypted databases where the keys are unknown and is detailed be-
low in the next Section. The main contributions of this work is to investigate several low-complexity
blockciphers such as LowMC, MiMC and to design efficient protocols for PRFs such as Naor-Reingold
and a less-known one based on the Legendre symbol. In the case of Legendre PRF we give the first
constant-round protocol which can be evaluated in any secret shared based MPC system, including
SPDZ.
6.2 Overview
Before proceeding with the preliminaries, we first outline some applications we have in mind. Our focus
is on secret sharing based MPC systems such as that typified by BDOZ [BDOZ11], SPDZ [DPSZ12,
DKL+13], and VIFF [DGKN09]; or indeed any classical protocol based on Shamir secret sharing. In
such situations data is often shared as elements of a finite field Fp, of large prime characteristic. Using
such a representation one then has efficient protocols to compute relatively complex functions such
as integer comparison [DFK+06], fixed point arithmetic [CS10], and linear programming [Cd10b].
Indeed the most famous of such efficient high level protocols is that needed to compute the output of
an auction [BCD+09].
Given such applications, evaluated by an MPC “engine”, the question arises as to how to get data
securely in and out of the engine. In traditional presentations the data is entered by the computing
parties, and the output is delivered to the computing parties. However, this in practice will be a sim-
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plification. Input and output may need to be securely delivered/received by third parties, in addition in
a long term reactive functionality the intermediate secure data may need to be stored in a database, or
other storage device.
If we examine the case of long term storage of data, which is stored by the MPC engine only to be
used again at a later date, the trivial way to store such shared data is for each party to encrypt their share
with a symmetric key, and then store each encrypted share. However, this incurs an N -fold increase in
storage at the database end (for N MPC servers), which may be prohibitive. A similar trivial solution
also applies for data input and output, except data input is now performed using N public keys (one
for each MPC server) and output is performed by each server producing a public key encryption of its
share to the recipient’s public key.
A more efficient solution would be to use a direct evaluation of a symmetric key primitive within
the MPC engine. Such a symmetric key primitive should be able to be efficiently evaluated by the MPC
engine1. We call such a symmetric key primitive “MPC-Friendly”. Given almost all symmetric key
primitives can be constructed easily from Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs), the goal is therefore to
produce an MPC-Friendly PRF.
The main problem of using “traditional” PRFs such as AES is that these are built for computational
engines which work over data types that do not easily match the operations possible in the MPC engine.
For example AES is very much a byte/word oriented cipher, which is hard to represent using arithmetic
in Fp. Thus we are led to a whole new area of PRF design, with very different efficiency metrics
compared to traditional PRF design.
6.2.1 Related Work
At the time of writing the paper [GRR+16] there was little direct work on this problem, despite the
recent plethora of proposed MPC applications; indeed the only paper we knew of which explicitly
designs PRFs for use in MPC, was [ARS+15], which we shall discuss below. The three lines of work
most related to the work in this thesis, apart from re-purposing designs from elsewhere, are
• Low complexity, “lightweight” ciphers for use in IoT and other constrained environments.
• Block and stream ciphers suited to evaluation by a Fully Homomorphic or Somewhat Homomor-
phic Encryption scheme, i.e., SHE-Friendly ciphers.
• Designs for use in SNARKs.
We now elaborate on the prior work in these areas.
Low Complexity Lightweight Ciphers: Block ciphers often iterate a relatively simple round func-
tion a number of times to achive security goals. Most early designs in this domain focused on small
area when implemented as a circuit in hardware. There, large depth (via a large number of rounds) is
1Note that public key encryption applications as mentioned above can be built from the symmetric key key primitives in
the standard KEM-DEM manner. The KEM component being relatively easy to implement, in most cases, in an MPC friendly
manner. Thus we focus on symmetric key primitives in this thesis.
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of no concern, since it simply means repeating a circuit that implements a single round more times.
Notable exceptions are mCrypton [LK06] and Noekeon [DPVAR00] which also feature a relatively
low depth. The more recent trend to emphasize low latency (with designs like PRINCE [BCG+12])
fits much better with our requirement of having low-depth. A property of all these designs is that they
lend themselves well to implementations where binary NAND gates, XOR gates, or multiplexers are
the basic building blocks in the used libraries. As explained above the majority of secret sharing based
MPC applications require description via Fp. Whilst bit operations are possible over Fp using standard
tricks (which alas turn XOR into a non-linear operation), applying such ciphers would require the Fp
data types to be split into a shared bit representation over Fp to apply the cipher. Such a conversion is
expensive.
SHE-Friendly Ciphers: Perhaps due to the recent theoretical interest in SHE/FHE schemes, this area
has had more attention than the more practical issues addressed in this thesis. The motivating scenario
for a SHE-Friendly cipher is to enable data to be securely passed to a cloud environment, using a
standard encryption scheme, which the cloud server then homomorphically decrypts to obtain a homo-
morphic encryption of the original data.
This line of work has resulted in a handful of designs. A block cipher called LowMC [ARS+15],
a stream cipher called Kreyvium [CCF+16] (based on the Trivium stream cipher) and FLIP [MJSC16]
(based on a filter permutation, although recently cryptanalysed in [DLR16]). The block cipher LowMC
is designed for both MPC and FHE implementation, but actually does not meet the MPC design goals
we have set. It does indeed have low depth, but it is a cipher based on operations in characteristic two.
The two SHE friendly stream cipher designs of Kreyvium and FLIP also suffer from the same problem
as the lightweight designs describe above, since they are also bit-oriented.
SNARK-friendly Constructions: Being SNARK-friendly means that the number of constraints is low.
This generally favours larger data types like Fp or F2n , and the depth of the circuit is of no concern.
MiMC [AGR+16] was originally designed for this use case and seems to be the only one in this area.
As the depth is not too high either, we choose it for detailed evaluation.
6.2.2 Recent related work
At the time of writing this thesis, there have been many improvements to evaluate lightweight PRFs in
MPC. Two years after, the work of Agrawal et al. [AMMR18] at CCS’18 constructed a more efficient
evaluation for the Naor-Reingold PRF in the distributed setting, i.e., they avoid generic secret sharing
techniques to execute a two-round protocol with applications to distributed key management and enter-
prise network authentication. Next, Albrecht et al. [AGP+19] showed how to use Feistel constructions
using MiMC to reduce the preprocessing cost when evaluating a blockcipher using generic MPC.
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6.3 Preliminaries
The goal of this work is to investigate the efficient evaluation of PRFs in a secret-sharing based MPC
setting. We leave the construction of the various higher level primitives (SSE, ORE, AE etc.) to future
work, although many of these can easily be constructed directly from a PRF.
To fix notation we will consider a PRF of the following form
F :
{
(Fp)` × (Fq)n −→ (Fr)m
(k1, . . . , k`, x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ Fk(x1, . . . , xn).
The various finite fields Fp, Fq and Fr may be distinct. Our MPC engine is assumed to work over the fi-
nite field Fp, as we always assume the key to the PRF will be a secret shared value. As a benchmark, we
compare all of our candidates to the baseline AES example used in prior work, and to implementations
of the given PRFs on clear (public) data.
Depending on the precise application, there are several distinct design criteria which we may want
to consider. Thus, there will not be a one size fits all PRF which works in all applications. We then have
various potential cases:
• In some applications the input is public and we need to embed the public elements x1, . . . , xn ∈
Fq into Fp. However, the more general case is when the input is secret shared itself, and we have
Fq = Fp.
• In some applications the output of the PRF will be public, and thus Fr can be any field. In
other applications we also want the output to be secret shared, so we can use it in some other
processing such as a mode of operation. In this latter case we will have Fr = Fp. In addition,
some applications, such as when using the (leaky) ORE scheme presented in [CLWW16] require
PRF outputs in {0, 1, 2}, and we may (or may not) require these to be secret shared (and hence
embedded in Fp).
• In some applications we would like a PRF which is just efficient in the MPC engine, and we
do not care whether the equivalent standard PRF is efficient or not. In other applications we
also require that the standard PRF is also efficient. For example when an external third party is
encrypting data for the MPC engine to decrypt.
In this thesis we consider four candidate PRFs for use in MPC systems, as well as the comparison case
of AES. Two of these are number theoretic in nature (the Naor-Reingold PRF, based on DDH, and a
PRF based on the Legendre symbol), whilst MiMC [AGR+16] and LowMC [ARS+15] are more akin
to traditional symmetric block cipher constructions.
AES: Since AES does not lend itself well to secure computation over prime fields, we use this purely
as a benchmark. We assume an MPC system which is defined over the finite field F28 , allowing for
efficient evaluation of the S-box [DK10, DKL+12]. We have
FAES : (F28)16 × (F28)16 → (F28)16.
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LowMC: This is a block cipher candidate [ARS+15] designed to be suitable for FHE and MPC style
applications; thus it has a low multiplicative depth and a low number of multiplications. It operates over
F2, so like AES, is not well-suited to the MPC applications for which we envisage our block ciphers
being used for. Thus we only consider LowMC as an additional base line comparison (along with AES)
for our ciphers. LowMC has block size n bits and key size k bits (we use n = 256 and k = 128 since
it has a lower rate of ANDs per output bit), giving
FLowMC : (F2)k × (F2)n → (F2)n.
Naor-Reingold: Let G = 〈g〉 be an elliptic curve group of prime order p in which DDH is hard, and
encode(·) be a hash function that maps elements of G into elements of Fp. The Naor-Reingold PRF
takes a uniform secret-shared key in Fn+1p , a message in Fn2 (secret-shared over Fp), and outputs a
public Fp element as follows:






To evaluate FNR in MPC naively would require computing exponentiations (or Elliptic-Curve scalar
multiplications) on secret exponents, which is very expensive. However, if the PRF output is public,
we show how the exponentiation (and hence PRF evaluation) can be done very efficiently, with active
security, using any MPC protocol based on secret sharing.
Legendre Symbol: We also consider an unusual PRF based on the pseudorandomness of the Legendre
symbol. This is a relatively old idea, going back to a paper of Damgård in 1988 [Dam90], but has not
been studied much by the cryptographic community. The basic version of the PRF is defined as,
FLeg(bit) : Fp × Fp → F2
(k, x) 7→ Lp(x+ k)

















The output is embedded into Fp, giving a secret-shared output in Fp. If needed, the range can easily
be extended to the whole of Fp by using a key with multiple field elements and performing several
evaluations in parallel. This gives a PRF
FLeg(n) : (Fp)((n+1)·`) × (Fp)n → Fp,
for some value ` = O(log2 p) chosen large enough to ensure a sufficient statistical distance from
uniform of the output. This PRF takes n finite field elements as input and produces an element in Fp as
output, where n is some fixed (and relatively small) number, say one or two.
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PRF log2 p Output (type) Online cost Assumption
Mult. Rounds
FAES 8 shared 960 50 –
FLowMC 2 shared 1911 13 –
FNR(n) 256 public 2 · n 3+log(n+ 1) EC-DDH
FLeg(bit) 128 shared 2 3 DSLS
FLeg(n) 128 shared 256 · n 3 DSLS
FMiMC 128 shared 146 73 –
Table 6.1: Overview of the cost of evaluating the PRFs in MPC.
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that the Legendre PRF can be evaluated very efficiently in MPC,
at the cost of just two multiplications in three rounds of interaction for FLeg(bit). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the only PRF that can be evaluated in a constant number of rounds on secret-shared
data, using any arithmetic MPC protocol. Since the underlying hard problem is less well-studied than,
say, DDH or factoring, we also provide a brief survey of some known attacks, which are essentially no
better than brute force of the key.
MiMC: This is a very recent class of designs whose primary application domain are SNARKs [AGR+16].
In addition to a cryptographic hash function, the design also includes a block cipher which is also us-
able as a PRF, with up to birthday bound security. The input, output and keys are all defined over Fp,
so we get
FMiMC : Fp × Fp → Fp.
The core of the round function is the simple map x 7→ x3 over Fp. The number of rounds is quite high
(for a 128-bit prime p 82 for full security, 73 for PRF security), but in terms of Fp multiplications the
performance turns out to be competitive.
The reason for selecting MiMC as a “standard” block cipher is that firstly it works over a finite
prime field of large characteristic, which is a common requirement for applications of secret-sharing
based MPC that perform arithmetic on integers or fixed-point data types. Secondly, the depth of the
computation is not too large, being 146. Thirdly, the number of non-linear operations is also 146,
this means that the offline preprocessing needed (to produce multiplication triples) will be very small
compared to other constructions.
In Table 6.1 we present an overview of the MPC-friendly PRFs we consider. The table shows the
number of secure multiplication needed to execute the online evaluation of the function on shared




Length Extension for FLeg(1)
1. c0 ← n.
2. For i = 1, . . . , n do
a) ci ← xi + FLeg(1)(k, ci−1).
3. a← FLeg(1)(k, cn).
4. Return a.
Figure 6.1: Using CBC Mode With FLeg(1).
Length Extension for FLeg(2)
1. c0 ← n.
2. For i = 1, . . . , n do
a) ci ← FLeg(2)(k, ci−1, xi).
3. Return cn.
Figure 6.2: Using Merkle-Damgård With FLeg(2).
6.3.1 Length Extension
We end this overview by noting that FMiMC and FLeg(n) can be extended to cope with arbitrary length
inputs in the standard way; either by using a CBC-MAC style construction or a Merkle–Damgård
style construction. For example, to extend FLeg(1)and FMiMC, so that they can be applied to an input
x1, . . . , xn ∈ Fp we can use CBC mode as in Figure 6.1. Whereas, to extend FLeg(2) we can apply
Merkle–Damgård as in Figure 6.2. These two extension techniques are often more efficient than using
an arbitrary length PRF as a base building block. The next chapter will deal with adding modes of
operation on top of the PRFs to manipulate arbitrary length data in encrypted form using MPC.
6.3.2 Multi-Party Computation Model
We use the same functionality as in Figure 3.1 initialized over a prime field Fp. We recall that additions
(and linear operations) are local operations so essentially for free. A multiplication uses a preprocessed
multiplication triple and requires sending two field elements in the online phase, with one round of
interaction. Squaring can be done using a square pair and sending just one field element, again in one
round.
The preprocessing can be implemented using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) (as in
the original SPDZ protocols, or protocol of Keller et al. [KPR18]) or Oblivious Transfer (OT), using
MASCOT protocol. [KOS16]. We present runtimes using the OT-based offline phase only, as at the
time of writing the paper this was the faster than their SHE counterpart. After Keller et al. [KPR18]
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improvements of SHE based preprocessing, one can easily take the preprocessing runtimes given in
this chapter and divide them by a factor of 6.
6.3.3 MPC Evaluation of AES and LowMC
As a means of comparison for the other PRFs we use as a base line a two party implementation of AES
using a SPDZ engine over the finite field F28 , embedded into F240 , as in [DKL+12]. Note that recently,
much lower latencies have been obtained by evaluating AES using secure table look-up [DNNR17,
KOR+17]. As the benchmark setup is the same with the previous chapter we will use the AES-BD
numbers and avoid the lookup table protocols due to their slightly more expensive preprocessing phase.
One should also bear in mind that this is only the time needed to evaluate the PRF. In a given application,
which is likely to be over a different finite field, the MPC engine will also need to convert data between
the two fields Fp and F240 . This is likely to incur a more significant cost than the evaluation of the PRF
itself
In addition to AES, we also present comparison executions for the low complexity block cipher
LowMC. This is to enable a comparison with our Fp based block ciphers against not only a standard
in-use block cipher (AES), but also a block cipher designed for use in MPC/FHE environments.
6.3.3.1 FLowMC Definition
LowMC [ARS+15] is a flexible family of block ciphers with operations over F2, designed to have a
low number of multiplications and a low multiplicative depth when implemented in MPC. Similar to
AES, it is based on an SPN structure where the block size n, the key size k, the number of S-boxes
m in the substitution layer and the allowed data complexity d of attacks can independently be chosen.
The number of rounds r needed to reach the security claims is then derived from these parameters.
The two most relevant parts of the round transformation are the SBOXLAYER and the LINEARLAYER.
SBOXLAYER is an m-fold parallel application of the same 3-bit S-box (of multiplicative depth 1) on
the first 3m bits of the state. If n > 3m then for the remaining n − 3m bits, the SBOXLAYER is the
identity. LINEARLAYER is the multiplication in F2 of the state with a predetermined dense randomly
chosen invertible binary n× n matrix that is different for every round.
Using the most recent v2 [ARS+15] formula for r, we need at least 13 rounds to achieve a security
comparable to AES as a PRF, i.e. k = 128 and d = 64. Using n = 256, the minimal number S-boxes
m for which this is true turns out to be 49.
6.3.3.2 Computing FLowMC in MPC
To evaluate LowMC in MPC, we consider two approaches. In the first method, denotedFLowMC(vector),
we work over F2128 and compute the matrix multiplications and XOR operations by parallelizing over
128-bit vectors. Specifically, each column Mi of the n × n matrix M is packed into F2128 elements;
to compute the product M [x] we take the inner product of all columns with [x]. For n = 256, this
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requires 512 XORs and 512 local finite field multiplications. However, we then need to switch back to
F2 to evaluate the S-box (with three F2 multiplications), which requires bit decomposition, adding one
round of interaction for every round of the cipher.
In the second approach, denoted FLowMC(M4R), we use the “Method of Four Russians” [ABH10]
to perform each matrix multiplication in O(n2/ log n) bit operations. We do not parallelize the compu-
tation by packing bits into vectors, so this actually results in a higher computation cost than the vector
method, but avoids the need for bit decomposition in each round.
In both methods, the total number of multiplications over F2 is 3 · m · r. The vector approach
requires 256 · r additional random bits, and also 2r rounds of communication, instead of r rounds for
M4R.
6.3.3.3 Performance
With parameters n = 256,m = 49, r = 13, we obtained a latency of 4ms and a throughput of almost
600 blocks per second.
As for AES, the need to convert from a Fp representation to a bit-oriented representation for ap-
plication of LowMC is likely to dominate the run-time for the actual PRF evaluation, making LowMC
unsuitable for the applications we discussed at the beginning.
6.4 Naor–Reingold PRF
In this section we describe the Naor-Reingold PRF, originally presented in [NR97]. We then go on to
describe how it can be efficiently implemented in a secret sharing based MPC system.
6.4.1 FNR Definition
Let G = 〈g〉 be a multiplicatively written group of prime order p in which DDH is hard, and encode(·)
be a hash function that maps group elements into elements of Fp. For a message x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈







where k = (k0, . . . , kn) ∈ Fn+1p is the key.
In practice, we choose G to be a 256-bit elliptic curve group over the NIST curve P-256, so require
an MPC protocol for Fp with a 256-bit prime p.
6.4.2 Public Output Exponentiation Protocol
The main ingredient of our method to evaluate FNR in MPC, when the key and message are secret-
shared over Fp, is an efficient protocol for publicly computing gs, for some secret value s ∈ Fp. The
protocol, shown in Figure 6.3, uses any arithmetic MPC protocol based on linear secret sharing over Fp.
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Protocol ΠExp([s])
1. The parties call FABB with command (Share, [s]), so that each party Pi obtains an additive
share si ∈ Fp
2. Each party Pi broadcasts yi = gsi
3. Compute y =
∏
i yi
4. Take a random shared [r], and compute [t] = [r] · [s]
5. Call FABB with (Share, [t]) so that each Pi obtains ti. Broadcast zi = gti
6. Open [r] and check that
∏
i zi = y
r
7. Output y
Figure 6.3: Securely computing a public exponentiation.
Functionality FABB-Exp
LetG = 〈g〉 be a group of prime order p. This functionality has all of the features ofFABB (running
in Fp), plus the following command:
PubExp: On receiving (exp, [s]) from all parties, where s is stored in memory, retrieve s, then
send y = gs to the adversary and wait for a response. If the adversary responds with Deliver
then send y to all parties. Otherwise output ⊥ to all parties.
Figure 6.4: Ideal functionality for public exponentiation.
This is modeled for the case of additive secret sharing by the Share command of theFABB functionality,
which produces random shares of secret values.
Given additive shares si ∈ Fp, each party Pi first broadcasts gsi , so the result y =
∏
gsi can be
computed. To obtain active security, we must ensure that each party used the correct value of si. We do
this by computing an additional public exponentiation of gt, where t = r · s for some random, secret
value r. This serves as a one-time MAC on s, which can then be verified by opening r and checking
that gt = yr. If an adversary cheats then passing the check essentially requires guessing the value of r,
so occurs only probability 1/p.
Note that the functionality FABB-Exp (Figure 6.4) models an unfair computation, whereby the ad-
versary first learns the output, and can then decide whether to give this to the honest parties or not. This
is because in the protocol, they can always simply stop sending messages and abort after learning y.
Theorem 15. The protocol ΠExp securely computes the functionality FABB-Exp in the FABB-hybrid
model.
Proof. We construct a simulator S, which interacts with any adversary Adv (who controls the corrupt
parties {Pi : i ∈ A}) and the ideal functionality FABB-Exp, such that no environment can distinguish
between an interaction with S and a real execution of the protocol ΠExp.
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• In the first round S receives si for i ∈ A, as the corrupt parties’ inputs to the FABB-Share com-
mand. S calls FABB-Exp with (exp, [s]) and receives y = gs. Then S samples si
$← Fp and sets
yi = g




j , then sends yi for
all i /∈ A to the adversary and gets back the corrupted parties’ response y∗i , for i ∈ A.
• Proceed similarly to the previous step: S samples ri
$← Fp, sets zi = yrii such that
∏
i zi = y
r,
and sends zi to Adv on behalf of the honest parties. Receives back courrupted parties z∗i .
• Sends r ←
∑
i ri to the adversary. S performs the checking phase with z∗i from Adv and the
honest zi. If the check passes send Deliver to FABB-Exp.
The indistinguishability argument follows from the fact that all broadcasted values gxi by S and the




Correctness is straightforward if all parties follow the protocol. An adversary Adv wins if it changes
the distribution of the functionality to output Deliver. Alas, this happens with negligible probability:
suppose a corrupt party Pj sends y∗j instead of yj = g
sj . We can write y∗j = g
sj · e, for some error
e 6= 1 ∈ G, and so y = gs · e. Then the check passes if Adv can come up with z∗j such that
∏
i zi =
grs · er. Writing z∗j = zj · f , this is equivalent to coming up with f ∈ G such that f = er. Since r is
uniformly random and unknown to the adversary at the time of choosing e and f , passing this check
can only happen with probability 1/|G|. Note that this requires G to be of prime order, so that e (which
is adversarially chosen) is always a generator of G.
More Efficient Protocol based on SPDZ. When using the SPDZ MPC protocol with the secret-shared
MAC representation from [DKL+13], we can save performing the multiplication [t] = [r] · [s]. Instead,
we can take the shared MAC value [m] (on the shared s), which satisfies m = s · α for a shared MAC
key α, and use [m] and [α] in place of [t] and [r]. However, in this case α cannot be made public,
otherwise all future MACs could be forged. Instead, steps 4–6 are replaced with:
• Each party commits to zi = yαi · g−mi .
• All parties open their commitments and check that
∏
i zi = 1.
If the parties are honest, we have zi = gs·αi−mi , so the check will pass. Since in SPDZ, the honest
parties’ MAC shares mi are uniformly random, the shares of αi are perfectly masked by the g−mi
factor in zi, so no information on α is leaked. The main difference here is that the parties must commit
to the zi shares before opening, to prevent a rushing adversary from waiting and forcing the product
to always be 1. The number of rounds and exponentiations is the same, but one multiplication is saved
compared with the previous protocol.
6.4.3 Secure Computation of Naor-Reingold
Given the protocol for public exponentiation, it is straightforward to evaluate the Naor-Reingold PRF
with public output when given a bit-decomposed, secret-shared input [x1], . . . , [xn] and key [k0], . . . , [kn].
First compute
[s] = [k0] ·
n∏
i=1
([xi] · [ki] + (1− [xi]))
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Protocol ΠNR
KeyGen: Call FABB.Random to generate n+ 1 random keys Jk0K . . . JknK.
Eval: To evaluate FNR(n)(k, x) on input JxK with key JkK:
1. Bit decompose JxK into Jx1K . . . JxnK.
2. Compute JsK = Jk0K ·
∏n
i=1(JkiKJxiK + (1− JxiK) (see text for details).
3. Call FABB-Exp on input JsK.
Figure 6.5: Computing FNR(n)(k,x).
using FABB, and then use ΠExp to obtain gs.
The product can be computed in dlog2 n+ 1e rounds using a standard binary tree evaluation. Alter-
natively, we can obtain a constant, 4-rounds protocol using the prefix multiplication protocol of Catrina
and de Hoogh [Cd10a], (which is an optimized variant of the trick of Bar-Ilan and Beaver [BIB89]) at
the expense of 2(n+ 1) additional multiplications.
Security of the ΠNR protocol is straightforward, since there is no interaction outside of the arith-
metic black box functionality.
Handling Input in Fp. If the input is given as a field element rather than in bit-decomposed form,
then we must first run a bit decomposition protocol, such as that of Catrina and de Hoogh [Cd10a] or
Damgård et al. [DFK+06]. The latter works for arbitrary values of x, whilst the former is more efficient,
but requires x is ` bits long, where p > 2`+κ for statistical security κ.
Complexity. For the logarithmic rounds variant based on SPDZ, with n-bit input that is already bit
decomposed, the protocol requires 2n multiplications of secret values and three exponentations, in a
total of dlog2 n+ 1e+ 3 rounds. The constant rounds variant takes 4n+ 2 multiplications in 7 rounds.
Note that there is a higher cost for the secure multiplications, as we require an MPC protocol operating
over Fp for a 256-bit prime p (for 128-bit security), whereas our other PRF protocols only require MPC
operations in 128-bit fields.
6.4.4 Performance
The main advantage of this PRF is the small number of rounds required, which leads to a low latency
in our benchmarks (4.4ms over LAN). However, the high computation cost (for EC operations) slows
down performance and results in a low throughput. We found that with a 256-bit prime p and n = 128,
the logarithmic rounds variant outperformed the constant rounds protocol in all measures in a LAN
environment. In a WAN setting, the constant round protocol achieves a lower latency, but is worse for
throughput and preprocessing time.
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6.5 PRF from the Legendre Symbol
In this section we consider a PRF based on the Legendre symbol, which to the best of our knowledge
was first described in [vHI03]. Whilst this PRF is very inefficient when applied to cleartext data, we
show that with secret-shared data in the MPC setting it allows for a very simple protocol.
6.5.1 FLeg Definition
In 1988, Damgård proposed using the sequence of Legendre symbols with respect to a large prime p as














, . . .
is pseudorandom, when starting at a random seed k. Although there have been several works studying
the statistical uniformity of this sequence, perhaps surprisingly, there has been very little research on
cryptographic applications since Damgård’s paper. Damgård also considered variants with the Jacobi
symbol, or where p is secret, but these seem less suitable for our application to MPC.











We now define the corresponding pseudorandom function (as in [vHI03]) as
FLeg(bit)(k, x) = Lp(k + x)
for k, x ∈ Fp, where p ≈ 2κ is a public prime. The security of this PRF is based on the following two
problems
Definition 16 (Shifted Legendre Symbol Problem). Let k be uniformly sampled from Fp, and define





. Then the Shifted Legendre Symbol (SLS)
problem is to find k, with non-negligible probability.
Definition 17 (Decisional Shifted Legendre Symbol Problem). Let OLeg be defined as above, and
let OR be a random oracle that takes values in Fp and produces outputs in {−1, 1}. The Decisional
Shifted Legendre Symbol (DSLS) problem is to distinguish between OLeg and OR with non-negligible
advantage.
The following proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 18. The function FLeg(bit) is a pseudorandom function if there is no probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm for the DSLS problem.
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6.5.2 Hardness of the Shifted Legendre Symbol Problem
The SLS problem has received some attention from the mathematical community, particularly in the
quantum setting. We briefly survey some known results below.






(k, x) ∈ F2p and compare these with OLeg(x) for all x ∈ Fp, which requires Õ(p2) binary opera-
tions. Russell and Shparlinski [RS04] described a more sophisticated algorithm using Weil’s bound on
exponential sums, which reduces this to Õ(p).
Van Dam, Hallgren and Ip [vHI03] described a quantum polynomial time algorithm for the SLS
problem that recovers the secret k if the oracle can be queried on a quantum state. They conjectured that
classically, there is no polynomial time algorithm for this problem. Russell and Shparlinski [RS04] also
extended this quantum algorithm to a generalization of the problem where the secret is a polynomial,
rather than just a linear shift.
One can also consider another generalization called the hidden shifted power problem, where the
oracle returns (k + x)e for some (public) exponent e|(p − 1). The SLS problem is a special case
where e = (p − 1)/2. Vercauteren [Ver08] called this the hidden root problem and described efficient
attacks over small characteristic extension fields, with applications to fault attacks on pairings-based
cryptography. Bourgain et al. [BGKS12] showed that if e = p1−δ for some δ > 0 then this problem has
classical query complexity O(1). Note that neither of these attacks apply to the SLS problem, which
cannot be solved with fewer than Ω(log p) queries [VD02].
At the time of writing the paper we were not aware of any classical algorithms for the SLS problem
in better than Õ(p) time, nor of any method for solving the DSLS problem without first recovering the
secret. There has been some progress within the last year concerning the security of the Legendre PRF
by Khovratovich [Kho19] or by Beulens et al [BBUV19]. They are able to solve the SLS problem on a
classical computer within time complexity O(
√






, the complexity increases to O(p log p). In conclusion, the cryptanalysis





is still an open problem for primes of at least 256-bits long whereas for
high degree SLS this seems to be a hard problem for the primes we consider in our paper (p ≈ 2128).
6.5.3 Secure Computation of FLeg(bit)
It turns out that FLeg(bit) can be evaluated in MPC very efficiently, at roughly the cost of just 2 multipli-
cations in 3 rounds of communication. Although this only produces a single bit of output, composing
together multiple instances in parallel with independent keys allows larger outputs to be obtained (see
later).
We first describe how to evaluate FLeg(bit) when the output is public, and then show how to extend
this to secret-shared output, with only a small cost increase.
Public output. Suppose we have a shared, non-zero [a] and want to compute the public output, Lp(a).
Since the output is public, we can simply take a random preprocessed non-zero square [s2], compute
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Protocol ΠLegendre
Let α be a fixed, quadratic non-residue modulo p.
KeyGen: Call FABB.Random to generate a random key JkK.
Eval: To evaluate FLeg(bit) on input JxK with key JkK:
1. Take a random square Js2K and a random bit JbK
2. JtK← Js2K · (JbK + α · (1− JbK))
3. u← Open(JtK · (JkK + JxK))





· (2JbK− 1) + 1)/2
Figure 6.6: Securely computing the FLeg(bit) PRF with secret-shared output.
[c] = [s2] · [a] and open c. By the multiplicativity of the Legendre symbol, Lp(c) = Lp(a).
By composing the PRF n times in parallel, this gives an n-bit output PRF that we can evaluate in
MPC with just n multiplications and n openings in 2 rounds. The preprocessing requires n random
squares and multiplication triples.
Shared output. Now suppose we instead want shared output, JLp(a)K. If we have a random non-zero
value JtK, and also the shared value JLp(t)K, then this is easy. Just open JaK · JtK, and compute the
Legendre symbol of this to get c = Lp(a · t). The shared value JLp(a)K can then be computed locally
using c and JLp(t)K, as c is public.
Generating a random value with a share of its Legendre symbol can be done very cheaply. Our
key observation is that we can do this without having to compute any Legendre symbols in MPC. Let
α ∈ Zp be a (public) quadratic non-residue, and perform the following:
• Take a random square Js2K and a random bit JbK.
• Output (2JbK− 1, JbK · Js2K + (1− JbK) · α · Js2K)
Note that since α is a non-square, the second output value is clearly either a square or non-square based
on the value of the random bit b (which is mapped into {−1, 1} by computing 2·b−1). Finally, note that
since s2 provides fresh randomness each time, α can be reused for every PRF evaluation. This gives us
the protocol in Figure 6.6, which realizes the functionality FABB-Leg shown in Figure 6.7. Notice that
all bar the computation of u can be performed in a preprocessing phase if needed.
Security. At first glance, the security of the protocol appears straightforward: since t and k are uni-
formly random, the opened value u should be simulatable by a random value, and this will be correct
except with probability 1/p (if s2 = 0). However, proving this turns out to be more tricky. We need to
take into account that if x = −k then the protocol causes u = 0 to be opened, but in the ideal world the
simulator does not know k so cannot simulate this. This reflects the fact that an adversary who solves
the SLS problem can find k and run the protocol with x = −k. Therefore, we need to assume hard-
ness of the SLS problem and show that any environment that distinguishes the two worlds (by causing
x = −k to be queried) can be used to recover the key k. The reduction must use the SLS oracle, OLeg,
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Functionality FABB-Leg
This functionality has all of the same commands as FABB, plus the following:
KeyGen: On receiving (keygen) from all parties, sample k $← Fp and store k.
PRF: On receiving (legendre, [x]) from all parties, where x is stored in memory, compute
y = Lp(x+ k) and store y in memory.
Figure 6.7: Ideal functionality for the Legendre symbol PRF, FLeg(bit).
to detect whether x = −k, in order to simulate the u value to the environment. To do this, they simply





from OLeg and check whether y = 0, for each Eval query made by the
adversary.
Theorem 19. The protocol ΠLegendre securely computes the functionality FABB-Leg in the FABB-hybrid
model, if the SLS problem is hard.
Proof. We construct a simulator S such that no environment Z corrupting up to n − 1 parties can
distinguish between the real protocol ΠLegendre, and S interacting with the ideal functionalityFABB-Leg.
In the KeyGen stage, S simply calls FABB-Leg with the keygen command. In the Eval stage, the
main task of S is to simulate the opened value u, which is done by sampling u $← Fp, and then call
FABB-Leg with (legendre, JxK).
We now argue indistinguishability of the two executions. In the real world, since t is computed as
s2 · (b + (1 − b) · α) for a uniform quadratic residue s2 and random bit b, then t is uniform in Fp.
This is because the map defined by multiplication by α is a bijection between the sets of squares and
non-squares modulo p. Therefore, if s2 is a uniformly random square, then α ·s2 is a uniformly random
non-square.
Now, since t is a fresh uniformly random value on each evaluation, the real world value u and
output y, as seen by Z , will be identically distributed to the simulated values as long as k + x 6= 0 and
s 6= 0. Whenever the former happens in the real world u = 0 is opened, whereas the ideal world still
simulates a random value, so the environment can distinguish. In the latter case, s = 0, the output y
will be incorrectly computed in the real world, but this can only happen with probability 1/p.
However, any environment Z that causes k + x = 0 to happen with non-negligible probability can
be used to construct an algorithm A∗ that breaks the SLS problem, as follows.
A∗ runs Z , emulating a valid execution of ΠLegendre by replacing Lp(x+k) computation with calls
toOLegk . These modified transcripts have the same distribution since the SLS oracle and (keygen) both
generate a random key. WhenA∗ runs Z internally, it knows the inputs provided by Z to all parties, so
knows the x value on each invocation of ΠLegendre. Once Z constructs a query for which OLegk returns
0 then A∗ responds to the SLS challenge with k = −x. Finally, the algorithm looks like this:
1. Interact with Z as the simulator S would do.
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2. Instead of computing the Legendre symbol Lp(x+ k) as in FABB-Leg, make a call to OLegk .
3. If OLegk(x) = 0, return −x as the SLS secret.
The only way Z can distinguish between S and ΠLegendre — except with probability 1/p — is by
producing a query x for which OLegk(x) = 0, since the two worlds are statistically close up until this
point. If Z can do this with probability ε then the probability that A∗ solves the SLS problem is the
same.
Overall, S correctly simulates the protocol ΠLegendre as long as u 6= 0, which happens with proba-
bility ≤ 1/p+ ε (s = 0 or solving SLS with probability ε).
Perfect Correctness. The basic protocol above is only statistically correct, as s2 = 0 with probability
1/p, and if this occurs the output will always be zero. Although this suffices for most applications, we
note that perfect correctness can be obtained, at the expense of a protocol that runs in expected constant
rounds. We can guarantee that the square s2 is non-zero by computing it as follows:
• Take a random square Js2K and a random value JyK.
• Compute JvK = Jy · s2K and open v. If v = 0 then return to the first step.
Note, that the iteration of the first step only happens if y = 0 or s = 0, which occurs with probability
2/p, so the expected number of rounds for this stage of the protocol is one.
6.5.4 Domain and Codomain Extension
Some applications may require a PRF which takes multiple finite field elements as input, and outputs
a finite field element. We now present how to extend the basic PRF FLeg(bit) to a function which takes
messages consisting of n finite field elements and outputs a single uniformly random finite field ele-
ment. Indeed our input could consist of up to t elements in the finite field where t ≤ n. In practice we
will take n = 1 or 2, and can then extend to larger lengths using CBC-mode or Merkle-Damgård (as in
Section 6.3.1).
We first define a statistical security parameter 2−stat, which bounds the statistical distance from
uniform of the output of our PRF. We let define p′ to be the nearest power of two to the prime p and
set α = |p − p′|. Then if α/p < 2−stat we set ` = dlog2 pe, otherwise we set ` = dlog2 pe + stat. A
standard argument will then imply that the following PRF outputs values with the correct distribution.
The key for the PRF is going to be an `× (n+ 1) matrix K of random elements in Fp, except (for
convenience) that we fix the first column to be equal to one. To apply the PRF to a vector of elements
x = (x1, . . . , xt) we “pad” x to a vector of n + 1 elements as follows x′ = (x1, . . . , xt, 0, . . . , 0, t)








This extended PRF requires one extra round of ` · (n− 1) secure multiplications compared to FLeg(bit).
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Since the matrix K is compressing, the distribution of y will act, by the leftover hash lemma, as
a random vector in F`p. With probability `/p we have yi 6= 0 for all i, which implies that the values
of Lp(yi) behave as uniform random bits, assuming our previous conjectures on the Legendre symbol.
Thus the output value of FLeg(n)(K,x) will, by choice of `, have statistical distance from uniform in
Fp bounded by 2−stat.
Our choice of padding method, and the choice of the first matrix column to be equal to one, is to





2i · FLeg(bit)(ki, yi)
)
(mod p).
In addition, the padding method ensures protection against length extension attacks.
6.5.5 Performance
We measured performance using the prime p = 2127 +45, which implied for FLeg(n) we could take ` =
128. Both FLeg(bit) and FLeg(1) obtain very low latencies (0.35ms and 1.2ms over LAN, respectively)
due to the low number of rounds. For a PRF with small outputs, FLeg(bit) achieves by far the highest
throughput, with over 200000 operations per second. For full field element outputs, FLeg(1) is around
128 times slower, but still outperforms AES in all metrics except for cleartext computation.
6.6 MiMC
6.6.1 FMiMC Definition
MiMC is a comparatively simple block cipher design, where the plaintexts, the ciphertexts and the
secret key are elements of Fp and can be seen as a simplification of the KN-cipher [NK95]. Its de-
sign is aimed at achieving an efficient implementation over a field Fp by minimizing computationally
expensive field operations (e.g. multiplications or exponentiations).
Let p a prime that satisfies the condition gcd(3, p− 1) = 1. For a message x ∈ Fp and a secret key
k ∈ Fp, the encryption process of MiMC is constructed by iterating a round function r times. At round
i (where 0 ≤ i < r), the round function Fi : Fp → Fp is defined as:
Fi(x) = (x+ k + ci)
3,
where ci are random constants in Fp (for simplicity c0 = cr = 0). The output of the final round is
added with the key k to produce the ciphertext. Hence, the output of FMiMC(x, k) is then given by
FMiMC(x, k) = (Fr−1 ◦ Fr−2 ◦ ... ◦ F0)(x) + k.
The condition on p ensures that the cubing function creates a permutation.
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The number of rounds for constructing the keyed permutation is given by r = dlog3 pe - for prime
fields of size 128 bits the number of rounds is equal to r = 82. This number of round r provides secu-
rity against a variety of cryptanalytic techniques. In particular, due to the algebraic design principle of
MiMC, the most powerful key recovery methods are the algebraic cryptanalytic attacks, as the Interpo-
lation Attack and the GCD Attack. In the first one introduced by Jakobsen and Knudsen in [JK97], the
attacker constructs a polynomial corresponding to the encryption function without any knowledge of
the secret key. In particular, the attacker guesses the key of the final round, constructs the polynomial
at round r−1 and checks it with one extra plaintext/ciphertext pair. In the second one, given two plain-
text/ciphertext pairs (pj , cj) for j = 1, 2, the attacker constructs the polynomials FMiMC(p1,K) − c1
and FMiMC(p2,K)− c2 in the fixed but unknown key K. Since these two polynomials share (K − k)
as a factor (where k is the secret key), the attacker can find the value of k by computing the GCD of
them.
If the attacker has access to a limited number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs only (at most n < p),
then the number of round r can be reduced. In this case, the number of rounds is given by r =
max{dlog3 ne, dlog3 p − 2 log3(log3 p)e} - for prime field of size 128 bits, the number of rounds is
equal to r = 73 if n ≤ 2115, while r = dlog3 ne otherwise.
6.6.2 Computing FMiMC in MPC
We consider two different approaches for computing FMiMC in MPC, with a secret shared key and
message. The basic approach is simplest, whilst the second variant has half the number of rounds of
communication, with slightly more computation.
MiMCbasic: The naive way to evaluate FMiMC requires one squaring and one multiplication for each
of the r rounds. Using SPDZ, the squaring costs one opening in one round of communication, and
the multiplication costs two openings in one round, giving a total of 3r openings in 2r rounds of
communication.
MiMCcube: If for each round we first compute a tuple ([r], [r2], [r3]), where r $← Fp, then given a
secret-shared value [x], we can open y = x− r and obtain a sharing of x3 by the computation
[x3] = 3y[r2] + 3y2[r] + y3 + [r3]
which is linear in the secret-shared values so does not require interaction.
For a single MiMC encryption, we first compute all of the cube triples for each round, which takes just
one round of communication by taking a preprocessed random square pair ([r], [r2]) and performing
one multiplication to obtain [r3]. Each round of the cipher then requires just one opening and a small
amount of interaction. The total communication complexity is still 3r openings, but in only r rounds.
109
CHAPTER 6. PRFS FOR FIELDS OF CHARACTERISTICS p
6.6.3 Performance
Using r = 73, we measured a latency of 12ms per evaluation for the simple protocol MiMCbasic, which
halves to 6ms for the lower round variant, MiMCcube. MiMCbasic gives a very high throughput of over
8500 blocks per second (around 20% higher than MiMCcube), and the offline cost is fairly low, at 34
blocks per second. In fact, apart from in latency, MiMC outperforms all the other PRFs we studied.
6.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the PRFs using the SPDZ multi-party computation
protocol [DPSZ12, DKL+13], which provides active security against any number of corrupted parties.
We focus here on the two-party setting, although the protocol easily scales to any number of parties
with roughly a linear cost.
The two main metrics we use to evaluate performance are latency and throughput, both of which
relate to the online phase of the SPDZ protocol. Latency measures the waiting time for a single PRF
evaluation; the best possible latency is recorded by simply timing a large number of sequential exe-
cutions of the PRF, and taking the average for one operation. In contrast, throughput is maximized by
running many operations in parallel to reduce the number of rounds of communication. Of course, this
comes at the expense of a higher latency, so a tradeoff must always be made depending on the precise
application. In addition to latency and throughput, we present the cost of running the preprocessing
phase and computing the PRF on cleartext data, for comparison.
Implementation Details: We implemented the protocols using the architecture of Keller et al. [KSS13a],
which runs the online phase of SPDZ. This system automatically uses the minimum number of rounds
of communication for a given program description, by merging together all independent openings. We
extended the software to use the Miracl library for elliptic curve operations over the NIST P-256 curve,
as required for the Naor-Reingold protocol. Note that although the SPDZ implementation supports
multi-threading, all of our online phase experiments are single-threaded to simplify the comparison.
Data type
Fp (ms) F2128 (ms)
128-bit 256-bit
Triple/Sq. 0.204 0.816 0.204
Bit 0.204 0.816 0.00014
Triple/Sq. 4.150 16.560 4.150
Bit 4.150 16.560 0.00285





PRF Best latency Best throughput Prep. (ops/s) Cleartext
(ops/s)
(ms/op) Batch size ops/s
AES 7.713 2048 530 5.097 106268670
FLowMC(vector) 4.302 256 591 2.562 7000
FLowMC(M4R) 4.148 64 475 2.565 1420
FNR(128)(log) 4.375 1024 370 4.787 1359
FNR(128)(const) 4.549 256 281 2.384 1359
FLeg(bit) 0.349 2048 202969 1225 17824464
FLeg(1) 1.218 128 1535 9.574 115591
FMiMC(basic) 12.007 2048 8788 33.575 189525
FMiMC(cube) 5.889 1024 6388 33.575 189525
Table 6.3: Performance of the PRFs in a LAN setting.
To estimate the cost of producing the preprocessing data (multiplication triples, random bits etc.),
we used figures from the recent MASCOT protocol [KOS16], which uses OT extensions to obtain
what are currently the best reported triple generation times with active security. Although in [KOS16],
figures are only given for triple generation in a 128-bit field, we can also use these times for random
square and random bit generation, since each of these can be easily obtained from one secret multi-
plication [DFK+06]. For the Naor-Reingold PRF, we multiplied these times by a factor of 4 to obtain
estimates for a 256-bit field (instead of 128), reflecting the quadratic communication cost of the proto-
col. 2 The costs for all of these preprocessing data types are summarized in Table 6.2.
Note that LowMC only requires multiplication triples in F2, for which the protocol of [FKOS15]
could be much faster than using F2128 triples. However, we are not currently aware of an implementa-
tion of this protocol, so use the F2128 times for now.
Benchmarking Environment: In any application of MPC, one of the most important factors affecting
performance is the capability of the network. We ran benchmarks in a standard 1Gbps LAN setting, and
also a simulated WAN setting, which restricts bandwidth to 50Mbps and latency to 100ms, using the
Linux tc tool. This models a real-world environment where the parties may be in different countries
or continents. In both cases, the test machines used have Intel i7-3770 CPUs running at 3.1GHz, with
32GB of RAM.
Results: The results of our experiments in the LAN and WAN environments are shown in Tables 6.3
and 6.4, respectively. All figures are the result of taking an average of 5 experiments, each of which
ran at least 1000 PRF operations. We present timings for AES and LowMC purely as a comparison
2The experiments in [KOS16] showed that communication is the main bottleneck of the protocol, so this should give an
accurate estimate.
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PRF Best latency Best throughput Prep. (ops/s)
(ms/op) Batch size ops/s
AES 2640 1024 31.947 0.256
FLowMC(vector) 1315 2048 365 0.1259
FLowMC(M4R) 659 2048 334 0.1261
FNR(128)(log) 713 1024 59.703 0.2359
FNR(128)(const) 478 1024 30.384 0.1175
FLeg(bit) 202 1024 2053 60.241
FLeg(1) 210 512 68.413 0.4706
FMiMC(basic) 7379 512 59.04 1.650
FMiMC(cube) 3691 512 79.66 1.650
Table 6.4: Performance of the PRFs in a simulated WAN setting.
metric; as explained in the introduction, these are not suitable for many MPC applications as they do
not operate over a large characteristic finite field.
LowMC obtains slightly better throughput and latency than AES over a LAN, with both the vector
and M4R methods achieving similar performance here. In the WAN setting, LowMC gets a very high
throughput of over 300 blocks per second. This is due to the low online communication cost for multi-
plications in F2 instead of F2n or Fp, and the fact that local computation is less significant in a WAN.
The M4R method gets half the latency of the vector method in this scenario, since the number of rounds
is halved. As discussed earlier, the preprocessing for LowMC would likely be much better than AES if
implemented with the protocol of [FKOS15].
In both scenarios, the Legendre PRF gives the lowest latency, even when outputing 128-bit field ele-
ments rather than bits, due to its low round complexity. The single-bit output variant achieves by far the
highest throughput of all the PRFs, so would be ideally suited to an application based on a short-output
PRF, such as secure computation of the (leaky) order-revealing encryption scheme in [CLWW16]. The
Legendre PRF with large outputs is useful in scenarios where low latency is very important, although
the preprocessing costs are expensive compared to MiMC below. However, the high cost of the Legen-
dre PRF “in the clear” may not make it suitable for applications in which one entity is encrypting data
to/from the MPC engine.
The Naor-Reingold PRF also achieves a low latency — though not as good as the Legendre PRF —
but it suffers greatly when it comes to throughput. Notice that in the LAN setting, the constant rounds
protocol actually performs worse than the logarithmic rounds variant in all measures, showing that here
the amount of computatation and communication is more of a limiting factor than the number of rounds.
Profiling suggested that over 70% of the time was spent performing EC scalar multiplications, so it
seems that computation rather than communication is the bottleneck in these timings. The requirement
for a 256-bit field (for 128-bit security) will be a limiting factor in many applications, as will the need
to bit decompose the input, if it was previously a single field element.
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The MiMC cipher seems to provide a good compromise amongst all the prime field candidates,
especially as it also performs well when performed “in the clear”. The cube variant, which halves
the number of rounds, effectively halves the latency compared to the naive protocol. This results in
a slightly worse throughput in the LAN setting due to the higher computation costs, whereas in the
WAN setting round complexity is more important. Although the latency is much higher than FLeg,
due to the large number of rounds, MiMC achieves the best throughput for Fp-bit outputs, with over
6000 operations per second. In addition, the preprocessing costs of MiMC are better than that of both
Legendre and the Naor-Reingold PRFs.
So in conclusion there is no single PRF which meets all the criteria we outlined at the beginning.
But one would likely prefer the Legendre PRF for applications which require low latency, and which




Modes of operation over Fp
This chapter is based on joint work with Nigel P. Smart and Martijn Stam [RSS17] which was published
in Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology 2017 and presented at FSE 2018.
7.1 Contributions
In this chapter we being our search for building more advanced protocol on top of the PRFs described
earlier, looking at the concrete case of Authenticated Encryption (AE) in MPC. After finding several
candidates suitable for doing AE in MPC such as OTR, PMAC, Hash-then-MAC we then formally
prove that they are secure with concrete query bounds. We then showed experimentally their perfor-
mance by instantiating them with the most efficient PRFs found in the previous chapter. Contrary to our
belief, when multiple blocks get authenticated MiMC turned out to be more efficient than the Legendre
PRF due to fewer openings done in parallel and a lower computational complexity.
7.2 Overview
In the previous chapter we have seen that there are many applications built on top of PRFs evaluated
on encrypted data which deals with sending data to and from an MPC engine E . Consider the example
when a client wants to send data securely to E : the client encrypts her data using a PRF in counter
mode to then let the system jointly decrypt using a PRF in MPC. The advantage of this method is that it
abstracts away the underlying structure of E , such as the number of parties or the type of MPC protocol,
and allows an easy key management due to the client storing just a single symmetric key.
But what happens if the data needs to be authenticated during transit? In this chapter we try to
answer this question by ensuring data integrity plus confidentiality to and from E , as well as proving the
client’s identity. In order to achieve this we survey the literature for highly parallel modes of operation
for AE and adapt them to work over a prime field. The restriction to work over a prime field comes
from the fact that most of the secret-sharing based MPC engines designed to work with a dishonest
majority are more efficient over a prime field.
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We examine how the currently best PRFs for secret shared MPC over Fp, namely MiMC and
Leg, can be used to enable nonce-based authenticated encryption, where we benchmark a number of
orthogonal options. As alluded to before, we are assuming that the key and the plaintext message
are held in secret shared form, but that the nonce and the resulting ciphertext are in the clear. This
assumption crucially informs our study.
Our first step is to select potential modes of operation for secret-sharing based MPC-driven, nonce-
based AE. In making such a selection there are a number of design desiderata to take into account
the somewhat unusual computational model. Firstly, the underlying PRF is only ever evaluated in the
forward direction, both during encryption and decryption (even though MiMC as a blockcipher does
have an inverse, it is rather inefficient). Secondly, the mode should allow a high degree of parallelism
of the PRF calls to take full advantage of the ability of secret-sharing based MPC engines to evaluate
many operations in parallel. Finally, the further computational overhead (beyond PRF calls) may be
complicated, provided it can be performed locally. To enable local computation, it can be worth opening
secret shared elements, provided this opening does not negatively affect security.
When examining various possible modes for authenticated encryption, we found two candidates
that best met our overall design criteria: on the one hand, a single combined mode based on OTR [Min14],
and on the other an Encrypt-then-MAC methodology using either CTR-Mode plus PMAC [BR02], or
CTR-Mode plus Hash-then-Encrypt (where in both cases the CTR-Mode is nonce-based by exploiting
a tweakable PRF). We converted the original PMAC and OTR algorithms (which use finite fields of
characteristic two) into variants that process blocks consisting of finite field elements in Fp, where p is
a large prime (say p > 2128). The resulting algorithms we dub pPMAC and pOTR. Here we took care
to ensure that the modifications made do not invalidate any of the original security proofs.
Modern modes of operation, including PMAC and OTR, are usually cleanest described based on a
tweakable primitive, and we follow suit. This obviously does necessitate the investigation of tweakable
PRFs in our MPC context. Luckily, creating tweakable PRFs turns out much easier than in the tradi-
tional, binary field setting. In that latter setting, Rogaway’s XE transform [Rog04] takes a PRF Ek(m)
and turns it into a tweakable PRF Ẽi,Nk (m) with a tweak (i,N) using a sequence of constants Mi in the
following manner:
Ẽi,Nk (m) = Ek(m⊕ (Mi · Ek(N))) .
It is important that the constants Mi do not repeat, and be easy to compute. This led many authors
to select Mi = 2T1 · 3T2 for two functions T1, T2 depending on i. This choice is prompted by the
characteristic two field, with the exact tweak applied depending on the field order. In our setting of
large prime characteristic, we obtain a trivial schedule by using a standard integer representation of the
field:
Ẽi,Nk (m) = Ek(m+ (i · Ek(N))) .
With CTR-then-pPMAC as an encryption methodology on a message consisting of ` finite field
elements (i.e. ` blocks in this context), we apply one round of ` tweakable-PRF evaluations to encrypt
the ` message blocks, then another round of `− 1 tweakable-PRF evaluations to produce a final MAC
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block, to which a final tweakable-PRF evaluation is performed. Ignoring non-message dependent PRF
evaluations this means we need to evaluate 2 · ` PRF evaluations in a total of three parallel rounds. For
the CTR+Hash-then-MAC mode we apply one round of ` tweakable-PRF evaluations to encrypt the `
message blocks, then a hash function in the clear to produce an intermediate open value, to which a
final tweakable-PRF evaluation is performed. This means we need to evaluate `+ 1 PRF evaluations in
a total of two parallel rounds. For the OTR mode we evaluate first a PRF on a nonce block, then apply
` PRF calls in two rounds (essentially performing a two round Feistel network). A final PRF evaluation
produces the tag. Overall, we require `+ 2 PRF evaluations over four parallel rounds to evaluate OTR
mode. Not surprisingly, we find that CTR+Hash-then-MAC turns out to be the most efficient of these
modes of operation.
In a second step we implemented the modes using the above two PRFs to see which performed
better in practice. Our experiments are carried out using the publicly available SPDZ engine [DPSZ12,
DKL+13], though any classical protocol based on Shamir secret sharing could also be used. Previously,
Grassi et al. [GRR+16] conducted experiments under the assumptions that the input and the output to
the PRF need to be kept in secret shared form. However, when used within one of the above modes of
operation this may no longer be true, enabling further optimizations to be made into precisely how the
PRFs are evaluated within the MPC system, a topic which we explore in this thesis.
Grassi et al. furthermore imply that the Leg PRF is to be preferred over the MiMC PRF, as the Leg
PRF (based on the Legendre symbol) had a lower online round cost and slightly higher preprocess-
ing costs. Their experiments seemed to confirm the preference for the Leg PRF. Interestingly, when
used within a mode of operation supporting parallel processing of the blocks, we find that the MiMC
PRF online phase performs much better. Though the Leg PRF has low round complexity and low
computational cost (when computational cost is measured in an MPC environment), its per-round com-
munication cost is high. Thus for each round of communication the number of bits sent between the
MPC servers is much larger than that for MiMC. When many PRF applications are done in parallel
this high per round communication cost causes network bottlenecks, resulting in a linear scaling in the
runtime as the number of blocks processed increases. For MiMC, reaching network saturation takes
longer and so, as the number of blocks processed is increased, the runtime only degrades sub-linearly.
Hence, MiMC will often significantly outperform Leg.
7.3 Preliminaries
In this section we recall the basic notions of Authenticated Encryption and its constituent building block
PseudoRandom Function, as well as generic design considerations in the context of MPC, including
details on the two existing PRFs designed for MPC that we will build upon. Throughout we will write
AdvO1,...,Oc for an algorithm Adv with access to c oracles O1, . . . , Oc. For a finite field Fp we let
F×p = Fp \ {0}.
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Algorithm Ẽi,Nk (m):
1: L← Ek(N)
2: ∆← i · L
3: Y ← Ek(∆ +m)
4: return Y
Figure 7.1: XE-based tweakable pseudorandom function over Fp.
7.3.1 Tweakable Pseudorandom Functions
A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is a keyed function F : K × X → Y , where K is called the key
space. The key k ∈ K is typically chosen at random and the function keyed with k is denoted Fk.
A PRF is pseudorandom if an adversary cannot tell the difference between oracle access to Fk,
for undisclosed k uniformly chosen at random from K, on the one hand and oracle access to a function
selected uniformly at random from the set Rand(X ,Y) of all functions which map X to Y , on the other.




∣∣∣Pr [ k $← K : AdvFk(·) ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [ ρ $← Rand(X ,Y) : Advρ(·) ⇒ 1 ] ∣∣∣
where we will informally say F is a PRF if this advantage is sufficiently small for all reasonably
resourced adversaries. It is easy to formalize our work to an asymptotic setting where security equates
to negligible advantages with respect to all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries operating against
function families (indexed by a security parameter).
In analogy with tweakable blockciphers, we shall also consider PRFs. A tweakable PRF (tPRF)
takes as additional input a tweak T chosen from a set of tweaks T , thus F̃ : K × T × X → Y .
Security is defined in much the same way as for a PRF, except that the adversary can query the function
on tweak–message pairs and the adversary’s goal is to distinguish F̃k from a random function ρ̃ ∈





∣∣∣Pr [ k $← K : AdvF̃k(·,·) ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [ ρ̃ $← Rand(T × X ,Y) : Advρ̃(·,·) ⇒ 1 ] ∣∣∣.
When considering PRFs with domain and co-domain such that X = Y = Fp, we shall write Ek(m),
without requiring Ek(·) being a permutation, and, in the tweakable setting, for the special case that
X = Y = Fp we introduce the notation Ẽi,Nk (m), with the tweak (i,N) ∈ F
×
p ×Fp = T . Given a PRF
Ek(·) we can create a tweakable PRF Ẽ·,·k (·) using Rogaway’s XE framework [Rog04] adapted to Fp by
setting Ẽi,Nk (m) = Ek(m+ (i · Ek(N))), for i 6= 0, as in Figure 7.1.
Theorem 20. Let E be any PRF with X = Y = Fp and let Ẽ be the tweakable PRF with tweak space
F×p × Fp as defined in Figure 7.1. Let Adv be an arbitrary adversary against the PRF advantage of Ẽ









1: if N 6∈ N then
2: N ∪← N







8: X ← m+ i · LN











17: X ∪← X
18: return LX
Figure 7.2: Games G2 and G3, where only G3 includes the boxed statements.
Proof. We closely follow Rogaway’s original proof for XE [Rog04, Theorem 7], making only minimal
changes to adapt from the Fn2 case to the more forgiving Fp case and to take advantage of operating
on functions, as opposed to permutations. The latter allows us to avoid two PRP–PRF switches in the
proof, resulting in a slightly tighter bound as a result. As is customary, without loss of generality we
assume the adversary does not repeat queries.
Let gameG0 be the original game where an adversary has access to Ẽ that calls E in the background
and let G1 be the game where the internal calls to E are replaced by calls to a random function. This









≤ AdvprfE (B) ,
where B is the adversary that runs Adv and answers the latter’s queries by evaluating Ẽ using calls to
its own oracle. The number of queries B makes is at most twice that of Adv and the runtime overhead
is limited to a few finite field operations per query.
Next consider the gamesG2 andG3 as depicted in Figure 7.2. GameG2 is identical toG1 where the
internal random function has been implemented using lazy sampling. By inspection, games G2 and G3
are identical until bad, and game G3 is identical to providing access to a random tweakable function,
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Oracle (N, (ij ,mj)j):
1: LN
$← Fp
2: for j do
3: X ← mj + ijLN
4: if X ∈ X then
5: set badxx
6: else if X ∈ N then
7: set badxn/nx
8: X ∪← X




























= AdvprfE (B) + Pr [ Adv sets bad in G3 ] .
What remains to bound is the probability Adv sets bad in G3. The first observation here is that in G3
the oracle’s output is independent of the input, which allows us to consider non-adaptive adversaries
only: given a sequence of queries (Nj , ij ,mj) what is the probability that the lazy sampling results in
bad being set?
Without loss of generality, we assume that the queries are sorted on their first component. This al-
lows us to track the probability that one of the bad events happens as LN gets sampled (see Figure 7.3).
Furthermore, we rely on ij ∈ F×p which means it has a multiplicative inverse so that, for a given triple









$← Fp : Ln = i−1j (X −mj)
]
= 1/p .
Bounding the probability that in the for loop badxx gets set is then easy: by using a union bound over
X ∈ X this equals |X |/p. Similarly, the probability that badxn/nx gets set is at most |N |/p. The overall
probability can then be bounded by union bound by
Pr [ Adv sets bad ] ≤
q∑
l=1




where we used |X | ≤ l − 1 and N ≤ q.
Pseudorandom functions can double as message authentication codes (MACs). While it is possible
to consider MACs in a more general context than PRFs (for instance allow probabilistic tagging and
introduce a separate verification function) and with a weaker unforgeability security notion, we will
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treat MACs as a deterministic keyed function MacGen : K × X → Y whose security notion coincides
with that of a PRF.
We are primarily interested in pPMAC, which is an adaptation of PMAC—or more accurately of
PMAC1 [Rog04]—to Fp. It can be considered a domain extension of Ek(·) with domain (and codomain)
Fp to MacGen with domain X = F∗p and codomain Y = Fp, where F∗p denotes the arbitrary length
strings of Fp elements, though there will be an effective upper bound on the maximum length we can
cope with.
7.3.2 Authenticated Encryption
For simplicity, we only consider AE schemes without associated data, although we are confident that
the techniques we develop in later sections apply in equal measure to AEAD schemes. An AE scheme
is defined by two algorithms (AE-EF,AE-DF), where we use the subscript F to denote that both the
input and output will be vectors of elements in a finite field (typically F = Fp due to their relevance to
MPC applications).
The encryption AE-EF always takes as input a key k, a message m ∈ F∗, and an additional input
N ∈ F or IV ∈ F, where the difference in notation refers to the distinction between nonce-based
security (N ) versus IV-based security (IV). The output consists of a ciphertext c ∈ F∗ and a separate
tag T ∈ F. Note that the bold notation k,m represents a set which can possible have more than one
field F element in it, for eg. to authenticate a message one needs k = (k, k′) where k is used for
encryption while k′ is used to compute the tag. Thus we have that
(c, T )← AE-EF(k, N,m)
with N possibly replaced by IV depending on the context. Henceforth we will assume that the scheme
is length-preserving, meaning that |c| = |m| irrespective of AE-EF’s inputs. The decryption function
AE-DF receives as input a key k, and (N, c, T ) (or (IV, c, T )) and outputs a purported plaintext m ∈ F∗
or ⊥ if the input is deemed invalid. We impose both correctness and tidiness [NRS14] on the pair
(AE-EF,AE-DF), so that
• (correctness) for all inputs AE-DF(k, N,AE-EF(k, N,m)) = m and
• (tidiness) for all inputs, if AE-DF(k, N, c) = m 6=⊥, then AE-EF(k, N,m) = c
which implies that as functions AE-DF is completely defined by AE-EF.
Our choice for a separate tag in the syntax is customary in part of the literature and preempts later
constructions where there is a clear authentication tag, although especially for encode-then-encipher
constructions the split would be artificial.
Security for an AE scheme is defined by two notions: PRIV and AUTH. Informally, the first prop-
erty defines what it means for a ciphertext to keep the message hidden, whereas the second defines
what it means for the ciphertext to be authenticated. The PRIV adversary works as a basic IND-CPA
adversary against the encryption scheme. In particular the adversary AE has access to an encryption
oracle implementing either AE-EF for the underlying AE scheme, or an oracle $ which just outputs
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random finite field elements of the correct length. The adversary will query this oracle with (Ni,mi)
(resp. just mi) in the nonce-based (resp. IV-based) setting, to obtain tuple (ci, Ti) (resp. (ci, Ti) plus
the IVi chosen by the experiment). The only constraint on the adversary’s calls to this oracle come in
the nonce-based setting, where the calls must be nonce-respecting, i.e. if i 6= j then Ni 6= Nj . For an
adversary Adv we let q denote the number of queries and σM the total length of all messages queried





The adversary’s goal is to distinguish between a genuine encryption oracle (which also outputs the
IV) and one that just outputs random values (ci, Ti) (resp. (IVi, ci, Ti)) of the corresponding length.




∣∣∣Pr [ k $← K : AdvAE-EF ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [ Adv$ ⇒ 1 ] ∣∣∣ .
An AUTH adversary Adv can access both oracles AE-EF and AE-DF, where it can make q encryp-
tion queries and qv decryption queries. We denote the encryption queries by (N1,m1), . . . , (Nq,mq)
(resp. m1, . . . ,mq), and, as above, we require that they are nonce-respecting in the nonce-based set-





















qv)); there are no restrictions on what can be passed to the decryption oracle by the adver-
sary. We let σM be as above and additionally use σC to denote the total length of the ciphertexts passed




i=1 |c′i|. The adversary wins, or is said to have forged a message,
if it passes a query to AE-DF which does not return ⊥ and which was not obtained from a query to






i∗)) for some i
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , qv}.
In other words, the adversary wins if there is no j ∈ {1, . . . , q} for which c′i∗ = cj , T ′i∗ = Tj and
N ′i∗ = Nj (resp. IV
′










As most of this thesis, we focus on generic MPC with secret sharing with an arbitrary number of parties
where the inputs are elements in a finite field Fp. Recall that if parties hold a secret shared value of x,
this is denoted as JxK. This secret shared value can be revealed to all parties by a process called opening
in which parties broadcast their shares to compute the value in clear.
We assume that the parties hold a sharing JkK of some symmetric primitive’s key as this can be
generated cheaply by generating a random authenticated secret. In this chapter we will assume that we
have access to some preprocessed shared random bits JbK where b ∈ {0, 1} and shared random squares
(JrK, Jr2K) where r ∈ Fp. These random squares and bits can be obtained by calling RandomSquare
or RandomBit within FABB functionality.
To measure the MPC complexity of a function we concentrate on the online phase although we
give metrics for the preprocessing phase as well. The function evaluation will require parties to both
perform local computations and to communicate with one another (this holds both for the offline and
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online phase by the way). The local computation is usually mostly ignored when considering MPC
complexity, instead the focus is strongly on the communication. This communication is performed in
rounds, where all parties can send as much data to any other party as they wish, based on the information
they have received in previous rounds. The two main metrics for the communication are the round
complexity and the number of openings (how many secret shared elements are opened to elements in
the clear). Unless the amount of data communicated in a single round floods the network capacity, the
round complexity strongly determines the latency required to compute the desired function securely.
The number of openings is a strong indicator of throughput as it indicates how much data the network
has to accommodate. Openings themselves take one round, but in one round many openings could
potentially be performed in parallel.
The main operations over Fp are addition and multiplication. Both addition of secret shared values
and scalar multiplication by clear values can be performed locally (i.e. without interaction) and are
deemed efficient: neither contributes to the number of rounds or openings of the overall computation.
On the other hand, multiplication of secret shared values does require a round of interaction between
the players: it requires two openings, which can be done in parallel thus consuming one round. Addi-
tionally, the multiplication will consume one of the preprocessed Beaver Triples. A value can also be
squared by consuming a shared random square; this only requires one opening, yet still takes one round
of interaction.
To reduce the number of online rounds when optimizing MPC, the main techniques are moving
input-independent computation to the preprocessing stage, parallelizing computations during the online
stage, and performing early openings to allow cheaper, subsequent operations on clear instead of shared
elements. We will see examples of all three techniques in what follows.
7.3.4 Two Candidate PRFs for MPC
7.3.4.1 MiMC
Minimal Multiplicative depth Cipher (MiMC) is a cipher which works in both binary and prime fields,
though we will only consider the prime field variant MiMC : Fp × Fp → Fp with p ≡ 2 mod 3
[AGR+16, GRR+16]. The cipher is a classical iterated Even–Mansour cipher using a simple algebraic
round permutation inspired by a cipher by Nyberg and Knudsen [NK95]. When incorporating the key
addition prior to applying the permutation, the round function is defined by
Fi(x) = (x+ k + ci)
3 ,
where the ci ∈ Fp are randomly chosen round constants that “are fixed once and can be hard-coded
into the implementation” [AGR+16]. This round function is iterated r times, with a final key addition
for whitening purposes to yield
FMiMC(k, x) = (Fr−1 ◦ Fr−2 ◦ ... ◦ F0)(x) + k .
123
CHAPTER 7. MODES OF OPERATION OVER Fp










c c c c d
Figure 7.4: Pictorial notation to define processing of open versus shared data.
Originally, r = dlog3 pe rounds were suggested for security [AGR+16, Section 5]. For a prime p of
128 bits this would lead to r = 82 rounds for full keyed-permutation security. However, if the attacker
only has access to a limited number n ≤ 2115 of plaintext/ciphertext pairs then the number of rounds
can be reduced to r = 73 [AGR+16, Section 4.3].
7.3.4.2 Legendre Symbol Leg
In 1988 Damgård proposed the use of the Legendre symbol to yield a PRF with input and output in
Fp [Dam90]. Although at that time there was no security proof that the resulting PRF is secure, several
reductions were made later to the decision shifted Legendre symbol (DSLS) problem [vHI03, Cv07].
The PRF Legbit : Fp × F∗p −→ {0, 1} is initialized with a random key k
$← Fp. To evaluate it
on input x, we simply call the Legendre symbol on k + x and normalise the output to be in {0, 1}
as opposed to {−1, 1}. It is known that Legbit is a pseudorandom function if there is no probabilistic
polynomial time adversary to solve DSLS efficiently [GRR+16].
This function can be extended to produce a field element by selecting a vector of keys k = (ki) ∈
FLp and by computing Leg(x) =
∑L−1
i=0 2
i · Legbit(ki, x) (mod p), for some value L. Assuming Leg
outputs an unbiased random bit, for general p one still needs to select L = d2 · log2 pe to ensure
statistical closeness to the uniform distribution over Fp, however if p is chosen sufficiently close to a
power of two then one can relax to L = dlog2 pe [GRR+16].
7.4 MPC Complexity of MiMC and Leg
When evaluating a tweakable PRF in an MPC setting, the key will always be secret and the tweak will
always be in the clear, but whether the main input and output are held in the clear or are secret shared
will depend on the application. Consequently, when optimizing MiMC and Leg we need to make a
distinction between four cases, depending on whether the input and/or output is held in the clear or is
secret shared. These four variants we will denote by the notation in Figure 7.4 in subsequent diagrams,
with an opening operation denoted by a coloured circle (red denoting a shared data item, and blue a
data item held in the clear).
In prior work on the MPC evaluation of MiMC and Leg, only the fourth and, for Leg only, the
third variant were discussed [GRR+16]. As we will see, the other variants are more useful when defin-
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Figure 7.5: Composing a tweakable PRF from a non-tweakable PRF in the case of clear text mes-
sage/shared output (resp. clear message and clear output).
ing modes of operation, and they can have a remarkably reduced MPC complexity. Another major
consideration is whether one is interested in online times subject to standard preprocessing (in which
multiplication triples, random squares and random bits are prepared ahead of time), or whether one is
interested in key dependent preprocessing for the specific PRF in question, or even tweak (and key)
dependent preprocessing for the specific tweakable PRF in question.
In the tweakable context, we can express the design in a similar pictorial way as in Figure 7.5.
However, the distinction as to whether the actual message is in the clear disappears, as even in this case
the input to the second PRF call is made on shared data due to the need to keep the output of the first
PRF shared. Thus we really only have two cases to consider for general PRFs, although specific PRFs
may have additional optimizations (see below for one such optimization in the case of the Leg PRF).
7.4.1 MiMC in MPC
Recall the MiMC PRF is defined by
Ek(x) = FMiMC(k, x) = (Fr−1 ◦ Fr−2 ◦ · · · ◦ F0)(x) + k ,
where
Fi(x) = (x+ k + ci)
3 .
Grassi et al. [GRR+16] consider two methods for computing MiMC in an MPC setting: MiMCbasic and
MiMCcube. Given our focus on online times for latency and throughput, only MiMCcube is of interest
to us; henceforth we will simply call it MiMC.
Using Standard Preprocessing. The computation of JyK ← JxK + JkK + ci can always be performed
locally, so of interest is the cubing Jy3K. The standard MPC method to compute MiMC uses a special
preprocessed tuple (JvK, Jv2K, Jv3K) for which v $← Fp. This preprocessed tuple itself could be com-
puted using squaring and multiplication during the offline phase, or it can be done in the online phase.
Given this tuple, to obtain Jy3K from JyK we open z = y − v to all parties and then compute locally:
Jy3K = 3 · z · Jv2K + 3 · z2 · JvK + z3 + Jv3K .
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Assuming the required r tuples (JvK, Jv2K, Jv3K) have been computed during the offline phase, the on-
line phase reduces to one opening and one communication round per cipher round, for a total of r
openings and r communication rounds for full evaluation of the cipher. If the tuple is produced in the
online phase then we require 3 · r openings and r + 1 rounds of communication (as all r tuples can be
processed simultaneously). In the case where the output is in the clear we require an additional opening
and round.
Using Key Dependent Preprocessing. If the input to MiMC is in the clear then a marginal im-
provement in performance results from the local evaluation of the first round function F0(JkK, x) =
(x+ JkK + c0)3, where we need the values (JkK, Jk2K, Jk3K) to be precomputed. As the improvement is
only minor over the general method above, we ignore this optimization in what follows.
Using Tweak Dependent Preprocessing. When evaluating the tweakable-PRF on a fixed nonce N
known at preprocessing time, sayN = 0 orN = 1, we could precompute the value of JMK = EJkK(N).
We treat this case as tweak dependent preprocessing, as opposed to key dependent preprocessing, as it
assumes knowledge of the application usage of the PRF at preprocessing time.
7.4.2 Leg in MPC
Recall the Leg PRF is defined by
Ek(x) = Leg(x) =
L−1∑
i=0
2i · Legbit(ki, x) (mod p)
where k = {ki}L−1i=0 . When evaluating Leg it suffices to compute the L invocations of Legbit in parallel,
followed by local computations for the linear combination of the Legbit outputs into Leg(x) (after all,
multiplications by public constants and additions can be done locally without any interaction between
parties). If the final output of Leg should be in the clear, then the Legbit already may be in the clear
(implicitly this observation uses that the indistinguishability of Leg follows from that of Legbit). Thus
the MPC complexity of Leg is equivalent to that of computing Legbit in parallel.
Note, we could use a tweak to also define the extra keys needed in the extension of Legbit to Leg,
thus saving storage at the expense of the evaluation of the tweak. Thus the tweakable Leg, would be
built out of a tweakable Legbit with two tweak inputs (one for the domain extension to Leg and one for
the actual tweak on the Leg function itself).
Using Standard Preprocessing. Grassi et al. [GRR+16] present an efficient method to compute Legbit
(Figure 6.6) when the input JxK and output JyK are both secret shared. Grassi et al. already observe that
the two steps leading up to the computation of u can be preprocessed and that the step following the
computation of u can be performed locally. The computation of u itself takes one round (containing two
openings) to compute JtK · (JkK + JxK) and one to open the result. Thus if a fixed quadratic non-residue
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α and the data tuples (JbK, JtK) are produced during the offline phase, then the online computation of
the PRF Legbit(JxK) will require two rounds of communication and three openings. Without the special
preprocessed tuples we would require an extra round and two extra openings.
Grassi et al. additionally suggest an alternative, conceptually easier evaluation when the input is
shared but the output should be in the clear: on input JxK take a preprocessed square Js2K, evaluate
Open(Js2K · (JkK + JxK)) and output the Legendre symbol of the result. This version still requires two
rounds of interaction and three openings, but it only consumes standard preprocessed data.
Using Key Dependent Preprocessing. However, the implementation suggestions by Grassi et al. are
not the end of the story. We first investigate what happens when the input x is provided in the clear, and
we allow key dependent preprocessing. Our key observation is that if the input x is in the clear, then
we can store (JbK, JtK, Jt · kK) in the offline phase. This allows simplification of Step 3 from Figure 6.6
to u← Open(Jt · kK + x · JtK), which requires only one round of interaction as multiplication by clear
values is free. Step 4 proceeds (locally) as before, leading to a shared output.
If both input and output are in the clear, the product Js2 · kK can be preprocessed and the only online
communication remaining is for Open(Js2 · kK + x · Js2K), namely one round and one opening. The
advantage of this method over the one with shared output is a reduction in the consumption of offline
material. However, in our tweakable PRF setting we see this optimization is never used.
Figure 7.6 presents a method to compute Leg as a whole for key dependent preprocessing of the
tweakable cipher when presented with a fresh value N . The method presented works for a shared input
JxK, requiring multiplications in Step 2b. These can be done in parallel with the openings of Step 2a,
thus for a shared input, the online costs amounts to two rounds of interaction and 3L + 1 openings. If
x is clear, then Step 2b can be performed locally, reducing the total number of openings to L + 1; the
number of rounds remains 2.
For more complicated calculations, such as re-use of the same N in a future sequential call to
the tweakable PRF, some pipelining might be feasible. For instance, the respective Steps 2a can still
be performed in parallel. However, the gains over a straightforward approach—treating the sequential
composition of two tweakable PRF calls as three sequential PRF calls—are not worth the significant in-
crease in consumption of preprocessed data. Whereas standard preprocessing only precomputes O(L)
elements, for Figure 7.6 we need to preprocess O(L2) elements instead. Due to the high preprocessing
cost for relatively marginal on-line gains, we discard the method of Figure 7.6 for the remainder of this
thesis.
Using Tweak Dependent Preprocessing. Recall that we adapted XE-tweaking of the form
Ẽi,Nk (m) = Ek(m+ (i · Ek(N))) , for i 6= 0 .
Due to the linearity of Leg as a function of Legbit, we are essentially interested in the evaluation of
Legbit(m+ (i · Ek(N))) ,
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Let α be a fixed, quadratic non-residue modulo p and JkiK the shared secret key (for position i)
Preprocess: For each future evaluation prepare tuples as follows:
1. For j ∈ {1, . . . , L}
• Take random squares Js(n)j
2K and random bits Jb(n)j K.
• Jt(n)j K← Js
(n)
j
2K · (Jb(n)j K + α · (1− Jb
(n)
j K))
• J(tk)(n)i K← Jt
(n)
i K · JkiK
2. For i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
• Take random squares Js(x)i
2K and random bits Jb(x)i K.
• Jt(x)i K← Js
(x)
i
2K · (Jb(x)i K + α · (1− Jb
(x)
i K))
• J(tk)(x)i K← Jt
(x)
i K · JkiK
3. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , L}
• J(tb)ijK← Jt(x)i K · Jb
(n)
j K
4. Output all the shares
Eval: To evaluate Leg on input JxK with key JkK and tweaks i and N , leading to shared output.
1. Retrieve a preprocessed tuple.
2. For i = j ∈ {1, . . . , L}
a) vj ← Open(J(tk)(n)j K +N · Jt
(n)
j K)
b) Jxt(x)i K← JxK · Jt
(x)
i K
3. For i ∈ {1, . . . , L}











• ui ← Open(J(tk)(x)i K + Jxt
(x)
i K + i · JtLiK)












Figure 7.6: Computing the tweakable Leg PRF with shared input, fresh N -tweak, and shared output.
in a number of scenarios, depending on whether the input m, resp. output, are clear or shared, and
whether N is fixed or fresh (we will always assume i to be fresh and in the clear, and N to be in the
clear).
For the scenario with a clear input m and a shared output, Figure 7.7 presents a method to compute
Legbit, when the N part of the tweak is fixed (and hence can be preprocessed). This method requires
in the online phase only a single round of openings. In the case where m is shared, one can save
preprocessing Jt · kK and compute the second line of the evaluation method by u← Open(JtK · (JkK +
JmK) + i · Jt ·MK)); this requires an additional round of interaction and an additional two openings.
7.4.3 Summary
It is clear the design choices for implementation depend very much on how much specialised prepro-
cessing one wants to perform. In the rest of this paper we restrict ourselves to the case where we allow
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Let α be a fixed, quadratic non-residue modulo p and JkK the shared secret key.
Preprocess: Assume JMK← EJkK(N) has already been computed. Then for each future evaluation
prepare tuples as follows:
1. Take a random square Js2K and a random bit JbK.
2. JtK← Js2K · (JbK + α · (1− JbK))
3. Jt · kK← JtK · JkK
4. Jt ·MK← JtK · JMK
5. Output (JbK, JtK, Jt · kK, Jt ·MK)
Eval: To evaluate Legbit on input m with key JkK and tweaks i and N , leading to shared output.
1. Retrieve a preprocessed tuple (JbK, Jt · kK, Jt ·MK)






· (2 · JbK− 1) + 1
)
/2
Figure 7.7: Computing the tweakable Legbit PRF with clear input, fixed N -tweak, and shared output.
key-dependent, but not tweak dependent preprocessing. In this context our tweakable PRF this is then
produced via our non-tweakable PRF via the methodology given in Figure 7.5. Note, when the message
in this diagram is given in the clear, this makes no difference to the execution of the second PRF call,
as the input is already in shared form.
In addition, any second call to the tweakable PRF with the same value N in the tweak can be done
without the need to call the first PRF again. When the output of the tweakable PRF is to be returned in
an open form, the second PRF call can be performed more efficiently in the case of Leg by using the
key-dependent preprocessing variant. This leads to the online costs given in Table 7.1.
7.5 Encrypt-then-MAC in Characteristic p
In this section we examine an Encrypt-then-MAC paradigm to obtain AE for messages/ciphertexts
consisting of vectors in Fp. To enable the efficient computation, we select a nonce-based IND-CPA
encryption mode which is highly parallel (specifically a modification of CTR mode). For the MAC
algorithm we present two possibilities, a Hash-then-MAC method (which is suitable as we always
MAC clear data), as well as a new MAC algorithm which we call pPMAC. Here pPMAC is the obvious
port of PMAC from binary fields to the field Fp, where we examine the PMAC proof to ensure that the
scheme is still secure.
7.5.1 Encrypt-then-MAC
The encrypt-then-MAC paradigm originally applied probabilistic encryption followed by authentica-
tion of the resulting ciphertext [BN08]. The probabilistic encryption itself only needs to be PRIV or
IND-CPA secure. Moving to a nonce-setting is relatively straightforward [NRS14]: assuming one has
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Rnds Open Prep Rnds Open Prep
MiMC (SP)
2 · r + 1 6 · r 4 · r 2 · r + 2 6 · r + 1 4 · r
r 3 · r 2 · r r + 1 3 · r + 1 2 · r
MiMC (TP) r 3 · r 2 · r r + 1 3 · r + 1 2 · r
Leg (SP)
4 10 · L 8 · L 5 8 · L 6 · L
2 5 · L 4 · L 2 3 · L 2 · L
Leg (KP)
3 4 · L 8 · L 3 4 · L 6 · L
2 3 · L 4 · L 2 3 · L 2 · L
Leg (TP) 2 3 · L 2 · L 3 3 · L+ 1 2 · L
Table 7.1: Summary of costs for our PRFs MiMC and Leg. The first line for each PRF is the cost of the
first such tweakable PRF call, and the second is the cost of subsequent PRF tweakable calls with the
sameN component in the tweak (clearly their is no second line when we use tweakable preprocessing).
The values SP, KP, and TP stand for standard preprocessing, key dependent preprocessing and tweak
dependent preprocessing. Note the costs when the input message is in the clear are identical to when
the input message is in shared form. The preprocessing costs are given in the number of data items
needed to be preduced by the prepreprocessing.
a MAC function, one simply needs to combine a nonce based encryption (Enc,Dec) scheme which is
just PRIV (i.e. IND-CPA) secure, and then authenticate the nonce and the obtained ciphertext with a
tag generated from a secure MAC function MacGen. This composition corresponds to scheme ‘N2’ as
studied by Namprempre et al. [NRS14]. This scheme is the only one of the four secure schemes (N1
up to N4) that feeds the ciphertext as opposed to the message to the MAC function. As in our context
ciphertext is in the clear whereas messages is shared—and we do not believe that the slightly increased
parallellism allowed by N1’s encrypt-and-MAC approach outweighs this advantage—we opted for this
N2 mode.
To obtain a nonce based scheme two variants of CTR mode are possible, either
ci ← mi + Ẽ1,Nk (i) = mi + Ek(i+ Ek(N))),
ci ← mi + Ẽi,1k (N) = mi + Ek(N + i · Ek(1))).
The latter variants is preferred as Ek(1) can be precomputed when allowing key dependent preprocess-
ing; it corresponds to a simplified variant of CTR-in-Tweak [PS16].
To this CTR mode nonce-based IND-CPA encryption we then add authentication via a MAC func-
tion. See Figure 7.8, where we use this CTR mode as the underlying encryption scheme and an arbitrary
MAC function. In this figure we present the algorithm, making specific reference to what data is shared
and what is open. The reader should note that in decryption we need to perform a secure comparison
between the input tag (in the clear), and the computed tag (in shared form). This is easily accomplished,
by opening the value JrK · (JTag′K−Tag), for a random value r from the preprocessing, and comparing
the value to zero.
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Given a message JmK = Jm1K, . . . , Jm`K for mi ∈ Fp and a pair of keys JkK = (JkK, Jk′K) for the
PRF EJkK(·) we define the AE mode CTR+MAC as:
AE-EF(JkK, N, JmK):
1: for i = 1, ` do
2: JciK← JmiK + JẼi,1k (N)K
3: Open JciK.
4: c← c1, . . . , c`.
5: Tag← MacGen(Jk′K, N‖c).
6: Return (c,Tag).
AE-DF(JkK, N, c,Tag):
1: for i = 1, ` do
2: JmiK← ci − JẼi,1k (N)K
3: JmK← Jm1K, . . . , Jm`K.
4: JTag′K← MacGen(Jk′K, N‖c).
5: if JTag′K 6= Tag then return ⊥.
6: Return JmK.
Figure 7.8: AE mode CTR+MAC in the nonce-based setting.
The algorithm pPMAC-Gen(k,m) is defined by:
1: Write m as ` finite field elements m1, . . . ,m` where mi ∈ Fp.
2: if ` ≥ p then return ⊥.
3: for i = 1, `− 1 do
4: Yi ← Ẽi,0k (mi)
5: Σ← Y1 + · · ·+ Y`−1 +m`
6: Tag← Ẽp−1,0k (Σ).
Figure 7.9: pPMAC in Fp
7.5.2 The PMAC Algorithm over Fp
The original PMAC algorithm [BR02] operates (after suitable padding) on elements in the finite field
F2n . The algorithm makes use of various constants, which in the original PMAC are taken to be from a
Gray code to enable efficient computation. In addition a “large” constant called Huge is defined, which
is equal to 1/x for x being the formal root of the defining polynomial for the field. The tag is produced
by utilizing an encryption function defined by Ek(m) : F2n −→ F2n .
PMAC1 [Rog04] is a conceptually simpler version of PMAC that recasts the masked blockcipher
calls as direct, tweakable blockcipher ones instead. This abstraction is especially potent when moving
to Fp and using a tweakable PRF. As we will be using F×p as tweak space, we can set Huge = p− 1 (to
be used by the final Ẽ call) and use tweak i to process message block mi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , p−2}. Hence
our Fp variant of PMAC1, henceforth referred to as pPMAC, takes in a message which is at most p− 2
finite field elements long and produces an element of the finite field Fp as final tag; the precise pPMAC
algorithm is given in Figure 7.9.
While the security of PMAC over F2n has received ample attention [MM07, DY15, LPSY16], the
security for our pPMAC version does not seem to follow directly from prior work. Hence we present
Theorem 21 to bound an adversary’s distinguishing advantage. Luckily, the proof is a fairly straight-
forward adaptation of Rogaway’s [Rog04, Section 11], where the use of a tweakable PRF instead of a
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Figure 7.10: Implementing pPMAC in MPC for clear inputs and clear outputs. The number of rounds
of interaction for the Leg tweakable PRF using key dependent preprocessing are given to the left.
tweakable blockcipher allows some simplifications and tightening of the bound.
Theorem 21. Let Adv be a PRF-adversary against pPMAC making q queries having a total message
length of σ finite field elements. Then there exists an adversary B attacking Ẽ making at most σ + q





(B) + q(q − 1)
2p
.
Proof. Let G0 be the original pPMAC game and let G1 be the game with the keyed Ẽ replaced by an
ideal tweakable random function. Let B be the adversary against Ẽ that runs Adv and uses its Ẽ oracle












where the number of Ẽ calls induced by Adv’s queries is at most σ + q and B’s overhead otherwise is
minimal.
Let G2 be the game where bad is set if two inputs cause colliding final Ẽ calls (with tweak Huge).
As the tweak Huge cannot be used for any other Ẽ calls, if no such collisions appear we can replace
the tag output by a freshly drawn Fp elements in G2. Then G1 and G2 are identical until bad. Morever,
to analyse the probability that Adv sets bad in G2 we may restrict without loss of generality to non-
adaptive adversaries.
For any given pair of distinct queries, there has to be at least one Ẽ call that is made with distinct
inputs (if the messages are identical until the final message block, no collision is possible). For a
collision to occur, fix the outputs for all the other message blocks (of this query pair) and one of the
distinct message blocks of the colliding pair, then the Ẽ value (for the corresponding distinct input)






results in the stated bound.
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Figure 7.11: CTR+pPMAC Encryption Mode. The number of rounds of interaction for the Leg tweak-
able PRF using key dependent preprocessing are given to the left.
In an MPC context, we are primarily interested in an implementation where both the message and
the tag are available in the clear, as our use case concentrates on the Encrypt-then-MAC setting where
pPMAC will be applied on an already opened ciphertext. Figure 7.10 shows the implications for the
underlying tweakable PRF calls, in the key dependent preprocessing setting. Note that the ‘N ’-tweak is
fixed toN = 0 which allows preprocessing of JMK = EJkK(0) as required in each call to Ẽ
i,0
JkK(m). Also,
notice that a naive implementation of the tweakable PRF will result that the remaining PRF applications
will be on shared inputs even if m itself is clear, courtesy of JMK being shared. When combined with
authenticated our CTR mode encryption we obtain an AE method given in Figure 7.11.
7.5.3 Hash-then-MAC
Whilst having pPMAC as a general MAC function might be useful in some other contexts, in terms
of creating a MAC for use in an Encrypt-then-MAC AE scheme the pPMAC function is overkill. A
simpler alternative, described in Figure 7.12 is to simply hash the clear ciphertext values ci and then
apply a single invocation of the PRF to the output. Note, the N -tweak value can be the same for this
PRF call, as for the PRF calls in the CTR mode.
One has to convert the output of the hash function function H into an element modulo p, so it can
be passed into our PRF. We require that the value passed to the PRF satisfies the collision resistance
property. If H is chosen to be a standard hash function such as SHA-256 or SHA-3, then simply
truncating the hash value to log2 p bits and treating the result as an integer modulo p will suffice.
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Figure 7.12: CTR and Hash-then-MAC Encryption Mode The number of rounds of interaction for the
Leg tweakable PRF using key dependent preprocessing are given to the left.
7.6 OTR in Characteristic p
OTR is a nonce-based AE mode of operation for blockciphers [Min14]. It has a number of advantages
that make it eminently suitable for adaptation to an MPC context, in particular its use of the forward
direction of the blockcipher only (even for decryption) and its high level of parallellization for both
encryption and decryption. The original OTR mode allows the encryption of arbitrary length bitstrings
using arbitrary length bitstrings of associated data. In this section we will adapt Minematsu’s OTR
to encrypt arbitrary vectors of Fp elements based on a tweakable pseudorandom function, where we
discard any associated data. Consequently, much of the complexity of the original OTR, for instance
related to padding to some multiple of the blocklength, disappears. Although OTR strictly speaking is
a blockcipher mode of operation, Minematsu already presents OTR as a tweakable blockcipher mode
of operation instantiated with a specific tweakable blockcipher. Our version of Fp will be based on this
perspective, making use of an Fp tweakable PRF Ẽ (which need not need be invertible). The tweaks
needed in our Fp variant are fairly straightforward. This contrast with a relatively complex tweak sched-
ule in the original OTR to avoid colliding masks over the finite field F2n (cf. [BS16]). Finally, in order
to present a cleaner implementation we removed the final block switch.
Our modified construction is presented in Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.14: encryption takes the key k
as well as a nonce N ∈ Fp and a message m ∈ F∗p, producing a ciphertext c ∈ F∗p and a tag Tag ∈ Fp,
whereas decryption takes the key k as well as N ∈ Fp, a ciphertext c, and a tag Tag to produce a
message m (or an invalid ciphertext symbol ⊥). Encryption only works for messages with fewer than
p/2 elements, with longer messages (and ciphertexts) rejected out of hand.
A diagramatic representation of encryption is given in Figure 7.15, where we additionally highlight
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1: Write m as ` finite field elements m1, . . . ,m`
2: if ` ≥ p/2 then return ⊥.
3: Σ← 0 where mi ∈ Fp.
4: for i = 1, b`/2c do
5: c2·i−1 ← Ẽ2·i−1,Nk (m2·i−1) +m2·i
6: c2·i ← Ẽ2·i,Nk (c2·i−1) +m2·i−1
7: Σ← Σ +m2·i
8: if ` is odd then
9: c` ← Ẽ`,Nk (0) +m`
10: Σ← Σ +m`
11: c← (c1, . . . , c`)
12: Tag← Ẽ−`,Nk (Σ)
13: return (c,Tag)
Figure 7.13: The Algorithm OTR-E(N,m).
1: Write c as ` finite field elements c1, . . . , c` where ci ∈ Fp.
2: if ` ≥ p/2 then return ⊥.
3: Σ← 0
4: for i = 1, b`/2c do
5: m2·i−1 ← c2·i − Ẽ2·i,Nk (c2·i−1)
6: m2·i ← c2·i−1 − Ẽ2·i−1,Nk (m2·i−1)
7: Σ← Σ +m2·i
8: if ` is odd then
9: m` ← c` − Ẽ`,Nk (0)
10: Σ← Σ +m`
11: m← (m1, . . . ,m`)
12: Tag′ ← Ẽ−`,Nk (Σ)
13: if Tag′ = Tag then
14: return m
15: return ⊥
Figure 7.14: The Algorithm OTR-D(N, c,Tag).
135
CHAPTER 7. MODES OF OPERATION OVER Fp
Leg + +
























c1 c2 c3 c4 c`−1 c` Tag
Figure 7.15: The OTR encryption mode. On the left hand side we present the number of rounds of
interaction of each stage for the Leg PRF, assuming key dependent preprocessing.
some MPC implementation details. OTR’s core encryption component is a two-round Feistel structure,
Here one cannot use an output in the clear for the PRF—which would potentially be faster, especially
for Leg—as this would be tantamount to using a public string as one-time pad and hence woefully
insecure.
Decryption follows in a similar manner, see Figure 7.16. Note that, as for our previous MAC-then-
Encrypt constructions, a secure comparison is needed to process the computed tag in the decryption
algorithm.
7.6.1 Security of pOTR
Minematsu proved that the original (bit-oriented) OTR is a secure AEAD scheme against nonce-
respecting adversaries. Our modified Fp largely inherits the original properties, but for completeness
we provide the relevant theorems and proofs below, where we of course draw heavily on Minematsu’s
work. For OTR’s security analysis Minematsu uses an alternative and conceptually cleaner mode,
dubbed OTR [Min14, Fig. 5], that is based on a tweakable n-bit URF. This mode already matches
ours a lot closer, as we use a tweakable PRF and the switch from a tweakable PRF to a tweakable
URF is standard (incurring precisely the tweakable PRF advantage). We will ignore the parameter τ (in
OTR[τ ]) for the length of tags, as it becomes moot in our Fp setting. Minematsu additionally introduces
OTR′, but in the absence of associated data this mode collapses to OTR. Thus we can safely refer to
the security result for OTR′ [Min14, Theorem 3] and its proof [Min14, Appendix A]. The proof for
privacy is essentially unchanged (and still straightforward), whereas for authenticity we can simplify
the proof considerably as there are fewer cases to consider due to our switch from bitstrings to elements
of Fp.
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Theorem 22. Let Adv be a PRIV adversary against OTR making q queries having a total message
length of σ finite field elements. Then there exists an adversary B attacking Ẽ making at most σ + q





Proof. The first, standard step is to substitute the tweakable PRF with its ideal cousin, the tweakable
URF, throughout. An adversary Adv that could distinguish between these two worlds can be turned into
a reduction B that wins the PRF’s security game by explicitly evaluating the OTR construction using
a tweakable PRF/URF oracle. A counting exercise will show that Adv’s queries to the construction
induce exactly σ + q queries to the underlying tweakable primitive.
With the tweakable URF in place, the key observation is that Adv is nonce-respecting and that,
for the encryption of a single message, the tweaks count from 1, . . . , ` and, as we enforce ` < p/2,
the tweak −` used for authentication will be distinct from these tweaks (modulo p). Consequently,
each tweak (i,N) is used at most once and we can replace the outputs of the tweakable URF with
independently and uniformly drawn Fp elements, ignoring the input. These random Fp elements act as
a one-time pad; inspection shows that all ciphertext elements ci as well as the Tag are thus affected,
making them perfectly indistinguishable from independently and uniformly drawn Fp elements as de-
sired.
Theorem 23. Let Adv be an AUTH adversary against OTR making qe encryption queries and qv
decryption queries, jointly having a total message length of σ finite field elements. Then there exists an
adversary B attacking Ẽ making at most σ+ qe + qv oracle queries and running in time comparable to






Proof. Again, the first, standard step is to substitute the tweakable PRF with its ideal cousin, the tweak-
able URF R̃, throughout, incurring the same term as in the bound above.
With the tweakable URF in place, Minematsu’s original security proof consists of a number of steps.
Firstly, we only need to consider an adversary making a single forgery attempt using the decryption
oracle, so qv = 1, and then extend it to an arbitrary number of decryptions using a standard guessing
argument [BGM04]. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we may assume that Adv makes all its
encryption queries before the final decryption query.
We denote the adversary’s forgery attempt by (N ′, c′,Tag′). For the forgery to be counted, it needs
to be fresh, that is (N ′, c′,Tag′) 6= (Nj , cj ,Tagj) for all encryption queries j ∈ [1 . . . q]. As for each
nonce and ciphertext vector there is one unique valid tag (by inspection of the decryption algorithm),
we in fact need that (N ′, c′) 6= (Nj , cj) for all j. For the forgery attempt (N ′, c′), we will use Tag∗ to
denote the unique valid tag corresponding to it, whereas for all internal variables related to (N ′, c′) we
will use a prime, for instance m′1 for the first tentative message block and Σ
′ for the unique input (used
by decryption) to the tweakable URF that produces Tag∗.
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The adversary’s advantage is upper bounded by the maximum probability it can find a forgery
(N ′, c′,Tag′) given an transcript of encryption queries {(Nj ,mj , cj , Tj)}, j ∈ [1 . . . q]. Here the max-
imum is over all possible transcript and the probability is over the ‘residual’ randomness of the tweak-
able URF, that is to sample the tweakable URF on values that are needed to evaluate Tag∗ and have
not yet been sampled during the encryption queries. As is customary, at this stage we can restrict to
deterministic, computationally unbounded adversaries.
To upper bound this maximum probability FPz, we will consider four cases (down from the origi-
nal’s 13): the forgery uses a fresh nonce; the forgery uses a nonce for an encryption query and matches
the even message length; the forgery uses a past nonce and matches the odd message length; and finally
the forgery uses a past nonce, but using a different message length.
Case 1: N ′ 6= Nj for all j ∈ [1 . . . q].
In this case, during decryption the tweak is fresh and hence the Tag∗ will be an independent, uni-
formly random value, so the probability that Tag′ is correct satisfies FPz = 1/p.
Case 2: N ′ = Nj with |c′| = |cj |, even, for some j ∈ [1 . . . q].
Let’s write (c′1, . . . , c
′
`) for c
′ and (c1, . . . , c`) for cj , so dropping the j index. As c′ 6= c we know
that for some i it holds that c′i 6= ci, where we will concentrate on the largest such i. As ` is even,
all ciphertext blocks come with a ‘twin’ that is processed as part of the same Feistel structure. Let
h = d(i + 1)/2e, then the indices of the two blocks (i.e. i and its twin) are 2h − 1 and 2h. For the
remainder of this case analysis, we will deal with this structure only, ignoring whether both of only
one (and which) of the ciphertext blocks differ between c′ and cj .
Figure 7.16 provides an overview of how decryption works, where we annotated three special colli-
sion events: e3 corresponds to the event Tag∗ = Tag′, e2 corresponds to the event that Σ′ = Σj , and
finally e1 corresponds to the event that m′2·h−1 = m2·h−1. Our overall strategy will be to bound
FPz ≤ Pr[e3] ≤ Pr[e3|¬e2] + Pr[e2|¬e1] + Pr[e1] ,
where all constituent three probabilities turn out to be at most 1/p, so the sum is at most 3/p.
Let’s start with Pr[e3|¬e2]. In this case, Tag∗ is the result of a fresh query R̃〈N,−`〉(Σ′), so the prob-
ability that it hits the adversary’s Tag′ is exactly 1/p.
If, on the other hand, e2 occurred, then Tag∗ = Tagj so if the adversary had indeed set Tag
′ = Tagj ,
the forgery attempt will be successful. To bound the probability of e2 occurring, we go back to the
point where m′2·h gets added to the checksum. Let’s denote with Σh−1 the checksum so far (for the
j-the query) and with Σh the checksum after addingm2·h, with similar primed notation for the values
when running decryption on the forgery attempt. Then e2 occurs iff Σh = Σ′h.
Tracing through the decryption algorithm (and see Figure 7.16) tells us that
m′2·h−1 = c
′






















h−1 − Σh1 + c′2·h−1 −m2·h
If e1 didn’t occur, the R̃〈N,2·h−1〉(m′2′·h−1) call is fresh, so the probability it hits the value on the right
hand side is exactly 1/p.
Finally, we are left with the event e1, namely thatm′2·h−1 = m2·h−1. Although it is not a given that an
adversary will be able to turn this event into a forgery, we are generous in granting a win regardless.
We will assume that c′2·h−1 6= c2·h−1, because otherwise the event e1 is not possible (by inspection).
Our assumption implies that the R̃〈N,2·h〉(c′2·h−1) call is fresh, and since it needs to hit a unique value
in order for e1 to occur, e1 happens with probability 1/p.
Case 3: N ′ = Nj with |c′| = |cj |, odd, for some j ∈ [1 . . . q].
As before, we write (c′1, . . . , c
′
`) for c
′ and (c1, . . . , c`) for cj , so dropping the j index. As c′ 6= c
we know that for some i it holds that c′i 6= ci, where we will concentrate on the largest such i, where
we use a special ordering that makes the final, odd block (i = `) the smallest. If, under this ordering,
“i > `” there is a difference in one of the blocks used in the Feistel structure and the analysis for `




` − R̃〈N,`〉(0) and m` = c` − R̃〈N,`〉(0)
we obtain that m′` and m` always differ, and as a consequence so will Σ
′ and Σ. This means that
Tag∗ = R̃〈N,−`〉(Σ′) is the result of a fresh call, hitting the adversary’s Tag′ with probability exactly
1/p.
Case 4: N ′ = Nj with |c′| 6= |cj | for some j ∈ [1 . . . q].
The length `′ = |c′| is used as part of the tweak for the final R̃ call, as Tag∗ = R̃〈N,−`′〉(Σ′).
Irrespective of Σ′, this −`′ 6= −`j and therefore the tweak (N,−`′) is fresh and the output Tag∗ is
random and independent, hitting the adversary’s Tag′ with probability exactly 1/p.
Overall we obtain that FPz ≤ 3/p gives an AUTH bound for any number of queries qv greater or equal
than one, and so AdvauthOTR(Adv) ≤ 3qv/p.
7.7 Experimental Results
We consider two measurements latency and throughput, with various message lengths. Latency shows
the total time required for a message to be encrypted and authenticated whereas throughput gives the
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Figure 7.16: The OTR decryption case.
maximum number of executions which can be done in parallel. The experiments were ran between
two machines each with Intel i7-4790 CPUs running at 3.60GHz, 16GB of RAM connected through a
LAN network of 1Gbps with an average ping of 0.3ms (roundtrip) and implemented using the SPDZ
software1. WAN experiments were simulated using Linux tc tool with an average ping latency of
100ms (roundtrip). To give precise timings, each experiment was averaged with at least 5 executions
where each execution authenticated at least 1000 messages. We choose to exclude the times in the
online phase for computing the key dependent preprocessing such as Ek(0) or Ek(1) since this is done
just once before the start of authentication.
Table 7.2 contains the preprocessing costs for encryption (similar costs apply for decryption). For
this we counted the number of triples and bits required to evaluate each mode of operation instantiated
with different PRF’s, these costs are given in terms of the message length `, i.e. the number of finite
field elements being encrypted. For Leg we assume a finite field size of p ≈ 2128, where p is chosen
such that we can select L = 128 in the construction of the Leg PRF. The amount of data sent per party
and computational cost is estimated, in the table, using the currently best-known method for producing
triples and bits in Fp with active security [KOS16]. According to [KOS16] bits and triples have the
same cost in arithmetic circuits Fp so we merge the costs into one column which is called Triples.
As expected, OTR has a lower preprocessing cost, vs. using CTR+pPMAC, since the number of PRF
calls is reduced by half compared to pPMAC; CTR+HtMAC is slightly better than OTR in terms of
preprocessing costs.
For the case of CTR and Hash-then-MAC in Table 7.3 we give what these offline estimates would
translate into in terms of MBytes of communication per party and throughput per second, for varying
values of the number of message blocks ` for a LAN and WAN setting. These numbers are derived from





Leg CTR+pPMAC 1024 · `− 256
MiMC CTR+pPMAC 292 · `
Leg CTR+HtMAC 512 · `+ 128
MiMC CTR+HtMAC 146 · `+ 146
Leg OTR 512 · `+ 728
MiMC OTR 146 · `+ 292
Table 7.2: Preprocessing costs for Encryption using OTR, CTR+pPMAC, and CTR+Hash-then-MAC
(HtMAC) in MPC for an ` length message.
PRF ` = 1 2 4 8 16 32
MBytes { Leg 14.42 25.95 49.02 95.16 187.43 371.98
per party MiMC 6.58 9.87 16.45 29.60 55.91 108.54
LAN Throughput { Leg 7.57 4.20 2.23 1.15 0.58 0.29
per second MiMC 16.58 11.05 6.63 3.68 1.95 1.00
WAN Throughput { Leg 0.38 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.01
per second MiMC 0.82 0.55 0.33 0.18 0.10 0.05
Table 7.3: Preprocessing cost (MBytes) and throughput (seconds) for encrypting message blocks of
size `, with two parties over a LAN and a simulated WAN network using CTR+HtMAC and MASCOT
[KOS16].
step for engines such as SPDZ. In Table 7.4 we present our results for the online phase, in terms of
latency and throughput for CTR and Hash-then-MAC, in the LAN and WAN setting.
PRF ` = 1 2 4 8 16 32
LAN Latency { Leg 1.17 1.97 2.75 4.61 8.20 15.68
(ms) MiMC 6.63 13.27 13.42 13.74 14.25 15.35
WAN Latency { Leg 154 256 258 262 274 295
(ms) MiMC 3760 7521 7521 7521 7521 7523
LAN Throughput { Leg 1389 895 527 285 149 76
per second MiMC 8853 5697 3589 2010 1079 561
WAN Throughput { Leg 151 100 59 33 17 8
per second MiMC 428 234 203 127 74 39
Table 7.4: Online phase latency (ms) and best throughput (seconds) for encrypting message blocks of
size `, with two parties over a LAN and a simulated WAN network, using CTR+HtMAC.
In Table 7.5 we present the online costs, as a function of ` for our various constructions. For each
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variant we give the number of rounds and the number of openings. As we have selected highly parallel
modes of operation, the round complexity does not depend on the message length. Intuitively, the
online round complexity should define the latency of a protocol and the online opening complexity
should define the throughput. However, due to the nature of actual physical networks we expect that as
soon as we reach the maximum capacity of the network, in terms of data sent (i.e. openings) per round,
the latency will drop off rapidly. Thus as ` increases we expect to see an increase in latency, despite
latency “theoretically” being a constant. The key question is then how big does ` need to be before the
latency for a specific PRF and mode decreases linearly in `?
PRF Mode Online cost
Rounds (Enc/Dec) Openings
Leg CTR+pPMAC 7/6 768 · `+ `
MiMC CTR+pPMAC 221/147 146 · `+ `+ 1
Leg CTR+HtMAC 5/4 384 · (`+ 1) + `
MiMC CTR+HtMAC 148/75 73 · (`+ 1) + `+ 1
Leg OTR 6/9 384 · (`+ 128) + `
MiMC OTR 220/295 73 · (`+ 2) + `+ 1
Table 7.5: Online Costs for OTR and CTR+pPMAC in MPC.
To investigate this potential drop off in latency we carried out experiments in the LAN setting, the
results of which are detailed in Figure 7.17 (for small messages) and Figure 7.18 (for long messages
for the MiMC PRF). We see that despite ciphers based on the Leg PRF having lower round complexity,
this does not translate into low latency as soon as the size of ` increases. For small values of ` we do
benefit from using Leg, but not for larger values. This is because we reach network capacity for only
a few parallel calls to Leg; as evaluting the PRF itself takes up a lot of network capacity. On the other
hand with MiMC we require more rounds, but in each round we need to send much less data, so even as
` increases the latency does not increase that much. Eventually we see that for large messages MiMC
ends up having the same growth as we experience with Leg for smaller messages.
In Figure 7.19 and Figure 7.20 we examine throughput for both Leg and MiMC in the LAN setting.
Not surprisingly for all options throughput decreases as ` increases, and we get a better throughput if
we select MiMC and use the CTR+HtMAC cipher. In this and in other figures in this section: OTR is
marked in blue, CTR+pMAC is marked in red, and CTR+Hash-then-MAC is marked in Green. Use of
the Leg PRF is marked with a dot on the line, and use of the MiMC PRF is marked with a cross.
Indeed contrary to the conclusion in [GRR+16] we conclude that MiMC is better than Leg for both
throughput and latency. The primary reason for this conclusion is that, unlike the work in [GRR+16],
we consider how these MPC-friendly PRFs work in a larger application and not in isolation.
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Figure 7.17: Latency of Encryption for OTR vs CTR+pPMAC vs CTR+Hash-then-MAC with MiMC
and Leg.













Figure 7.18: Latency of Encryption for OTR vs CTR+pPMAC vs CTR+HtMAC with MiMC, for large
message sizes.
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Figure 7.19: Throughput of OTR vs CTR+pPMAC vs CTR+HtMAC with MiMC and Leg.
















Figure 7.20: Throughput of OTR vs CTR+pPMAC vs CTR+HtMAC with MiMC and Leg.
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Chapter 8
Towards an universal share conversion
This chapter is based on joint work with Tim Wood [RW19a] which was presented at INDOCRYPT
2019. Security proofs were done by the co-author of this work, we leave them here for completeness.
8.1 Contributions
In the previous chapter we have covered various circuits that support computations over fields of char-
acteristic two or p. One major open problem is how to switch efficiently between different types of
protocols: SPDZ over characteristic p fields and SPDZ over characteristic 2 fields; SPDZ over Fp and
constant round protocols such as BMR. In this chapter, we show the first efficient construction of how
to achieve share conversions for dishonest majority. For the case of moving between SPDZ and con-
stant round protocol, our work reduces the cost of garbling over the folkore method by at least 100, 000
AND gates. More concretely, this chapter focuses on share conversions between SPDZ and BMR for
dishonest majority.
We also shed some light on the landscape of share conversions for other dishonest majority proto-
cols in Section 8.6 (which is unpublished work but given in the eprint version [RW19b]).
8.2 Overview
MPC over a finite field or a ring is used to emulate arithmetic over the integers, and consequently,
non-linear operations such as comparisons between secrets (i.e. <,>,=) are an important feature of
MPC protocols. One of the shortcomings of MPC based on secret-sharing is that these natural but more
complicated procedures require special preprocessing and several rounds of communication.
One way to mitigate these costs would be to use circuit-garbling instead of secret-sharing for
circuits involving lots of non-linear operations, since this method has low (in fact, constant) round
complexity. Recent work has shown that multiparty Boolean circuit garbling with active security in the
dishonest majority setting can be made very efficient [WRK17b, HSS17, KY18]. However, performing
general arithmetic computations in Boolean circuits can be expensive since the arithmetic operations
145
CHAPTER 8. TOWARDS AN UNIVERSAL SHARE CONVERSION
must be accompanied with reduction modulo a prime inside the circuit. Moreover, efficient construc-
tions of multiparty constant-round protocols for arithmetic circuits remain elusive. Indeed, the best-
known optimisations for arithmetic circuits such as using a primorial modulus [BMR16] are expensive
even for passive security in the two-party setting. The only work of which the authors are aware in the
multiparty setting is the passively-secure honest-majority work by Ben-Efraim [Ben18].
So-called mixed protocols are those in which parties switch between secret-sharing (SS) and a
garbled circuit (GC) mid-way through a computation, thus enjoying the efficiency of the basic addition
and multiplication operations in any field using the former and the low-round complexity of GCs for
more complex subroutines using the latter. One can think of mixed protocols as allowing parties to
choose the most efficient field in which to evaluate different parts of a circuit.
There has been a lot of work on developing mixed protocols in the two-party passive security set-
ting, for example [HKS+10,KSS13b,KSS14,BDK+18]. One such work was the protocol of Demmler
et al. [DSZ15] known as ABY, that gave a method for converting between arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao
sharings. For small subcircuits, converting arithmetic shares to Boolean shares (of the bit decomposi-
tion) of the same secret – i.e. without any garbling – was shown to give efficiency gains over performing
the same circuits in with arithmetic shares; for large subcircuits, using garbling allows reducing online
costs. Mohassel and Rindal [MR18] constructed a three-party protocol known as ABY3 for mixing
these three types of sharing in the malicious setting assuming at most one corruption.
For mixed protocols to be efficient, clearly the cost of switching between secret-sharing and gar-
bling, performing the operation, and switching back must be more efficient than the method that does
not require switching, perhaps achieved by relegating some computation to the offline phase.
8.2.1 Our approach
When considering mixed protocols in the active setting, the primary technical challenge is in maintain-
ing authentication through the transition from secret-shared inputs and secret inputs inside the GC, and
vice versa. The naïve way of obtaining authentication from SS to GC is for parties to bit-decompose
the shares of their secrets and the MACs locally and use these as input bits to the circuit, and validating
inside the GC. This solution would require O(n · κ · log |F|) bits per party to be sent to switch inputs
in the online phase, where n is the number of parties, κ is the computational security parameter, and F
is the MPC field, since each party needs to broadcast a GC key for each bit of the input. This method
also requires garbling several additions and multiplications inside the circuit to check the MAC. The
advantage of this solution, despite these challenges, is that it requires no additional preprocessing, nor
adaptations to the garbling procedure.
Contrasting this approach, our solution makes use of special preprocessing to speed up the con-
version. This results in reducing the circuit size by approximately 100, 000 AND gates per conversion
for a field with a 128-bit prime modulus (assuming Montgomery multiplication is used). Let Fq de-
note the finite field of order q. In this work we show how to convert between secret-shared data in Fp,
where p is a large prime and is the MPC modulus, and GCs in F2k through the use of “double-shared”
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authenticated bits which we dub daBits, following the nomenclature set out by [NNOB12]. These
doubly-shared secrets are values in {0, 1} shared and authenticated both in Fp and F2k , where by 0 and
1 we mean the additive and multiplicative identity, respectively, in each field. In brief, the conversion of
a secret shared input a into a GC involves constructing a random secret r in Fp using daBits, opening
a − r in MPC, bit decomposing this public value (requiring no communication) and using these as
signal bits for the GC, and then in the circuit adding r and computing this modulo p, which is possible
since the bit decomposition of r is doubly-shared. This keeps the authentication check mostly outside
of the circuit instead requiring that the MAC on a−r is correct. Going the other way around, the output
of the circuit is a set of public signal bits whose masking bits are chosen to be daBits. To get the output,
parties XOR the public signal bits with the Fp shares of the corresponding daBit masks, which can be
done locally. These shares can then be used to reconstruct elements of Fp (or remain as bits if desired).
The only use of doubly-shared masks is at the two boundaries (input and output) between a garbled
circuit and secret-sharing; all secrets used in evaluating arithmetic circuits (i.e. using standard SS-based
MPC) are authenticated shares in Fp only; all wire masks “inside” the circuit (that is, for all wires that
are not input or output wires) are authenticated shares of bits in F2k only. The online communication
cost of our solution is that of each party broadcasting a single field element and then broadcasting
log |F| key shares per input, for a circuit of any depth. Thus the cost is O(κ · log |F|) per party, per field
input to the circuit. The offline cost grows quadratically in n as generating daBits requires every party
to communicate with every other party.
While the main focus of this work is to allow Boolean circuits to be evaluated on (the bits of) field
elements of Fp, our method gives a full arithmetic/Boolean/garbled circuit mixed protocol as once the
bits of a− r are public and the bit decomposition of r is known in F2k , the parties can run the Boolean
circuit computing (a − r) + r mod p to obtain the bits of a in the field F2k with authentication.
Converting back to Fp involves XORing the public signal bits with shared daBits (which is free in
F2k ). Our work is also compatible of converting classic SPDZ shares in Fp with the recent protocol
SPDZ2k of Cramer et al [CDE+18].
We remark that several of the multiparty arithmetic garbling techniques of [Ben17] require the
use of “multifield shared bits”, which precisely correspond to our daBits (albeit in an unauthenticated
honest-majority setting). In fact, this special preprocessed material lead to more efficient multiparty
arithmetic garbling for dishonest majority [MW19].
Our construction involves two steps: the first extends the MPC functionality to allow for the same
bits to be generated in two independent FPrep sessions in two different fields; the second uses this
extended MPC functionality to perform the garbling SPDZ-BMR-style [LPSY15], which we explained
in Chapter 3 Thus, while replacing the garbling is not an entirely black-box procedure, the necessary
modifications to existing protocols are modest.
Our implementation shows that in some cases switching between arithmetic and Boolean circuits
gives more efficient protocols by an order of magnitude than executing plain-SPDZ while increasing
the preprocessing costs by a factor of two. More recent work shows that the preprocessing cost can be
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reduced by approximately a factor of five [AOR+19, RST+19].
Active security beyond bounded inputs. While essentially all of the basic actively-secure MPC proto-
cols enable the evaluation of additions and multiplications, for more complicated non-linear functions
the only solutions that exist are those that require additional assumptions on the input data. For ex-
ample, comparison requires bit decomposition, which itself requires that secrets be bounded by some
constant. Since the bits of each input are directly inserted into the circuit, we can avoid this addi-
tional assumption. We refer the reader to [DFK+06] or the documentation for the SCALE-MAMBA
project [ACK+19, §10 Advanced Protocols] for an overview of implementations of other functions in
MPC.
8.3 Preliminaries
Our protocol makes use of MPC as a black box, with functionality outlined in Figure 3.2. The func-
tionality FPrep over a field F is realised using protocols with statistical security sec if |F| = Ω(2sec)
and computational security κ depending on the computational primitives being used. We will describe
MPC as executed in the SPDZ-family of protocols [DPSZ12, DKL+13, KOS16, KPR18, CDE+18].
8.3.1 Secret-sharing
As in the previous chapters we will asume that values are additively shared. but in this case we need
three different types of shared values in our scheme, over two different fields, always additively shared
along with their MAC shares. A secret a ∈ Fp is shared amongst the parties by additively sharing the
secret a in Fp along with a linear MAC γp(a) defined as γp(a) ← α · a, where α ∈ Fp is a global
MAC key, which is also additively shared. By “global” we mean that every MAC in the protocol uses
this MAC key, rather than each party holding their own key and authenticating every share held by
every other party. Similarly, a secret c ∈ F2k and its MAC γ2k(c) = ∆ · c, where ∆ ∈ F2k is an
additively-shared global MAC key, are additively shared in F2k amongst the parties.
We denote shared, authenticated secrets in the following ways:
Sharing in Fp JaKp = (a(i), γp(a)(i), α(i))ni=1
where a ∈ Fp and a(i), γp(a)(i), α(i) ∈ Fp for all i ∈ [n].
Sharing in F2k JcK2k = (c(i), γ2k(c)(i),∆(i))ni=1
where c ∈ F2k and c(i), γ2k(c)(i),∆(i) ∈ F2k for all i ∈ [n].
Sharing in both JbKp,2k = (JbKp, JbK2k) where b ∈ {0, 1}.































and party Pi holds every value indexed by i. Moreover, secret JbKp,2k is considered correct if the bit
is the same in both fields, by which we mean they are either both the additive identity or are both the
multiplicative identity, in their fields. Creating these bits efficiently is one of the main contributions of
this work. Notice that the superscript on the MACs is outside the bracket: the parties each hold one
share of the MAC α · a on a, not MACs on the shares a(i). The security of the MACs comes from the
fact that, any adversary learns at most n − 1 values and so does not know the global MAC key and
hence can only alter the secret and its MAC correctly with probability at most 1/|F|.
As explained in the previous chapters, additions of secrets / public values or multiplication by
public values can be done locally by each party. The main difficulty is in performing secret shared
multiplications using the Beaver’s trick [Bea92].
Active security. Since all operations in the online phase are linear, if we assume a secure preprocessing
(offline) phase, in the online phase only additive errors need to be detected. This is where the MACs
are used: if the MAC on the final output of the circuit being computed is incorrect, then an additive
error has been introduced on the MAC or the secret, and in this case the parties abort. If there is no
error, then either the output is correct, or (it can be shown that) the adversary must have learnt enough
information to guess the global MAC key. If p is O(2sec) then the chance of the adversary doing so is
already negligible, and otherwise parties can generate dsec/ log pe independent global MAC keys, hold
this number of MACs on each secret and require that all MACs on the final output be correct. We refer
the reader to [DKL+13] for details on the MAC checking procedure.
8.3.2 Conditions on the secret-sharing field
Let l = blog pc. Throughout, we assume the MPC is over Fp where p is some large prime, but we
require that one must be able to generate uniformly random field elements by sampling bits uniformly
at random {JrjKp}l−1j=0 and summing them to get JrKp ←
∑l−1
j=0 2




−sec). Roughly speaking this says that p is slightly larger than a power of 2.
(By symmetry of this argument we can require that p be close to a power of 2.) Recall that sampling a
uniform element of {0, 1}l produces the same distribution as sampling l bits independently by standard
measure theory. It follows from Lemma 24 that the statistical distance between the uniform distribution
over Fp and the same over {0, 1}l is negligible.
Lemma 24. Let l = blog pc, let P be the probability mass function for the uniform distribution P over
[0, p)∩Z and letQ be the probability mass function for the uniform distributionQ over [0, 2l)∩Z. Then
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Protocol Π+Rand
This protocol is in the FRand,FCommit-hybrid model. Let RShuffle(seed, s) denote any determinis-
tic algorithm that takes a random seed seed and a vector s and outputs a permutation of components
of s. Recall κ is the computational security parameter.
Initialise Parties agree on a session identifier sid and callFRand with input (Initialise, {0, 1}κ, sid).
Random subset To compute a random subset of size t of a set X , parties run Random to obtain a
random seed seed for a PRG and then do the following:
1. Let X = {xi}|X|i=1. Parties set the vector s = (s1, . . . , s|X|) ← (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
{0, 1}|X|, where the first t bits are set to 1 and the remaining bits set to 0.
2. Each Pi locally computes s′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
|X|) ← RShuffle(seed, s) and outputs the set
S ← {xi : s′i = 1}.
Random buckets To put a set of items indexed by a set X into buckets of size t where t divides
|X|, parties run Random to obtain a seed seed for a PRG and then do the following:
1. LetX = {xi}|X|i=1. Each Pi locally computes s′ ← RShuffle(seed, s) where s← (i)
|S|
i=1.
2. For each i = 1 to |S|/t, let Si ← {xs′j : (i− 1) · t < j ≤ i · t}.
Figure 8.1: Protocol Π+Rand.

































In order to place items into random buckets and shuffle them around, we need access to certain func-
tionalities which given a set X: i) compute a random subset of X and ii) place all items of X randomly
into t separate buckets. Details on how to realize the protocols are given in Figure 8.1.
8.3.4 Arbitrary Rings vs Fields
Our protocol uses actively-secure MPC as black box, so there is no reason the MPC cannot take place
over any ring Z/mZ where m is possibly composite, as long as m is (close to) a power of 2. The
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security of our procedure for generating daBits can tolerate zero-divisors in the ring, so computation
may, for example, take place over the ring Z/2lZ for any l, for which actively-secure FPrep can be
realised using [CDE+18].
Note on XOR. In our context, we will require heavy use of the (generalised) XOR operation. This can
be defined in any field as the function
f : Fp × Fp → Fp
(x, y) 7→ x+ y − 2 · x · y,(8.1)
which coincides with the usual XOR function for fields of characteristic 2. In SS-based MPC, addition
requires no communication, so computing XOR in F2k is for free; the cost in Fp (char(p) > 2) is one
multiplication, which requires preprocessed data and some communication. This operation is the main
cost associated with our offline phase, since generating daBits with active security requires generating
lots of them and then computing several XORs in both fields.
8.3.5 Garbled Circuits
Throughout this chapter we will use BMR garbling where the preprocessing material for the garbling is
done using MASCOT protocol over F2k as described in the introductory Section 3.6. In Section 8.4.2
we describe the modifications necessary to this standard garbling technique to provide inputs from get
outputs to Fp.
8.4 Protocol
In our protocol, one instance of FPrep over Fp is used to perform addition and multiplication in the
field, and one instance of FPrep over F2k is used to perform the garbling. Note that since the keys for
the PRF live in the field F2k in the garbling protocol, the instance of FPrep[F2k ] must be over a field
with k = O(κ) for computational security. Indeed, we emphasise that in our protocol k is not directly
related to log p. Once the garbling is completed, the full MPC engine in F2k is no longer required:
the parties only maintain the Fp instance of FPrep and retain the garbled circuits in memory, and will
additionally need to make sure they can still perform the procedure Check in FPrep on values opened
in the evaluation of the GC.
In summary, our protocol requires a single opening of a secret-shared value and then locally bit-
decomposing this public value to obtain the input wire signal bits to the garbled circuit. Once the parties
have these, they open the appropriate keys for circuit evaluation, and the rest of the protocol (including
retrieving outputs in secret-shared form) is local. The key challenge in creating the garbled circuit is
that for some wire masks, namely a certain set of input masks and all the output wires, we need wire
masks which are the same value in Fp and F2k (i.e. both the additive identity or both the multiplicative
identity in each field), which then must be used in the garbling stage of the preprocessing.
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We construct the functionality FCABB by first showing how to generate daBits, and then showing
how this procedure coupled with two instances of the standardFPrep functionality gives a preprocessing
phase which we call F+Prep, given in Figure 8.3 which can be used to realise FCABB.
It would be straightforward to instantiate FCABB directly in the FPrep-hybrid model, using two
independent instances of FPrep over the fields Fp and F2k . However, we choose to build up to FCABB
via the functionality F+Prep for three reasons:
1. This approach more faithfully resembles the execution of the protocols in our implementation,
where daBits are generated and the “extended” FABB functionality FPrep is used to run the ex-
tended BMR protocol.
2. The daBits are “raw” preprocessed data, so F+Prep really forms a complete “offline” phase from
which garbling and secret-sharing can be done.
3. Any future work giving a better protocol for creating daBits for two independent FPrep instances
does not require reproving the security of the extended BMR protocol that makes use of daBits.
FPrep F+Prep FCABB
FPrep + ΠdaBits ΠCABB
Figure 8.2: Functionality dependencies
8.4.1 Generating daBits using Bucketing
Any technique for generating daBits require some form of checking procedure to ensure consistency
between the two fields. Checking consistency often means checking random linear combinations of
secrets produce the same result in both cases. Unfortunately, in our case such comparisons are mean-
ingless since the fields have different characteristics, so shares are uniform in Fp and F2k and so multi-
plications in the field are not compatible. We can, however, check XORs of bits, which in Fp involves
multiplication. (See Equation 8.1 in Section 8.3.) It is therefore necessary to use a protocol that min-
imises (as far as possible) the number of multiplications. Consequently, techniques using oblivious
transfer (OT) such as [WRK17b] to generated authenticated bits require a lot of XORs for checking
correctness, so are undesirable for generating daBits.
Our chosen solution uses FPrep as a black box. In order to generate the same bit in both fields, each
party samples a bit and calls the Fp and F2k instances of FPrep with this same input and then the parties
compute the n-party XOR. To ensure all parties provided the same inputs in both fields, cut-and-choose
and bucketing procedures are required, though since the number of bits it is necessary to generate is a
multiple of log p ≈ sec and we can batch-produce daBits, the parameters are modest.
We use similar cut-and-choose and bucketing checks to those described by Frederiksen et al.
[FKOS15, App. F.3], in which “triple-like” secrets can be efficiently checked. The idea behind these
checks is the following. One first opens a random subset of secrets so that with some probability all




This functionality extends the reactive functionality FPrep with commands to generate the same
bits in two independent sessions.
Instances of FPrep
Independent copies of FPrep are identified via session identifiers sid;
Additional command
daBits: On receiving (daBits, id1, . . . , id`, sid1, sid2), from all parties where idi 6∈ Reg.Keys for
all i ∈ `, await a message OK or Abort from the adversary. If the message is OK, then
sample {bj}j∈[`]
$← {0, 1} and for each j ∈ [`], set Regsid1 [idj ] ← bj and Regsid2 [idj ] ← bj
and insert the set {idi}i∈[`] into Regsid1 .Keys and Regsid2 .Keys; otherwise send the messages
(Abort, sid1) and (Abort, sid2) to all honest parties and the adversary and ignore all further
messages to FPrep with session identifier sid1 or sid2.
Figure 8.3: Functionality F+Prep.
then puts the secrets into buckets, and then in each bucket designates one secret as the one to output,
uses all other secrets in bucket to check the last, and discards all but the designated secret. For a single
bucket, the check will only pass (by construction) if either all secrets are correct or all are incorrect.
Thus the adversary is forced to corrupt whole multiples of the bucket size and hope they are grouped
together in the same bucket. Fortunately, (we will show that) there is no leakage on the bits since the
parameters required for the parts of the protocol described above already preclude it. The protocol is
described in Figure 8.4; we prove that this protocol securely realises the functionality F+Prep in Figures
8.3 and in the FPrep-hybrid model. To do this, we require Proposition 25.





< 2−sec. Then the
probability that one or more of the ` daBits output after Consistency Check by FPrep||ΠdaBits in Figure
8.4 is different in each field is at most 2−sec.
Proof. Using FPrep[Fp] and FPrep[F2k ] as black boxes ensures the adversary can only possibly cheat
in the input stage. We will argue that:
1. If both sets of inputs from corrupt parties to FPrep[Fp] and FPrep[F2k ] are bits (rather than other
field elements), then the bits are consistent in the two different fields with overwhelming proba-
bility.
2. The inputs in F2k are bits with overwhelming probability.
3. The inputs in Fp are bits with overwhelming probability.
We will conclude that the daBits are bits in the two fields, and are consistent. We now start with the
argument for the first item:
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Protocol FPrep||ΠdaBits
This protocol is in the FPrep-hybrid model.
Initialise:
1. Call an instance of FPrep with input (Initialise,Fp, 0); denote it by FPrep[Fp].
2. Call an instance of FPrep with input (Initialise,F2k , 1); denote it by FPrep[Fk2].
To generate ` bits, all of the following procedures are performed, in order.
Generate daBits:






2. For each i ∈ [n],








j=1 and Pj (j 6= i) has
input (Input, sidp, idbij , i,⊥)
m
i=1.




j=1 and Pj (j 6= i) has
input (Input, sid2k , idbij , i,⊥)
m
i=1.
d) Store the outputs of FPrep[Fp] and FPrep[F2k ] as JbijKp and JbijK2k respectively
where j ∈ [m].
Cut and Choose:
1. Call F+Rand with input (RSubset, [CB`], (C − 1)B`) to obtain a set S.
2. Call FPrep[Fp] with inputs (Open, sidp, JbijKp, 0)j∈S for all i ∈ [n].
3. Call FPrep[F2k ] with inputs (Open, sid2k , JbijK2k , 0)j∈S for all i ∈ [n].
4. If any party sees daBits which are not in {0, 1} or not the same in both fields, they send
the message Abort to all parties and halt.
Combine: For all j ∈ S, compute the XOR sum of parties’ bit shares.
1. Set JbjKp ← Jb1jKp and then for i from 2 to n compute: JbjKp ← XOR(JbjKp, JbijKp).






1. Call F+Rand with input (RBucket, [B`], B) and use the returned sets (Si)
`
i=1 to put the
B` daBits into ` buckets of size B.
2. For each bucket Si,
a) Relabel the bits in this bucket as b1, . . . , bB .
b) For j = 2 to B, compute JcjKp ← Jb1Kp + JbjKp − 2 · Jb1Kp · JbjKp and JcjK2k ←
Jb1K2k ⊕ JbjK2k .
c) Call FPrep[Fp] with inputs (Open, sidp, JcjKp, 0)Bj=2. If check passes call FPrep[2k]
with inputs (Open, sid2k , JcjK2k , 0)Bj=2.
d) Parties send Abort and halt if they see dabits which are not in {0, 1}.
e) Set JbiKp,2k ← Jb1Kp,2k .
3. Call FPrep[Fp] with input (Check, sidp). Then call FPrepF2k with input (Check, sid2k).
4. If the checks pass without aborting, output {JbiKp,2k}`i=1 and discard all other bits.
Figure 8.4: Protocol FPrep||ΠdaBits.
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Claim 1. If both sets of inputs from corrupt parties to FPrep[Fp] and FPrep[F2k ] are bits (rather than
other field elements), then the bits are consistent in the two different fields with overwhelming proba-
bility.
Proof. Let c be the number of inconsistent daBits generated by a given corrupt party. If c > B` then
every set of size (C − 1)B` contains an incorrect daBit so the honest parties will always detect this in
Cut and Choose and abort. Since (C−1)B` out of CB` daBits are opened, on average the probability
that a daBit is not opened is 1− (C − 1)/C = C−1, and so if c < B` then we have:
(8.2) Pr[None of the c corrupted daBits is opened] = C−c.
At this point, if the protocol has not yet aborted, then there are B` daBits remaining of which exactly c
are corrupt.
Suppose a daBit JbKp,2k takes the value b̃ in Fp and b̂ in F2k . If the bucketing check passes then for
every other daBit Jb′Kp,2k in the bucket it holds that b̃⊕ b̃′ = b̂⊕ b̂′, so b̃′ = (b̂⊕ b̂′)⊕ b̃, and so b̃ = b̂⊕1
if and only if b̃′ = b̂′ ⊕ 1. (Recall that we are assuming the inputs are certainly bits at this stage.) In
other words, within a single bucket, the check passes if and only if either all daBits are inconsistent, or
if none of them are. Thus the probability Consistency Check passes without aborting is the probability
that all corrupted daBits are placed into the same buckets. Moreover, this implies that if the number of
corrupted daBits, c, is not a multiple of the bucket size, this stage never passes, so we write c = Bt for
some t > 0. Then we have:























































Since the randomness for Cut and Choose and Check Correctness is independent, the event that both
checks pass after the adversary corrupts c daBits is the product of the probabilities. To upper-bound the











The maximum occurs when t is small, and t ≥ 1 otherwise no cheating occurred; thus since the





< 2−sec, the daBits are consistent in both fields, if they are
indeed bits in both fields.
Claim 2. The inputs in F2k are bits with overwhelming probability.
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Proof. Next, we will argue that the check in Cut and Choose ensures that the inputs given toFPrep[F2k ]
are indeed bits. It follows from Equation 8.2 that the step Cut and Choose aborts with probability
C−c if any element of either field is not a bit, as well as if the element in the two fields does not
match. Moreover, in Consistency Check, in order for the check to pass in F2k for a given bucket, the
secrets’ higher-order bits must be the same for all shares so that the XOR is always zero when the
pairwise XORs are opened. Thus the probability that this happens is the same as the probability above
in Equation 8.4 since again this can only happen when the adversary is not detected in Cut and Choose,
that he cheats in some multiple of B daBits, and that these cheating bits are placed in the same buckets
in Consistency Check.
Now we proceed to the last claim:
Claim 3. The inputs in Fp are bits with overwhelming probability.
Proof. We now show that all of the Fp components are bits. To do this, we will show that if the Fp
component of a daBit is not a bit, then the bucket check passes only if all other daBits in the bucket are
also not bits in Fp.
If the protocol has not aborted, then in every bucket B, for every 2 ≤ j ≤ B, it holds that
(8.5) b1 + bj − 2 · b1 · bj = cj









least one bji is generated by an honest party, this value is uniform and unknown to the adversary when
he chooses his inputs at the beginning.
Suppose b1 ∈ Fp \ {0, 1}. If b1 = 2−1 ∈ Fp then by Equation 8.5 we have b1 = cj ; but cj is a bit,
so the “XOR” is not the same in both fields and the protocol will abort. Thus we may assume b1 6= 2−1
and so we can rewrite the equation above as
(8.6) bj =
b1 − cj
2 · b1 − 1
.













1 − cj)(b1 − (1− cj))
(2 · b1 − 1)2
so b1 = cj or b1 = 1− cj ; thus b1 ∈ {0, 1}, which is a contradiction. Thus we have shown that if b1 is
not a bit then bj is not a bit for every other bj in this bucket. Moreover, for each j = 2, . . . , B, there are
two distinct values bj ∈ Fp \ {0, 1} solving Equation 8.6 corresponding to the two possible values of
cj ∈ {0, 1}, which means that if the bucket check passes then the adversary must also have guessed the
bits {cj}Bj=1, which he can do with probability 2−B since they are constructed using at least one honest






Thus we have shown that the probability that b1 ∈ Fp \ {0, 1} is given as output for the Fp com-
ponent is at most the probability that the adversary corrupts a multiple of B daBits, that these daBits
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are placed in the same buckets, and that the adversary correctly guesses c bits from honest parties (in
the construction of the bits {bj}j∈B) so that the appropriate equations hold in the corrupted buckets.
Indeed, needing to guess the bits ahead of time only reduces the adversary’s chance of winning from
the same probability in the F2k case.
We conclude that the daBits are bits in both fields and are the same in both fields with probability
except with probability at most 2−sec.
Theorem 26. The protocol FPrep||ΠdaBits securely realises F+Prep in the (FPrep,F
+
Rand)-hybrid model
against an active adversary corrupting up to n− 1 out of n parties.
Proof. To prove security in the UC framework we must show that to any environment Z , for any
adversary A there exists a simulator S such that the execution of an idealised version of the protocol
run by a trusted third party F with the simulator is indistinguishable from a real execution of the
protocol Π between the honest parties and the adversary. The environment specifies the code run by
the adversary as well as the inputs of all parties, honest and dishonest. Additionally, the environment
sees all outputs of all parties; it does not see the intermediate interactions in subroutines of the honest
parties’ executions, otherwise distinguishing would be trivial as honest parties either perform Π or
interact with F. In the (FPrep,F+Rand)-hybrid model, the adversary is allowed to make oracle queries to
these functionalities and S must generate the responses.
Note the functionality does not have access to the random tapes honest parties as this would make
distinguishing between worlds trivial: it would be impossible for the simulator to emulate honest parties
to the real-world adversary indistinguishably since for any random tape sampled by the simulator, the
environment would always be able to execute the protocol internally, using its knowledge of the random
tapes of honest parties to execute the entire protocol deterministically, and compare it to the output of
the simulator.
Following standard practice, and as described in [Can00, §4.2.2], we define a simulator which
interacts with the adversary A as a black box. This allows us to make the claim that the simulator
works regardless of the code run by the adversary and hence prove the claim.
Suppose the adversary corrupts t < n parties in total, indexed by a set A. We define a sequence of
hybrid worlds (Hybrid h)n−th=0 and show that each is indistinguishable from the previous. Hybrid h is
defined as follows:
Definition 27. (Hybrid h)n−th=0 game. The simulator has the actual input of n− t−h honest parties and
must simulate the remaining h honest parties towards the adversary.
The simulator is described in Figure 8.5.
Claim 4. The FPrep,F+Rand-hybrid world is indistinguishable from Hybrid 0.
Proof. Correctness of the simulation holds as follows. The simulator emulates FPrep[Fp], FPrep[F2k ]
and F+Rand, so all calls made to these oracles are dealt with as in an execution of the protocol. Indeed,
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Simulator Sh
Prep+
The simulator is (vacuously) parameterised by h, which means the simulator knows the actual
inputs of n− t− h honest parties, and must simulate for the remaining h. We denote the adversary
by A.
Initialise: On receiving the call toFPrep with inputs (Initialise,Fp, sidp) and (Initialise,F2k , sid2k),
initialise corresponding internal copies.
Calls to FPrep[Fp] All calls for producing preprocessing, other than what is described below, sent
from A to FPrep[Fp] should be forwarded to FPrep. All response messages from FPrep are
sent directly to A.
Calls to FPrep[F2k ] All calls for producing preprocessing, other than what is described below, sent
from the A to FPrep[F2k ] should be forwarded to FPrep. All response messages from FPrep
are sent directly to A.
For the following procedures, send the calls to the internal copies of FPrep[Fp], FPrep[F2k ] and
F+Rand as described in the protocol.
[Start] Call F+Prep with input (daBits, id1, . . . , id`, sidp, sid2k).
Generate daBits: Run Generate daBits from FPrep||ΠdaBits with A, sampling inputs for all hon-
est parties.
Cut and Choose: Run Cut and Choose from FPrep||ΠdaBits with A.
Combine: Run Combine from FPrep||ΠdaBits with A.
Check Correctness: Run Check Correctness from FPrep||ΠdaBits with A.
[Finish] If the protocol aborted, send Abort to FPrep, and otherwise send OK.
Figure 8.5: Simulator Sh
Prep+
.
for all calls to FPrep in either field which are outside of the daBits generation procedure, the commands
are forwarded to FPrep and relayed back to A, and since FPrep has the same interface as FPrep by
definition, there is no difference between the worlds. As for the daBit generation, when the adversary
makes calls to provide (random) inputs and then perform Cut and Choose, the simulator does not
forward the messages through to FPrep since all bits used in the protocol except the final output bits
are discarded. Instead the command (daBits, id1, . . . , id`, sidp, sid2k) is sent to FPrep and the simulator
executes the daBit routines honestly with the adversary, making random choices for honest parties by
sampling in the same way as in the protocol.
Now we argue indistinguishability between executions: we must show that for any algorithm A
specified by the environment Z , it holds that
EXEC(Z,AFPrep,FRand ,FPrep||ΠdaBits) ∼ EXEC(Z,S0Prep+ ,F
+
Prep)
where ∼ denotes statistical indistinguishability of distributions, and the randomness of these distribu-
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tions is taken over the random tapes of honest parties and the adversary and simulator.
First, note that the oracles FPrep and F+Rand are executed honestly by S
0
Prep+
so the contribution to
the distributions is the same in both executions.
Second, since the inputs of honest parties are sampled during the protocol, they are not specified
or known by the environment. However, if the adversary performs a selective-failure attack, then the
environment may learn information. A selective failure attack is where the environment can learn some
information if the protocol does not detect cheating behaviour. For example, if the environment guesses
an entire bucket of bits and chooses inputs for the adversary’s input so that the bucket check would
pass based on these guesses, then if the protocol does not abort then the environment learns that its
guesses were correct. Then if the final output bit is not the XOR of all parties’ inputs then the execution
must have happened in Hybrid 0 since in this world the output depends on the random tape of FPrep
and is independent of the adversary’s and honest parties’ random tapes, contrasting the output in the
FPrep,F+Rand-hybrid world in which the final output is an XOR of bits on these tapes (which were
guessed by the environment). Since this happens with probability 12 , in expected 2 executions, the
environment can distinguish. However, by Proposition 25, the environment can only mount a selective
failure attack with success with probability at most 2−sec by the choice of parameters.
Thus the only way to distinguish between worlds is if the transcript leaks information on the honest
parties’ inputs. In Check Correctness, XORs are computed in both fields and the result is opened; how-
ever, this reveals no information on the final daBit outputs as the linear dependence between the secret
and the public values is broken by discarding all secrets in each bucket except the designated (i.e. first)
bit. We conclude that the overall distributions of the two executions are statistically indistinguishable
in sec.
Claim 5. Hybrid h is indistinguishable from Hybrid h+ 1 for h = 0, . . . , n− t− 1.
Proof. There is no difference between these worlds since honest parties’ (random) inputs are sampled
the same way in both cases.
Since FPrep is secure up to t = n− 1, the result follows.
8.4.2 Garbling and Switching
In this section we give a high-level description of how our approach can be used to provide input to a
garbled circuit from secret-shared data, and convert garbled-circuit outputs into sharings of secrets in
Fp.
8.4.2.1 From SS to GC




j · JrjKp is constructed from daBits {JrjKp,2k}
blog pc−1
j=0 , and FPrep is called with
input (Check, 0) either at this point or later on, and then these public values are taken to be input bits to
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the garbled circuit. To correct the offset r, the circuit (x− r) + r mod p is computed inside the garbled
circuit. This is possible since the bits of r can be hard-wired into the circuit using the F2k sharings of
its bit-decomposition.
Note that typically for a party to provide input bit b on wire w in a garbled circuit, the parties reveal
the secret-shared wire mask JλwK2k to this party, which broadcasts Λw ← b⊕λw, called the associated
signal bit; then the parties communicate further to reveal keys required for ciphertext decryptions,
which is how the circuit is evaluated. This mask thus hides the actual input (and is removed inside the
garbled circuit). Since the inputs here are the bits of the public value x−r, there is no need mask inputs
here, and thus it suffices to set all the corresponding wire mask bits to be 0.
8.4.2.2 From GC to SS
In standard BMR-style garbling protocols, the outputs of the circuit are a set of public signal bits. These
are equal to the actual Boolean outputs XORed with circuit output wire masks, which are initially
secret-shared, concealing the actual outputs. Typically in multi-party circuit garbling, the wire masks
for output wires are revealed immediately after the garbling stage so that all parties can learn the final
outputs without communication after locally evaluating the garbled circuit. When garbling circuits
using SS-based techniques, and aiming for computation in which parties can continue to operate on
private outputs of a GC, a simple way of obtaining shared output is for the parties not to reveal the
secret-shared wire masks for output wires after garbling and instead, after evaluating, to compute the
XOR of the secret-shared mask with the public signal bit, in MPC.
In other words, for output wire w they obtain a sharing of the secret output bit b by computing
JbK2k ← Λw ⊕ JλwK2k .
In our case, we want the shared output of the circuit to be in Fp, and to do this it suffices for the
masks on circuit output wires to be daBits (instead of random bits shared only in F2k as would be done
normally) and for the parties to compute (locally)
JbKp ← Λw + JλwKp − 2 · Λw · JλwKp.
To avoid interfering with the description of the garbling subprotocol, we can define an additional layer
to the circuit after the output layer which converts output wires with masks only in F2k to output wires
with masks as daBits, without changing the real values on the wire. To do this, for every output wire w,
let JλwK2k be the associated secret-shared wire mask. Then,
• In the garbling stage take a new daBit Jλw′Kp,2k ,
1. Set JΛw0K2k ← JλwK2k ⊕ Jλw′K2k .
2. Call FPrep with input (Open, 0, idΛw0 , 1) to obtain Λw0 .
• In the evaluation stage, upon obtaining Λw,
1. Compute Λw′ ← Λw ⊕ Λw0 .
2. Compute the final (Fp-secret-shared) output as JbKp ← Λw′ + Jλw′Kp − 2 · Λw′ · Jλw′Kp.
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Observe that Λw0 ≡ λw0 so this procedure is just adding a layer of XOR gates where the masking bits
are daBits and the other input wire is always 0 (so the gate evaluation doesn’t change the real wire
value). Note that since the signal bits for XOR gates are determined from input signal bits and not the
output key, there is no need to generate an output key for wire w0.
For correctness, observe that
Λw′ ⊕ λw′ = (Λw ⊕ Λw0)⊕ (λw ⊕ λw0)
= ((b⊕ λw)⊕ (0⊕ λw0))⊕ (λw ⊕ λw0)
= b.
8.5 Implementation
We have implemented daBit generation and the conversion between arithmetic shares and garbled cir-
cuits. Our code is developed on top of the MP-SPDZ framework [Ana19] and experiments were run on
computers with commodity hardware connected via a 1 Gb/s LAN connection with an average round-
trip ping time of 0.3ms. The FPrep[Fp] functionality is implemented using LowGear, one of the two
variants of Overdrive [KPR18]; theFPrep[F2k ] functionality is implemented using MASCOT [KOS16].
In our experiments, F2k is always taken with k = κ = 128 since this is the security of PRF keys used
in SPDZ-BMR. The daBits are always generated with κ = 128 and the same statistical security sec as
the protocol for FPrep.
8.5.1 Primes.
We require that p be close to a power of 2 so that a − r is indistinguishable from a uniform element
of the field, as discussed in Section 8.3. Since we use LowGear in our implementation, for a technical
reason we also require that p be congruent to 1 mod N where N = 32768. (This is the amount of
packing in the ciphertexts.) Consequently, using LowGear means we always lose 15 = log 32768 bits
of security if p > 65537 since then the k-bit prime must be of the form 2k−1 + t · 215 + 1 for some t
where 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k−16−1, so the secret masks r constructed from a sequence of bits “miss” at least this
much of the field.
8.5.2 Cut and choose optimisation
One key observation that enables reduction of the preprocessing overhead in F2k is that parties only
need to input bits (instead of full F2k field elements) into FPrep during FPrep||ΠdaBits. For a party to
input a secret x in MASCOT, the parties create a random authenticated mask r and open opened it to
the party, and the party then broadcasts x + r. Since the inputs are just bits, it suffices for the random
masks also to be bits. Generating authenticated bits using MASCOT is extremely cheap and comes
with a small communication overhead (see Table 8.3).
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Figure 8.6: Total communication costs for all parties per preprocessed element.
8.5.3 More efficient packing for MAC Check
Instead of a set of k secret bits being opened as full F2k field elements (0, . . . , 0, b1), . . . , (0, . . . , 0, bt) ∈
Fk2 ∼= F2k , we can save on all the redundant 0’s being sent by sending a single field element (bk, . . . , b1) ∈
F2k . This optimisation reduces by a factor 2 the amount of data sent for the online phase of daBit gen-
eration.
8.5.4 Complexity analysis.
In LowGear (Overdrive) and MASCOT the authors choose to avoid reporting any benchmarks for
random bit masks in F2k or random input masks in Fp since they focused on the entire triple generation
protocol. Fortunately their code is open source and easy to modify so we micro-benchmarked their
protocols in order to get concrete costs for the procedure Input for FPrep[Fp] and FPrep[F2k ]. For
example, in the two-party case, to provide an input bit costs overall 0.384kbits with MASCOT in F2k .
For LowGear providing bits as input is equivalent to providing an entire Fp field element, strongly
contrasting the case for F2k ; thus the cost for an input is 2.048kb. Hence, with the current state of
protocols, inputs are cheap in a binary field whereas triples are cheap in a prime field.
8.5.5 Bucketing parameters.
Recall that our goal is to minimise the total amount of communication and time spent by parties gener-
ating each daBit. After examining the input and triple costs for LowGear and MASCOT (see Table 8.1)
we observed that the optimal communication for statistical security sec = 64 and a p ≈ 2128 is achieved
with a generation of l = 8192 daBits per loop, a cut-and-choose parameter and C = 5 and a bucket
size B = 4. Then we ran the daBit generation along with LowGear and MASCOT for multiple parties
on the same computer configuration to get the total communication cost in order to see how communi-
cation scales in terms of number of parties. Results are given in Figure 8.6. Although MASCOT triples
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# Parties MASCOT F2k LowGear Fp
Input (bit) Triple Input Triple
2 0.384 360.44 2.048 30.146
3 1.024 1081.32 5.888 89.67
4 1.92 2162.64 11.520 178.572
5 3.072 3604.4 18.94 296.85
Table 8.1: Communication costs (kbits) for fields with different characteristic.
are never used during the daBit production, we believe that comparing the cost of a daBit to the best
triple generation in F2k helps to give a rough idea of how expensive a single daBit is.
sec > 40 sec > 64 sec > 80
# daBits 128 1024 8192 128 1024 8192 128 1024 8192
Calls to FPrep[{Fp, |F2k}].Input 40 16 12 42 40 40 36 28 24
Calls to FPrep[Fp].Multiply 7 7 5 13 9 7 17 13 11
Achieved sec 40 47 44 67 64 64 82 84 90
Table 8.2: Two parties preprocessing cost per daBit while varying the number of daBits per batch and
statistical security. Parameters minimize for total communication given by LowGear and MASCOT.
To see how efficiency scales when the statistical security parameter sec is increased, we record
the fewest numbers of calls to FPrep, optimising for total (actual) communication cost in Table 8.2.
Since the numbers are dependent on integers (number of parties, size of buckets, and cut and choose
parameter), several of the numbers in the table give far better security than the minimum stated. Note
that since we optimise for the total communication cost and not for the smallest Cut and Choose and
Bucketing parameters that achieve each level of security, in the cost for sec = 64 the number of calls
to FPrep.Input is larger than for sec = 80. The bucket size, correlated with the number of calls to
FPrep.Multiply, is therefore is smaller than for sec = 80.
8.5.6 Share conversion
To reduce the amount of garbling when converting an additive share to a GC one, if we assume the
Fp input to the garbled circuit is bounded by p/2sec, then a uniform r in Fp is 2sec times larger than a
so a − r is statistically-indistinguishable from a uniform element of Fp; consequently, one need only
garble a+ r and not a+ r mod p, which makes the circuit marginally smaller – 379 AND gates for a
128 bit prime rather than ≈ 1000 AND gates for an addition mod p circuit.
In Table 8.4 we split the conversion into two phases: the cost of generating 127 daBits for doing a
full conversion (including the preprocessing triples from LowGear) and the online of SPDZ-BMR.
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40 128 128 76.60 2.30 6.94 85.84 0.159 < 10ns 0.004 0.163
64 128 128 146.47 7.68 9.39 163.54 0.303 < 10ns 0.010 0.313
80 128 128 192.95 4.60 7.32 204.88 0.485 < 10ns 0.008 0.493
Table 8.3: 1 Gb/s LAN experiments for two-party daBit generation per party. For all cases, the daBit
batch has length 8192.
Conversion
daBit (total) SPDZ-BMR
Comm. (kbits) Time (ms) ANDs Online (ms)
SPDZ 7→ GC 20769 39.751 379 0.106
GC 7→ SPDZ 10303 19.719 0 0.005
Table 8.4: Two parties 1 Gb/s LAN experiments converting a 63 bit field element with 64 statistical
security. BMR online phase times are amortized over 1000 executions in parallel (single-threaded).
8.5.7 Comparison to semi-honest conversion.
When benchmarked with 40 bit statistical security, the online phase to convert 1000 field elements of
size 32 bits takes 193ms. Our solution benefits from merging multiple conversions at once due to the
SIMD nature of operations and that we can perform a single MAC-Check to compute the signal bits
for the GC. Note that our conversion from an arithmetic SPDZ share to a SPDZ-BMR GC share takes
about 14 times more than the semi-honest arithmetic to an Yao GC conversion in ABY or Chameleon
on an identical computer configuration [RWT+18, DSZ15].
8.5.8 Multiple class Support Vector Machine
A support vector machine (SVM) is a machine learning algorithm that uses training data to compute a
matrixA and a vector b such that for a so-called feature vector x of a new input, the index of the largest
component of the vector A ·x + b is defined to be its class. We decided to benchmark this circuit using
actively-secure circuit marbling as it is clear that there is an operation best suited to arithmetic circuits
(namely, JAK · JxK + JbK) and another better for a Boolean circuit (namely, argmax, which computes
the index of the vector’s largest component).
We have benchmarked the online phase of a multi-class Linear SVM with 102 classes and 128
features over a simulated WAN network (using the Linux tc command) with a round-trip ping time
of 100ms and 50Mb/s bandwidth with two parties. The SVM structure is the same used by Makri
et al. [MRSV19] to classify the Caltech-101 dataset which contains 102 different categories of images
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such as aeroplanes, dolphins, helicopters and others [FFFP04]. In this dataset, x ∈ F128p ,A ∈ F102×128p
and b ∈ F102p , and it requires 102 conversions from Fp to Fk2 – one for each SVM label. The particular
SVM used by Makri et al. has bounded inputs x where log |x| ≤ 25, a field size log p = 128 and
statistical security sec = 64.
We have implemented a special instruction in MP-SPDZ which loads a secret integer modulo p
(a SPDZ share) into the SPDZ-BMR machine. To merge all modulo p instructions of SPDZ shares
into SPDZ-BMR to form an universal Virtual Machine requires some extra engineering effort: this
is why we chose to micro-benchmark in Table 8.5 the different stages of the online phase: doing
JyKp ← JAKp · JxKp + JbKp with SPDZ, then the instruction converting JyKp = (Jy1Kp, . . . , Jy102Kp) to
({J(y1)jK2k}
log p−1
j=0 , . . . , {J(y102)jK2k}
log p−1
j=0 ), ending with the evaluation stage of SPDZ-BMR on
argmax(((J(y1)jK2k)
log p−1
j=0 , . . . , (J(y102)jK2k)
log p−1
j=0 )).
We name this construction Marbled-SPDZ.
Online cost. The online phase (Table 8.5) using Marbled-SPDZ is more than 10 times faster than
SPDZ-BMR and about 10 times faster than SPDZ.
Preprocessing cost. The preprocessing effort for the garbling (in AND gates) is reduced by a factor
of almost 400 times using our construction. We chose to express the preprocessing costs of Table 8.5
in terms of AND gates, random triples and bits mainly for the reason that SPDZ-BMR requires much
more work for an AND gate than WRK. Based on the concrete preprocessing costs we have in Table 8.5
we give estimations on the communication where the preprocessing of the garbling is done via WRK:
performing an SVM evaluation using i) WRK alone would require 6.6GB sent per party (3.8kb per
AND gate), ii) SPDZ alone (with LowGear) would require 54MB per party (15kb per triple/random
bit), iii) Marbled-SPDZ would take 160MB per party.
Nevertheless, the main cost in Marbled SPDZ is the daBit generation (119 MB) which is more than
70% of the preprocessing effort. If one chooses sec = 40 then we need five triples per daBit and 65
daBits per conversion which amounts to only 119MB for the entire SVM evaluation (twice the cost
of plain SPDZ). A detailed cost can be found in Table 8.6 where the column daBitC represents the
conversion cost whereas the GC column is the SPDZ-BMR protocol.
8.6 Generality of daBits
In Diagram 8.7 we show how our daBit generation bridges different MPC protocols for dishonest
majority. Our inspiration is drawn from Keller and Yanai [KY18] which can convert between SPDZ-
BMR and SPDZ over Fk2 by setting the global difference used in the free-XOR as the global MAC-
key in SPDZ[Fk2]. Their main idea is to sample a secret random bit authenticated in Fk2 and use that
random bit to do a share conversion. This lends nicely because the authentication key has the same
representation in both engines whereas we need more involved techniques (eg: use cut and choose)
to generate such a preprocessed authenticated random bit between SPDZ[Fp] and SPDZ-BMR (or
BMR[Fk2]).
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SPDZ 54 2661 2661 19015 9797 -
SPDZ-BMR 0 2786 2786 - - 14088217{ SPDZ 1 133
271.73
13056 0 -
Marbled-SPDZ daBitC 2 137 63546 0 27030
GC 0 1.73 - - 8383
Table 8.5: Two-party linear SVM: single-threaded (non-amortized) online phase costs and preprocess-







SPDZ 49.4 MB - - 49.4 MB
GC - 4917 MB 1768 MB 6685 MB{ SPDZ 24.48 MB - -
108.87 MBMarbled daBit convert 71.13 MB 6.83 MB 2.45 MB
GC - 2.92 MB 1.05 MB
Table 8.6: Two-party linear SVM communication cost for preprocessing in MBytes and statistical se-
curity sec = 40.
BMR and TinyOT. This is done by converting the pairwise MAC to a global one and it is explained in
several papers [HSS17,WRK17b]. Going from a global MAC to a pairwise one is slightly more difficult
but could be achieved using daBits or a similar consistency check by Damgård et al. [DEF+19] to go
from a bit share in SPDZ[Z2k ] to a TinyOT sharing.
TinyOT and SPDZ2k. Recently Damgård et al. [DEF+19] introduced a method of switching back and
forth between SPDZ[Z2k ] to TinyOT. They use a lightweight batch-check to ensure input consistency
in both engines. Although they show how to switch a random bit JbK2k ∈ Z2k to JbK2 ∈ Fk2 their
subroutines can be used to convert a full input JxK2k ∈ Z2k by bit-decomposing it and then translate
each bit into the TinyOT family of protocols.
SPDZ2k and SPDZ. One can use daBits to convert from a SPDZ[Fp] share to a SPDZ[Z2k ] share. The
high level idea of converting between a field and a ring is to generate the same correlated randomness
JrKp ∈ Fp and JrK2k ∈ Z2k by bit-composing the daBits. Then the conversion from JxKp to JxK2k
becomes trivial: parties open JxKp − JrKp, assign this to a public y then perform the reduction modulo
p in SPDZ[Z2k ] using the public constant y i.e. JxK2k ← (y + JrK2k) mod p. This procedure can be
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Figure 8.7: Share conversions for dishonest majority protocols. Dashed lines use our daBits as an inner
subroutine.
adapted to allow conversions from SPDZ[Z2k ] to SPDZ[Fp]: parties open JxK2k − JrK2k in Z2k then
add the randomness back in Fp and truncate the result modulo Z2k . A similar idea can be applied to
convert from SPDZ[Fp] to SPDZ[Fk2] with the exception that in the last step parties now truncate their
shares modulo Fk2 .
SPDZ and TinyOT family. This conversion can be done again with daBits and works in the same way
we describe it in our paper for SPDZ[Fp] and BMR[Fk2]. Recently Aly et al. [AOR+19] improve and
fully integrate the conversion between SPDZ and WRK/HSS garbling into SCALE-MAMBA. Their
protocol improvements come from a slightly modified check of Damgård et al. [DEF+19] with a twist
in how parties extract the least significant bit of a SPDZ share by tweaking their shares locally in the





Throughout my PhD I have noticed that one does not need to be a genius in order to come up with new
ideas (although being clever would be of benefit). It also turned out that being able to write a bit of
code can get you in all sorts of collaboration. That or being brave enough to dive into undocumented
code and try to make some sense of it - so much fun though frustrating at some times.
The more I think about research the more I see it as a two-step problem solving algorithm: 1)
find an interesting problem which can help many others and many would be thankful if it would have
been solved then 2) dig deep enough into the problem, understand all the available literature and then
start combining ideas, test them or ask more experienced people. The second step can be avoided by
choosing a problem which requires a large amount of engineering which no one wants to do it but
everyone would like to have this extra tool created. Sadly, sometimes a lot of engineering might not get
you any publications due to its lack of “novelty” but would help the community. On the bright side,
most likely there will always be a venue which would accept your work if it is useful enough.
Another path that one might take to come up with new ideas is to think hard of a problem X. Then
they could stumble upon some adjacent problem Y and realise that it would be really useful to have a
solution for Y. As a personal anecdote this is perhaps how the “Marbled Circuits” paper was born: one
day I was thinking how to write AES in SPDZ over modulo p circuits and then I realised that writing
AES is much easier over F2k rather than Fp. Then I have started to ask around about share conversions
in SPDZ and turns out no one had any clue how to solve this issue. One year later I have asked Marcel
again about this and he pointed me to one of his papers where they needed to convert between SPDZ
over F2k and BMR garbled circuits. That was a good enough start for me to take Tim on board and start
thinking more deeply about this problem. In retrospective “Marbled Circuits” would have not been
possible without Tim and I owe him a great deal for accepting to collaborate with me.
My point here is that perhaps there is no perfect recipe on how to solve research problems but some
of these ideas worked out well for me: find people who are more clever than you and work together.
Now we have arrived to a list of problems which I consider to be somehow cool if someone would
solve them:
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Applications of Lookup Tables in Fp. In Section 5.8 we presented an improved protocol for eval-
uating look-up tables over arithmetic circuits when the inputs are from a prime finite field Fp. One
immediate question is how to generate efficiently the preprocessing material required for the online
phase of such protocol as well as finding good applications where this could be useful: computing high
degree functions for floating and fixed point arithmetic other privacy preserving scientific operations
such as logistic regression.
Performance metrics platform for MPC systems. Probably the work I have done that had the most
impact during my PhD was creating the Awesome-MPC list [Rot19] where people can find a list with
introductory papers to MPC and categorizes briefly existent MPC software based on their description.
As simple as this list might be, it sparked some interested into creating an SoK paper by Hastings et
al. [HHNZ19] which looked at various frameworks and tested whether their description matched the
implementation and classified the software in terms of usability. The next obvious step to do is to take
all these frameworks and benchmark their performance on the same type of machines and figure out
some approximate “universal” cost metric such as communication data, network type, circuit depth for
running some simple programs to then run them on all frameworks. This seems to be a huge engineering
effort as the researchers have to integrate different experimental code but the end result we envision
might matter: being able to choose a framework based on the (proven in real-time) performance for
specific tasks.
Improving compilers for MPC. Due to the rise of mixed protocols or the ability to switch between
garbled circuits and secret sharing based frameworks for the two-party semi-honest case [DSZ15], re-
cently for three-parties honest majority [MR18] and as presented in this thesis multiparty with dishonest
majority [RW19a] there is a high need for designing compilers which have in mind the costs of switch-
ing between different frameworks. There is some work done in this direction called HyCC [BDK+18]
and by Ishaq et al. [IMZ19] but the former works only for semi-honest two-party computations used
by ABY while the latter is not integrated yet into any MPC framework. Although we split the circuit
manually for the SVM in Section 8.5.8 it would be very interesting to decide automatically which parts
of the circuit to be evaluated in GC and which using linear secret sharing.
Random bit generation in Fp. This is by far one of the most interesting theoretical problem we
consider. In [AOR+19, RST+19] we reduce the problem of generating a daBit to roughly generate a
random shared bit b $← {0, 1} ∈ Fp. As opposed to GC frameworks where generating random shared
bits b $← {0, 1} ∈ F2 is cheap, in the secret shared domain to generate one bit of randomness shared in
a large field Fp has approximately the cost of a full random triple. Perhaps newly introduced techniques
by Boyle at al. [BCG+19a, BCG+19b] might be helpful to realize random shared bits “silently”.
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